The national security of the modern Russian state is now based on a more complex than before complex of multifaceted political, diplomatic, economic, technological, ideological, military and other measures. In different periods Russian history military means were either brought to the fore, or relegated to second place, or acted as the last, decisive means of protecting the statehood of Russia.
The national security of the modern Russian state is now based on a more complex than before complex of multifaceted political, diplomatic, economic, technological, ideological, military and other measures. Of decisive importance among them were and are means of a predominantly political nature, aimed at creating a favorable external and internal situation for the country, eliminating existing and potential military threats, their localization, strengthening the international position of the state, ensuring stable geopolitical positions, reliable protection its interests from encroachments from outside and the resolution of emerging contradictions by peaceful means. However, these measures can be effective only if they are organically combined with military defensive actions, active deterrence of a potential aggressor, blocking his attempts to exert political and economic pressure, and even more so by force of arms to achieve political goals.
In different periods of Russian history, military means either came to the fore, or were relegated to second place, or acted as the last, decisive means of protecting the statehood of Russia. Sometimes they actively served the implementation of imperial Russian policy, but most often they ensured the protection of the state from aggression, its defense, freedom and independence from outside encroachments. In any case, the more irreconcilable and active Russia's foreign expansionist policy became, the greater the role played by military force. On the contrary, the more Russia was interested in maintaining international stability, the less important was the direct use of the armed forces in its foreign policy activities.
One way or another, the whole history of Russia, as, indeed, of most other states, is organically linked with its repeated participation in defensive or offensive wars, armed clashes and conflicts. Periods of peaceful development both in the distant past and in our time have been interrupted more than once by years of war hard times. Since ancient times, Russia had to repel numerous enemy invasions, when its fate hung in the balance. At the same time, she repeatedly acted as a defender of other friendly peoples and countries, helping them to defend their freedom and independence. At the same time, she Russian empire in many cases, she undertook major conquest campaigns, strengthening her position in the world and expanding state borders. The growth of the Russian state was carried out not only as a result of the voluntary accession to it of neighboring countries, seeking protection from enemies in it, but also by conquering other nationalities and states by force of arms.
In any case, the military aspects of ensuring Russia's national security were based on the solution, in one combination or another, of a complex set of military-political, strategic, economic, diplomatic, scientific and technical tasks. Of particular importance here was the development of a rational military policy that strictly corresponded to the specific situation and the political goals arising from it that faced the army and the country, and its real economic and military capabilities. According to this policy, a military organization states, military doctrine was formed, a national military strategy was determined and carried out.
Of course, in past eras and in our time, all these structural elements of the military security mechanism had different meanings, as a rule, they differed in their content and nature. However, some general principles did not cease to operate, due to historical traditions, national traits of the people, as well as the peculiarities of the geographical and geopolitical position of the Russian state, which, having a certain stability, one way or another manifested themselves at all stages of its development. To a large extent, they retain their power even now.
If we talk specifically about Russia's military strategy, then such special enduring features could include: national identity, reliance mainly on its own national forces; continentality; peripheral orientation; sequential neutralization of threats from the west, east and south; proportional development of forces with a priority rate on ground forces; resoluteness of actions, flexible combination of offensive and defense, positional and maneuver forms of struggle.
This work is dedicated to the disclosure of these common features and the characteristic specifics of the Russian military strategy, the complex chain of its evolutionary development and sharp revolutionary leaps, especially in recent decades. Its main goal is to reveal the historical roots and origins of the national military strategy, the stages of its formation and improvement; explore the features of Russia's military strategy in the pre-revolutionary era and in the Soviet period; to establish the pattern of its formation at the present stage, in the conditions of the reorganization of the "Russian state. At the same time, the main attention was supposed to be paid primarily to the theory and practice of military strategy in recent years, to an analysis of the changed conditions and new approaches to the development of Russia's military strategy for the near future.
Naturally, Russia's military strategy cannot be considered in isolation from the general process of the development of military art in the world. Its basic principles, categories, provisions, attitudes and requirements are closely related to the achievements of the military strategy of other states. The Russian military strategy, taking into account everything useful, used them to achieve its goals, or developed a line of counteraction to the strategic efforts of enemies, opposing their strategic efforts and actions with its own strategic plans and methods of action. In this dialectical interweaving, Russia's military strategy, constantly enriching itself, at the same time had an inverse effect on the strategies of other countries. Therefore, it is impossible to understand its essence and content without parallel consideration common ground military strategy. As you know, military strategy, being an integral part of military art, its highest area, embraces the theory and practice of preparing the wound and the armed forces for war, planning and conducting war and large-scale strategic operations.
The theory of military strategy as a system of scientific knowledge studies the regularities, nature of war and methods of its conduct, develops the theoretical foundations for the use of the military forces of the state to achieve political goals, planning, preparing, waging war and strategic actions of all kinds. As an area of practical activity, military strategy is engaged in solving issues related to the definition in specific conditions of the strategic tasks of the armed forces and the forces and means necessary for their implementation, the development and implementation of measures to prepare the armed forces, theaters of military operations, the economy and the population of the country for war; planning of war and strategic operations; the organization of the deployment of the armed forces and their leadership in the conduct of operations on a strategic scale, as well as the study of the corresponding capabilities of a potential adversary.
Strategy as a field of practical art, military leadership activity of military leaders (highest level) has been known since ancient times. The theory of strategy, as an integral part of military science, was formed much later as a result of the generalization of the accumulated military-historical experience, the systematization and development of knowledge about the war. Her role is growing rapidly. Now it is acquiring decisive importance not only in terms of a correct understanding of the increasingly complex military phenomena, but also in the implementation of the ever-expanding possibilities of military art in the light of the extremely high demands placed on it.
There are two levels of military strategy: the strategy of waging war as a whole and the strategy of waging large-scale operations. They are united by common principles, but differ in scope, the nature of the issues under consideration, the content of the tasks and approaches to their consideration.
The strategy of warfare is connected with the development of its general problems, the immediate, subsequent and further political and strategic goals, the sequence and order of their achievement, the forms and methods of preparing and conducting armed struggle, the definition and implementation of political, diplomatic, economic and proper strategic plans for war, individual military campaigns, the creation of the necessary material base for this and its use, the organization of the deployment of forces, the conduct of economic and military mobilization. At this level, the general character of actions in war, political and military maneuvering of forces, and ways of successfully ending the war are worked out. This area is of decisive importance for evaluating long-term forecasts and determining the prospects for war.
The strategy of conducting operations deals with the components of war, determines the systems of operations of the state's armed forces in the conduct of various wars, the goals, forms and methods of strategic actions. At this level, the development of plans of operations and strategic actions, the procedure for coordinating the efforts of various branches of the armed forces, the procedure for preparing theaters of military operations and the organization of command and control of the armed forces are established.
Of course, one cannot ignore the conventions of such a division, but the more complex the war becomes, the more acute the need for such a conditional division becomes.
Both in the past and even more so at the present time, military strategy occupies a leading, dominant place in the art of war. It dictates the starting requirements for operational art and tactics, sets tasks for them, defines common goals, the achievement of which they must be subordinated to. Battles and operations that do not correspond to the conditions of the strategy, in the final analysis, may not only be useless, but also cause defeat. At the same time, as before, tactics and operational art provide the source material for strategy, and it is through them that strategy basically realizes its potentialities. Of course, the traditional history of Russian military strategy, the interdependence between strategy, operational art and tactics, in which tactical successes are summed up into operational success, and the sum of operational successes gives the final strategic result, becomes not so simple. Military strategy is now at its disposal powerful tools enabling it to directly achieve its goals. In turn, the results of operational actions can sometimes be very significant, and reach a strategic level.
An analysis of world and local wars, as well as military conflicts, shows that one of the most effective forms of armed struggle was partisan actions. They were distinguished by high efficiency, especially when the goals, tasks and interests of the state progressive forces that used partisan forms of struggle and the regular army completely coincided with the interests and tasks of the majority of the country's population, as was the case, for example, in the Patriotic Wars of 1812 and 1941 - 1945 gg.
The relationship between military strategy and politics, diplomacy, economics, and ideology is becoming much more complex. Military strategy, as at all times, is entirely subordinate to politics, determined by it and serving it. In any case, politics today, to an even greater extent than ever before, has a decisive influence on military strategy, determines its goals, tasks, nature and general direction. It prepares the war, forms the material base and creates a favorable environment for its conduct, mobilizes all the forces and resources of the state for the conduct of the war. Proceeding from the requirements of politics, the methods of strategic actions of the armed forces, the main and secondary theaters of war, the main objects of application of military efforts, allies and opponents are chosen. As modern and recent history testifies, a short-sighted policy pushes strategy to adventure. military strategy, on the other hand, has a powerful reciprocal effect on politics.At any rate, during war, and sometimes even before war, politics often has to reckon with considerations of military strategy, to limit or reconsider its goals and methods of achieving them.More In addition, there are cases when the military factor becomes decisive for some time.
Unfortunately, the prevailing opinion that politicians should deal with politics and the military should deal with defense issues is extremely erroneous. Politics in its pure form does not exist. It is viable and effective only when it takes into account economic, socio-political, ideological and defense aspects in the aggregate. If one of these components is underestimated, the policy becomes flawed. Therefore, politicians and the military need to work hand in hand. Figuratively speaking, the prelude to the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people and its dynamics should become a textbook not only for politicians, but also for those government officials on whom the country's military security depends. On June 22, 1941, the army, as a result of the inconsistency of their actions, was placed in an unnatural position: in the conditions of the aggression that had begun, it was forbidden to cross the border when launching counterattacks. Many commanders cautiously gave the order to open fire on the enemy. As a rule, the efforts of military strategy and diplomacy are coordinated with politics. At the same time, on the eve and during the war, diplomacy is usually subordinated to the interests of military strategy, is actively used to push the process of political isolation of hostile states, to attract as many allies as possible to its side, to achieve a favorable orientation of neutral countries, to strengthen the political positions of one’s own state and friendly alliances, disrupt the enemy coalition. On the whole, it is called upon to help create a situation that would make it possible to avoid military clashes at an undesirable moment and the formation of an unfavorable international situation. In some cases, it can also act as one of the means of strategic disinformation in the interests of solving certain military tasks.
But the main thing is that over time, the direct and indirect dependence of military strategy on the economy is constantly increasing. Economic conditions have a multifaceted and versatile influence on strategy. They are usually the root cause of the outbreak of wars, determine its nature and strength, means and methods of waging. Ultimately, the course and outcome of a war, the shape of the armed forces, and their potential depend on the economic factor and the material resources of the state. This determines the direction of military strategy and its planning.
At the same time, the military strategy has a reverse effect on the economy, the country's leadership, when making all economic decisions, one way or another has to reckon with the requirements of a possible war. Based on strategic considerations, the location of industry is determined, production and science are developing in a targeted manner, new technologies are being developed and introduced, and stocks of material resources are being created. With the outbreak of war, the economy is completely reorganized on a war footing: industry is mobilized, Agriculture, transport and communications, the structure of production is changing, labor and material resources are being redistributed, the country's financial system is being rebuilt. All this is becoming a primary condition for the successful implementation of the principles of strategy, not only in large-scale, but also in local wars.
A close organic relationship exists between military strategy and ideology. It manifests itself in various aspects: in the order of the influence of ideology on the nature of the strategy, the use by the strategy of the means and methods of ideological struggle to strengthen its armed forces and the forces of the people, the psychological weakening of the enemy, the consideration of the moral factor in strategic decisions and actions. Here, too, there are both direct and feedback, since an effective strategy actively promotes the growth of the moral and spiritual forces of the army and the people, the strengthening of certain ideological principles. Finally, the interrelation of military strategy with the military doctrine of the state must also be taken into account. A rational strategy usually proceeds from the requirements of military doctrine and is guided by them in solving practical problems. At the same time, to one degree or another, it is based on the data of military science, as well as on the conclusions and solutions of military problems of other social, natural and technical sciences.
Military strategy began to take shape with the advent of the army and the emergence of wars. Its formation is associated with the formation of slave-owning states. In the wars of this period, especially Ancient Egypt, the Greco-Persian wars (V-IV centuries BC), the Punic wars (III-II centuries BC), the Gallic campaigns of Julius Caesar and many others, originated and began to have a significant impact on the course and outcome of hostilities such principles, methods and forms strategic application armed forces, as surprise, concentration of efforts on decisive directions against the main enemy, maneuvering, siege of fortresses, naval blockades, etc.
The development of military strategy as an art was greatly influenced by the practical military activities of the great generals of antiquity: Epaminondas, who first applied the principle of uneven distribution of troops along the front in order to concentrate forces for the main attack on a decisive sector, Alexander the Great, who organized and conducted military operations on the basis of a far-sighted, a deeply thought-out war plan, careful coordination of the efforts of the army and navy, sought to completely crush the enemy, consolidate the occupied territories in political and military relations, turned the cavalry into the main striking and maneuvering force of the troops. The strategic creativity of the Carthaginian commander Hannibal, who attached decisive importance to the correct assessment of the military-political situation, the organization of reconnaissance and the clear interaction of infantry with cavalry, was distinguished by special features. A significant contribution to the strategy of that time was made by Julius Caesar, who, like Alexander the Great, showed particular concern for the development of war plans, the coordinated use of various means and forms of struggle, dismemberment of the enemy and defeating him in parts.
The first attempts to bring the accumulated knowledge in the field of strategy into a system were made by the generals and historians of Ancient China - Confucius, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu. They summarized and formulated some general rules waging war, which have not lost their significance even now. Later, the so-called "Behistun inscription" appears, containing generalized information about the campaigns of the Persian king Darius in Central Asia. The "History" of Herodotus was devoted to a versatile study of the Greco-Persian wars, and wars Ancient Greece- "History" of Thucydides. Important positions on military strategy were revealed in the works of the prominent ancient Greek thinker Xenophon (“Anabasis”, “On the art of equestrianism”), in the works of Julius Caesar (“Notes on the Gallic War”, “Notes on the Civil War”). At the beginning of a new era, the first generalized military-theoretical works appeared. Significant of them are: Onisander’s “Instruction to military leaders” (at the end of the 4th - beginning of the 5th centuries AD), “On military affairs” by Vegetius (390-410), etc. These works dealt mainly with issues of tactics and training of troops, but contained some fundamental guidelines for the conduct of the war as a whole.
With all its diversity, the military strategy of the states of the slave-owning era was subordinate to their political goals, was based on the slave-owning economy with the ensuing low level of development. military equipment. The most important turning point at that time was the improvement of edged weapons, the creation of heavy defensive weapons and siege weapons.
Already at an early stage, the basic elements of strategic planning and leadership of the armed struggle took shape. Specific approaches to the choice of the moment of the beginning of the war, the objects of the main attack, the place and time of battles were determined. Subsequently, as the scale of the armed struggle increased, the duration of military campaigns increased (from several weeks to several years and even decades), and the groupings of the fighting sides became more powerful. Accordingly, the military strategy became more complicated. The principles of waging war against several opponents at the same time, in different theaters of military operations, were developed, and the procedure for creating strong bases for the deployment of military operations was determined.
The transition to a new socio-economic formation - feudalism - also meant a transition to a new stage in the development of strategy. In the period of early feudalism (5th-11th centuries), due to the state fragmentation of Western Europe, the strategy of conducting numerous wars between small feudal states with limited goals, the use of knightly, mercenary and militia armies, acquired the greatest importance. At the same time, the strategy of wars was being improved in the East, with the use of significant military masses for broad conquests. Achieving the set goals by delivering sudden swift strikes, combining defense and offensive, and storming fortresses acquired great importance at this time. Significant changes in military strategy took place in the 16th-17th centuries. in connection with the formation of centralized states. A particularly steep revolutionary leap in strategy occurred in connection with the creation and widespread use of firearms, which not only decisively influenced the conduct of the war, but also the entire system of military-political relations between states. In the military strategy of most Western European countries highest achievement strategies at this time considered the capture of enemy territory without decisive battles, the ability to force his army to retreat. In order to counter the maneuver of enemy troops and defend their territory, powerful fortresses were erected. The troops were evenly distributed (along the fortresses and strongholds), covering as far as possible all directions. This strategy is called the cordon strategy. The English military theorist G. Lloyd (1720-1780), who was called the "father of the science of strategy", believed that its main content should be access to enemy communications, and the immediate task was to threaten him material base(shops). A follower of Lloyd, the Prussian military theorist A. Bulow (1757-1807) reduced the whole strategy to the science of troop movements and maneuver, and considered achieving victory by "starving out" the enemy as the main method of strategic actions. However, in many other states, especially in the east and south of the Euro-Asian continent, including Russia, these principles have not found recognition and practical application. As before, their strategic aims were based on resolute and bold actions, activity, skillful concentration of the main efforts on decisive directions, and a stubborn struggle for the strategic initiative.
In the XVIII - early XIX centuries. With the establishment of capitalist relations, the creation of mass armies, the growth of productive forces, the development of science and technology, the improvement of firearms, the strategy of "crushing" the enemy replaced the cordon strategy. It was characterized by a consistent weakening of the enemy with his decisive defeat in a pitched battle.
Generalization of the experience of wars in the late 18th - early 19th centuries. contributed to the further formalization of military strategy into a system of knowledge. Numerous military-theoretical works appeared, including the works of prominent military theorists of the West - A. Jomini, K. Clausewitz, in Russia - N. V. Medem and P. A. Yakovlev. Clausewitz in his work "On War" brought out the position on the connection between war and politics. Using the dialectical method of F. Hegel, he developed a position on the relationship between defense and offensive and formulated some strategic principles for waging war. Having based his research on the experience of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz saw the tasks of strategy in organizing a general battle, for which he recommended concentrating all forces and means.
The theory of military strategy received significant development in the second half of the 19th century. Construction railways, the invention of fundamentally new means - telephone and telegraph, the replacement of the sailing fleet with steam, the introduction of rapid-fire rifled weapons expanded the possibilities of strategy, increased the scope of operations. All this was reflected in military practice and received appropriate coverage in a number of scientific works. X. Moltke the Elder, in particular, continuing to adhere to the strategy of a general battle, attached paramount importance to the widespread use of railways to concentrate large masses of troops. The Russian theorist G. A. Leer in his writings continued the study of the special nature of the relationship between military strategy and politics. He has the prerogative in defining a strategic operation as part of a campaign or war.
With the entry of capitalism into the stage of imperialism, new changes took place in the nature and content of war and military strategy. significant changes. The decisive influence on this was the policy of the largest world powers, aimed at redistributing the already divided world, and participation in wars of the broad masses of the people.
Creation of large factories and industrial complexes, new industries (engine building, automotive, chemical, etc.), the growth of mechanical transport, the mechanization of the main production processes made it possible to equip the armed forces in large quantities with a variety of military equipment, including automatic weapons, and increased the role of the economic factor in the war. All this led to an increase in the scope and intensity of strategic actions, their further division in space and time, and complicated the command and control of troops and the provision of their actions.
New features of the military strategy of the era of imperialism appeared for the first time in the Spanish-American (1898) and Anglo-Boer (1899-1902) wars. Elements of the army, and in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and front-line operations, began to emerge in them. Comprehension and generalization of new phenomena in the development of military affairs of this period are reflected in the works of A. Schlieffen (Germany), F. Foch (France), F. Colomb (England), A. Makhzna (USA), Russian military theorist N.P. Mikhnevich.
most brightly character traits the military strategies of the leading states manifested themselves in the first and second world wars. Strategic concepts based on the possibility of achieving victory in a short maneuver war turned out to be untenable. By the end of the first year of the First World War, the coalitions of both sides were forced to switch to conducting strategic defense on continuous positional fronts of great length. This was primarily due to the incomplete consideration by the belligerent states of the new economic opportunities of the coalition and the sharply increased combat power of the armed forces in connection with equipping them with new means of combat, including tanks and aircraft.
All the belligerents were characterized by a centralized unification of the military and political leadership, the presence of higher political and strategic bodies for commanding the armed struggle. Problems of coalition strategy have taken on an important role: the development of unified plans of action, the creation of a unified command, and the organization of strategic interaction.
During this period there was new form waging war - a long struggle on continuous positional fronts with the need to conduct a number of large-scale operations carried out simultaneously or sequentially on various fronts and theaters of military operations. The strategic defense of the rear received considerable development. Basically, the problem of a tactical breakthrough was solved. But the most important issues of preparing and conducting offensive operations at great depth failed to be implemented.
The military strategy of pre-revolutionary Russia developed along the same main lines, and yet in a new, special way. At least two fundamental circumstances distinguish its historical path. First, Russia avoided the slave-owning phase of the development of society, and, consequently, the corresponding system of military-strategic views. Second, Russia has gone through a series of periods of centralization and disintegration, decline and revival, national isolation and active external pressure, local and imperial politics. This predetermined the repeated change of its military strategy, its especially complex and multifaceted nature.
In World War II, the decisive influence on military strategy was the further development of productive forces, the deployment on this basis by the leading states of the world of multimillion-strong armies, the emergence of new types of troops using large masses of tanks, aviation, artillery, airborne assault forces, air defense systems, aircraft carriers in military operations. and other forces. Of decisive importance, however, was the sharply changed alignment of military and political forces: the participation in the war of the Soviet Union with an authoritarian regime of a socialist orientation and Germany with a totalitarian fascist regime of an openly racist, aggressive nature. The clash of these forces gave the war, and at the same time the strategy of all the warring countries and coalitions, an unprecedented decisive and uncompromising character. At the same time, each of the warring countries adhered to its own strategy. The strategy of fascist Germany and Japan was based on the adventurist theory of blitzkrieg, which provided for a surprise attack without declaring war and defeating the enemy in one short-term campaign. This strategy, however, very soon suffered a complete collapse, in connection with which both Germany and Japan during the war were forced to abandon their initial strategic orientations, switch to a strategy of phased actions, and then drag out the war, which, however, with the same eventually failed miserably.
During the war, the strategy of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain also changed dramatically, but it evolved in a diametrically opposite direction. The strategy of all countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, especially the strategy of the USSR, acquired an ever more decisive, active, offensive character, which was one of the most important reasons for their world-historic victory in World War II.
With the end of this war, the military strategy of all the victorious states developed for some time taking into account the experience gained, the alignment of military-political forces in the world and the further development of traditional means of armed struggle with full mechanization and motorization of armies. In the following years, however, the strategy experienced at least five major revolutionary shifts. In the late 40s and early 50s, they were associated with the creation of nuclear weapons, in the 60s - with the mass equipping of the armed forces with missiles of various types and purposes, in the 70s - with the establishment of the so-called strategic balance between the USSR, USA, ATS and NATO, in the 80s - with the advent of high-precision conventional weapons, and finally, in the early 90s - in connection with a sharp turn in the military-political situation, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the collapse of the USSR, the dismemberment of the unified Soviet armed forces, reorientation of the policy of the Eastern European countries and the formation of a number of new independent states, including Russian Federation as successors to the USSR. At the same time, all military-strategic views, fundamental doctrinal principles, views on the means, forms and methods of warfare were subjected to a complete breakdown each time.
The last period continues to this day. It is associated with a radical revision of the policy of most states, their military doctrines, all strategic concepts, but not for military-technical, but for geopolitical reasons.
At the latest stage of its history, Russia has seventy years of experience of Soviet power within the USSR, in military matters it relies on the Soviet military doctrine and its corresponding military strategy, on the basis of which the USSR waged the civil and Great Patriotic Wars, participated in many local wars and conflicts.
The period of Soviet power is often seen as a break in the history of Russian military strategy. Actually it is not. In fact, it was a special stage of its development. In fact, the Soviet military strategy was a continuation of the Russian military strategy, only it was based on a fundamentally different ideological and political basis, a different economic and state system without losing their most important national features.
The Soviet period in the development of Russian military strategy left a deep imprint on it, its essence, content and forms have changed significantly. This was reflected in all areas of defense construction, the development of military thought, and the training of personnel. At least three generations of military leaders have grown up, brought up on her ideas. A whole scientific system has taken shape, which determined the direction of strategic thinking and the nature of the practical activities of all command and control bodies of the armed forces. As a result, a number of new stable traditions were formed, which in many respects retain their strength even now.
Of great importance was the fact that the Soviet military strategy was born in the course of breaking up the old military machine in the fire of revolution and civil war. Throughout its further history, it was completely subordinated to the military policy of the Soviet state and the Communist Party. Its main provisions are: a strictly class approach to all questions of military affairs; unity of political and military leadership, a Marxist-Leninist approach to the analysis of the factors determining the course and outcome of a war, and taking them into account in strategic planning and directing military operations; the use of contradictions in the camp of the enemy, the utmost decisiveness and uncompromising action; optimal determination of the direction of the main strike and concentration of the main efforts to solve the most important tasks; flexible maneuvering of reserves; rational use of forces and means; the consistent build-up of efforts in selected areas up to the complete defeat of the enemy, the skillful creation and effective use of large reserves have stood the test of time.
A distinctive feature of the Soviet military strategy has always been a rational combination of diverse types, forms and methods of military operations. At the same time, the decisive role was always assigned to the offensive, although it was not absolutized. In all wars, along with the strategic offensive, strategic defense, counter-offensive and withdrawal were also widely used. Partisan actions acquired a large scope.
The pinnacle of the development of Soviet military strategy was the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In the course of it, fundamentally new forms of strategic actions were found and successfully applied - operations of groups of fronts. They were carried out in the most important strategic areas, characterized by decisiveness of goals, large spatial scope, dynamism and effectiveness in solving strategic problems. During these years, it was possible to successfully solve such problems as a rapid breakthrough of the tactical, operational and strategic defense of the enemy, the encirclement and destruction of its large groupings, the conduct of joint operations by formations and formations of the Ground Forces, long-range aviation, the Navy and the Air Defense Forces of the country. Military strategy has been enriched by the experience of strategic leadership of massive armed forces, including coalition forces, on fronts of great length.
In the postwar years, Soviet military strategy continued to develop rapidly. At the same time, all the strategic concepts being developed were aimed at confronting the United States and NATO, and in the 70s, China. In a short time, a theory of the strategy of a nuclear missile war was created. In the future, it was constantly refined and improved, taking into account the profound changes that took place in the military-political situation, the state of the armed forces, the technical means of warfare, and the views of potential adversaries. Over time, the multi-variant strategic concepts of unlimited, including preemptive, use of nuclear weapons were replaced by the strategy of its phased introduction into operation. This was followed by a strategy of repelling aggression, first by conventional means, followed by a transition at a dangerous stage in the development of the conflict to nuclear war. Finally, the concept of equal readiness for both nuclear and conventional war was developed, which was replaced by a strategy of predominant readiness for conventional war in its new forms.
The historiography of the development of Soviet (Russian) military strategy during this period is very extensive: the first theoretical works on Soviet military strategy began to be created immediately after the end of the civil war. Among the pre-war works, the works of M. N. Tukhachevsky “National and Class Strategy”, “Issues of Modern Strategy”, “War as a Problem of Armed Struggle”, the theoretical works of M. V. Frunze “Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army”, “Front and Rear in the War of the Future”, “Main Military Tasks of the Moment”, major research by A. A. Svechin “Strategy”, monograph by B. M. Shaposhnikov “The Brain of the Army”. Of great importance were the works of A. V. Golubev, S. N. Krasilnikov, V. K. Triandafillov, E. A. Shilovsky, G. S. Isserson, A. N. Lapchinsky, which revealed the possible nature of a future war and substantiated a new theory of "deep operations".
During the Great Patriotic War, the greatest contribution to the theory and practice of military strategy was made by outstanding Soviet generals: G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky, I. S. Konev, K. K. Rokossovsky, K. A. Meretskov, L. A. Govorov and many others.
The works of V. D. Sokolovsky, R. Ya. Malinovsky, M. V. Zakharov, S. P. Ivanov, A. A. Grechko and other military leaders and prominent military scientists played an important role in the development of a new military strategy - the strategy of the nuclear age. . Of particular importance were those published at that time fundamental research: "Military Strategy" (1968), "Modern War" (1978), "Local Wars: History and Modernity" (1975), etc.
With the collapse of the USSR, a qualitatively new stage in Russian military strategy began. At the same time, within its framework, many of the installations of the Soviet military strategy, in a refined form, retained their influence and strength. The formation of the military strategy of the Russian Federation continues.
NATO expansion, about which politicians have been talking for so long, on March 12, 1999 became a fact. The ambassadors of three Eastern European countries, once part of the same military alliance with Russia, handed over to the US Secretary of State documents on the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to the North Atlantic Alliance. With the admission of new members to NATO, the combat strength of the European grouping of forces of the bloc increased by almost 13 divisions, approximately 360 thousand military personnel and more than 8 thousand units of military equipment were replenished almost entirely of Soviet production, including 3600 tanks, more than 4000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, almost 400 combat aircraft. In Europe, the balance of power was once again upset. In the new millennium, this creates many problems for our country.
The bloc's eastward move has been a cold shower for many liberal Russian politicians. With this decision, the United States and its allies dispelled their romantic halo of “fighters against totalitarianism” and appeared as tough pragmatists who do not put their previous verbal promises at all and want to take maximum advantage of the temporary weakness of yesterday’s still formidable adversary. Alliance created Unique opportunity include the strategically important region of Eastern Europe as a zone of its stable geopolitical control. The advancement of the bloc to the borders of Russia is an important step towards the establishment of American world hegemony.
The emerging threat, to a certain extent, consolidated the national elite of Russia, which in all other respects was divided by ideological contradictions. The negative attitude towards NATO's advance to the East has become almost the only example of the consent of the country's leading political forces.
The war in the Balkans, cynically and brazenly unleashed by NATO in March of the same year against Yugoslavia, the total destruction of not only the military, but also the economic infrastructure of this country, the bombing of one of the most beautiful capitals in Europe - Belgrade in front of the entire world community, is nothing but the final chord of establishing a new world order on the planet. Politicians - arbiters of destinies ordinary people, there is something to think about.
After the collapse of the USSR and the Soviet Armed Forces in Russia, military reform and the conversion of the military industry were declared for several years. In fact, under the propaganda noise about both, the military sphere was being destroyed: the military industry was put out of action, the foundations were destroyed and the existing mechanisms for mobilizing the country in the event of a military threat were dismantled, the well-functioning system of manning the armed forces became less and less reliable, the training system was liquidated young people to military service, the levels of combat training and military education in the army and navy decreased, the defensive consciousness of the people was deformed and disoriented. The detrimental consequences of such actions were clearly demonstrated by the events in Chechnya. At the same time, the assertions of Russian fans of Western civilization that the West has a peaceful and friendly attitude towards the reformed Russia turned out to be a myth.
It is important to realize that, taking into account the changed role of Russia in the world, its limited economic opportunities, ensuring the country's military security is achievable only if right choice priorities in military construction, in the formation and development of domestic military strategy. It should also be emphasized that if Russia does not retain powerful strategic nuclear forces capable of largely leveling the gap in more expensive conventional weapons from the leading countries of the world, all talk about the military security of the state will be pointless: our country will simply be doomed to division into spheres of influence between the leading countries. world centers.
The military strategy of the Russian Federation is called upon to determine real and effective ways and means of ensuring the military security of Russia as independent state in relation to its modern geopolitical and geostrategic position in the modern world. It should not adapt to the policies of individual parties and movements in power or fighting for it, but to ensure the protection of Russia's true national interests.
When developing it, it is necessary to take into account profound shifts in the world military-political and strategic situation, the internal situation in the country, radical changes in the political and economic situation in Russia, its domestic and foreign policy, tasks, structure and state of the armed forces. Proceeding from this, it is necessary to develop fundamentally new views and military-strategic guidelines. But, of course, with all this it is important to preserve everything positive and progressive that has been accumulated and tested over the long path of developing the theory and practice of pre-revolutionary Russian and post-revolutionary Soviet military strategy.
Danilevich A.A., Pronko V.A.
The subordination of all forces and means to a single command does not depend on the name of the control body in the theater of operations (TVD). For a scientifically based solution of this issue, it is desirable to take into account firstly, positive and negative sides from the experience of the past, and Secondly, - and this is the main thing - to clearly define for the solution of which defense tasks and in what conditions of the conduct of armed struggle new system military administration.
SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Back in the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries. (in the Franco-Prussian, Russian-Turkish, Russian-Japanese wars) several separate armies operated on the battlefields, united by command in the theater of operations. With the increase in the scope of the armed struggle during the First World War, when 8-10 armies acted on the line of the Russian-German confrontation on both sides, it became necessary to create front commands (army groups), which included 3-4 armies each. In the Russian army - the Northern, Western and South-Western fronts, the control of the fronts was carried out by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command through the field headquarters.
In World War II the scope of the armed struggle increased even more and from the Soviet side in the army in different periods it was necessary to create up to 10-15 front commands (as organs of the operational-strategic level), including 5-9 combined arms armies, 40-70 rifle divisions, 1-3 tank armies, 1-2 air armies with a total strength of up to 800 thousand people.
At the same time, it was necessary to manage several fleets, separate formations of the Air Force, Air Defense, large formations of the reserve of the Supreme High Command and other troops. All this complicated and hampered the operational control of the Armed Forces. In addition, before the start of the war, the very organization of the strategic command and control of the Armed Forces had not been sufficiently thought out.
It was proposed that, as in the period of the Civil War, the head of state would head the Defense Council (GKO) of the country, and the main military command would be headed by the people's commissar of defense. But since he, without the knowledge of Stalin, could not make any decisions and this slowed down the management process, the latter stood at the head of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The command and control of the services, branches of the Armed Forces, logistics, technical and other services remained very low and fragmented.
In connection with this, the current situation has demanded an increase in the efficiency and effectiveness of command and control of the Armed Forces in two directions.
Firstly, emphasis was placed on enhancing the role of the General Staff as the main (and not "working") body of strategic control of the Armed Forces, freeing it from some secondary functions of recruiting and providing troops (forces). The official position, status, rights and functional responsibilities commands of the branches of the Armed Forces, branches of service, and above all the Air Force, artillery, armored troops, communications, engineering troops, a centralized rear of the Armed Forces has been created. These measures have fully justified themselves.
Secondly, in order to improve control and coordination of the actions of the fronts, on 07/10/1941 it was decided to create high commands in strategic directions.
In the first, most difficult period of the war, they brought some benefit, but they did not fully justify themselves, and in September 1942 they were abolished. First of all, because they could not be turned into an ordinary governing body with the functions of planning operations and setting tasks for the fronts assigned to them. The appearance of such an intermediate link between the Headquarters and the fronts would sharply (by 2-3 days) reduce the efficiency of command and control.
All strategic operations were planned by the General Staff and operational directives were issued on behalf of the Headquarters. In addition, having no directly subordinated forces and means at their disposal, they could not significantly influence the course of operations.
However, in the course of the war, for the first time, such a new form of strategic action arose as the operation of a group of fronts, where the efforts of several fronts, fleets, air armies and air defense formations were combined to achieve certain strategic goals. To coordinate the efforts of the fronts and other formations in such operations, it was necessary to introduce the institution of representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Most often, G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky, N.N. Voronov, S.K. Timoshenko and others.
It seems that the Armed Forces of Russia (the Union of Great, Lesser and White Russia) should be able to perform the following main military-strategic tasks:
1) inflict at least unacceptable damage on the aggressor in a retaliatory or retaliatory nuclear missile strike;
2) to gain and maintain air supremacy over the entire national territory and adjacent airspace;
3) to gain and maintain dominance in the coastal marine zone of Russia, and subsequently in the strategically important zones of the World Ocean;
4) gain and maintain dominance in the radio-electronic sphere in the war zone;
5) create in short time the necessary grouping of ground forces in any strategic and operational direction (in a separate strategic area) capable of inflicting defeat and defeating the invading grouping of aggressor troops;
6) to disorganize the work of the enemy's rear and disrupt the stable functioning of the main systems for ensuring the life of the population and enemy troops by special actions on its territory.
1. The US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty crossed out all balanced agreements in the field of the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now Russia is free from all previously assumed obligations to develop a strategic nuclear triad - ground, air and sea nuclear forces, as well as to deploy tactical and operational means of delivering nuclear weapons.
The Strategic Missile Forces will remain the main component of the strategic nuclear triad. It seems that it is necessary to preserve the existing and develop new types of so-called "heavy missiles" silo-based. The center of the global military-political confrontation will continue to shift into space, and now it is even difficult to predict all the possible consequences and their impact on the deployment of ballistic missiles on the territory of the country, taking into account new tasks. The dismantling of hundreds of mine installations, which, in fact, are mini-cosmodromes with highly trained personnel and all the necessary infrastructure (on the basis of one such dismantled mine, transferred to special forces in the Yasnaya region in Transbaikalia, I had to serve for some time) will mean, firstly , the thoughtless and barbaric destruction of huge material resources and invested labor, secondly, and most importantly, may subsequently require their restoration in order to solve those tasks in space that are not yet sufficiently identified and understood by heavy universal rockets.
However, the main deterrent force in our nuclear triad (RVSN, sea and air strategic forces) are and must remain strategic nuclear submarines (RPLS) with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). After the criminal liquidation of the railway mobile ICBM complexes, which had a very high degree of invulnerability as a result of constant covert maneuvering, our nuclear submarine missile carriers remained, perhaps, the only component of the triad capable of striking back if the enemy preempts us in the use of nuclear or high-precision weapons against strategic nuclear forces. . With the timely dispersal of the forces of the Northern and Pacific Fleets in numerous bays and gulfs in the coastal zone, our nuclear-powered SSBNs, which, unlike the American ones, have the ability to launch ICBMs even from the surface, will be quite capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the aggressor, both from points of dispersed parking and from military protected areas. If they do not die before that a terrible and mysterious death by someone's evil will. So let's love, pray and hope for the skill of our submariners, the most courageous warriors of all military professions. While they are still alive and protecting us...
Russia's loss of the ability to inflict unacceptable, or rather irreparable, damage to the United States on their territory and population, in a retaliatory or retaliatory strike will essentially mean our unilateral nuclear disarmament in the face of a possible aggressor.
2. The military-strategic task of gaining air supremacy presupposes the creation of such a correlation of forces and means of combat in the air sphere, which would, firstly, exclude (suppress) the infliction of massive air-missile strikes (MARU) on troops and other important objects on the national territory and, secondly, ensured the use of strike aircraft over enemy territory. Only such a situation in the airspace can be called dominance. Dominance in the air over the national territory is only, at best, "half of domination", since the launches of cruise and other air-to-surface missiles will be carried out by the enemy over their territory and under the cover of their air defense.
However, in the current state Russian Air Force, which will become the initial, starting point for the creation of Russian aviation, will have to be guided by the principle formed by the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu: "invincibility lies in yourself, victory is in the enemy." We need to ensure our own invincibility by excluding or significantly limiting the possibility of delivering massive air and missile strikes on our territory, and only then to use the main forces of the defense industry to increase the strike capabilities of the Air Force. Therefore, the priority development of the air defense of the country and troops, especially fighter aviation, radio engineering troops, the restoration of the combat readiness of anti-aircraft missile units does not mean underestimating or belittling the role of front-line, attack or bomber aviation. It's just that the country is now practically defenseless against an aerospace attack.
What can we say about the rest of the Russian lands, if the main object of air defense cover - Moscow and the Central Industrial Region of Russia - were left without protection from air strikes, since the old S-50 system practically collapsed. The terms for bringing the S-300 missile and anti-aircraft regiments of this system to combat readiness to the full use of combat capabilities have increased from several minutes to Soviet time up to several days (!), since now they require measures to staff them up to wartime states. Who and how will have time to resupply them and carry out combat coordination, if the flight time of NATO aviation and strategic cruise missiles is already tens of minutes and will continue to decrease? Even now, 75 missiles out of 100 (in Soviet times from two to six out of 100) can break through to Moscow, other Russian cities, as well as power plants, industrial enterprises and other important objects represent range targets for enemy aviation.
Even during the Second World War, aviation destroyed to the ground in a few days big cities. As the events in Yugoslavia, twice in Iraq and in Afghanistan have shown, the aircraft of the United States and its allies can actually crush the rear of the enemy and deprive the population of electricity, heat, water, disrupt transport and other important life support systems.
Modern aviation can do everything or almost everything. But only on condition that the air defense system allows it to do so. That is why the restoration of the air defense system is task No. 1 in preparation for military operations and the immediate priority in gaining air supremacy. And when tactical nuclear weapons return to the armament of anti-aircraft missile units and fighter aircraft, those who want to fly in the Russian sky and bomb us will immediately decrease.
“Russians cannot and cannot be bombed” - this is what our potential adversaries must learn, and this is the main goal of preparing the Air Force to gain air supremacy over the territory of Russia and the future Union of Great, Little and White Russia.
3. In modern conditions, any meaningful conversation about possible directions and priorities for the development of the Russian fleet is based on the issue of aircraft carriers. Without full-fledged aircraft ships that have a universal range of combat use and ensure the implementation of almost all strategic and operational tasks, both in oceanic and coastal maritime zones, we cannot solve the national task of ensuring security and protecting the Fatherland from threats and attacks from the sea. Their design, construction and introduction into the fleet takes ten to twenty years, so the sequence and content of work on the restoration and development of the fleet should be built within the framework of the aircraft carrier concept of the future Navy. The creation of a shipbuilding complex for aircraft carriers in the Far East will reduce the time required to ensure Russia's maritime security.
A complete program for the development of the fleet should provide for the creation of six to eight aircraft carrier strike formations (AUS): two to three formations in the Atlantic, one in the Mediterranean, one in the Indian Ocean and two or three formations in the Pacific Ocean. How does such a program compare with the views on aircraft carriers of other naval powers? Not to mention the US, which has twelve multipurpose aircraft carriers, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, India, and Brazil have carrier forces. "On the way" China, Japan and a number of other countries. Russia is washed by the seas of three oceans. But our geographical position gives us not only the advantage of direct access to the oceans, as other states of the world also get the opportunity of geostrategic access to our land territory. Therefore, the appearance of full-fledged aircraft carrier ships in the Russian fleet is a long overdue problem. The presence in Russia of six to eight aircraft carriers with a nuclear power plant, with several catapults (possibly in combination with a springboard) for the operational rise into the air of about 50 aircraft (fighters, bombers, radar reconnaissance, control, etc.) and other necessary weapons will allow Russia adequately respond to threats to national security from any maritime or oceanic theater of operations.
How much will such a program cost us? With the cost of one aircraft carrier at 2.5 - 3 billion dollars, the entire program for the construction of aircraft carriers will amount to 15-20 billion dollars. Plus the corresponding coastal infrastructure. Ocean carrier strike formations also require the presence, constant and stable operation of the global space navigation system, support by strategic long-range aviation, highly organized operational, logistic and other types of support anywhere in the World Ocean.
When a near-war liberal shobla hears something about Russian aircraft carriers, she usually starts to poke her eyes and yell about the huge cost of the projects. Reference: in just one month (for example, in July 2006), Russia's foreign exchange reserves increase by an average of $15 billion. Thus, Russia monthly (!) puts into American banks an amount equal to the cost of its entire naval aircraft carrier program. So it's not about money, but about those ruling scoundrels who are now sending money across the ocean, in the waters of which American military superiority is supported by their financial efforts.
Ultimately, the "aircraft carrier case" is a matter of ensuring Russia's maritime security. One may ask why exactly aircraft carriers are needed, aren't there other ships and other means of armed struggle at sea to provide our sailors with decent opportunities to fight enemy ships and submarines? At sea, as well as on land and in the air, the one who is able to open fire first, that is, earlier and at a greater range, almost always wins. Therefore, military operations at sea have always consistently and steadily moved towards an increase in the range of fire combat. Initially, this was achieved through the calibers of naval artillery pieces. Already in the First World War, aircraft carriers appeared. The absence of naval missile weapons during the Second World War made aircraft carriers the main striking force in the war at sea. The emergence of anti-ship missiles, including long-range ones, has increased the fire capabilities of non-aircraft carrier-based naval groupings, but they still cannot be compared with carrier-based aircraft in terms of the radius of combat use. Therefore, even a powerful naval formation or an operational squadron that does not have fighter air cover, knowingly dooms itself to an inevitable defeat from enemy air strikes. Shipborne air defense systems alone are indispensable here: after all, even effective air defense is only defense; non-aircraft carrier grouping has no offensive strike aviation capabilities. Under these conditions, enemy aircraft carrier strike formations, being at a distance inaccessible to rocket and artillery fire, and having absolute air supremacy, will methodically grind non-aircraft carrier Russian naval formations with breaks for breakfast, lunch, lunch and dinner.
In 1982, after the completion of the work and the recommendation of the State Commission under the leadership of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, then General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev, who was killed in 1991, a program was adopted for the construction of Soviet "classic" multi-purpose aircraft carriers with 45-50 aircraft on board of the MiG-29 and Su-27 type. By 1990, the USSR Navy had four heavy aircraft-carrying ships (TAVKR) built in 1970-80. and three more aircraft carriers were in various stages of construction. At the same time, the aircraft carriers "Varyag" and "Ulyanovsk" (with nuclear power plant) were in a fairly high degree of readiness. Now there is almost nothing left of the seven Soviet aircraft carriers. Half were sold for pennies to other countries (“Varangian” - to China), others were cut into scrap metal. Our only half-dead TAVKR, the Admiral Kuznetsov, can be classified as a light aircraft carrier and does not have sufficient combat capabilities to fight the enemy aircraft carrier fleet. The urgent need to adopt and implement a program for the construction of mixed-use and strike aircraft carriers obvious. Full-fledged aircraft carriers due to the corresponding types aircraft sharply increase the capabilities of radar and other types of aerial reconnaissance in the interests of the entire naval formation, of which they are the core.
That's in general view the future of the Navy, the immediate priority task is to gain and maintain dominance in the coastal maritime zone of Russia and prevent (stop) the infliction of massive air and missile strikes from the sea on the national territory.
Why domination of the sea is associated with a 700-1000 km coastal zone? Firstly, this is the most probable line for launching air and sea-based cruise missiles. Secondly, for the same reason that we need aircraft carriers, the existence of this zone is due to the need for air supremacy over our ship formations. So far, such dominance is possible only as a result of the combat use of sea and other coastal-based aviation, the radius, flight time and resource of which are limited. The optimal composition of the combat arms, naval groupings, naval aviation and marines, coastal units in each fleet is different and is determined by the characteristics and specific conditions of a particular theater of operations.
According to the providential wisdom of I.V. Stalin, following the results of World War II, Russia received the Kaliningrad region in the Baltic - our "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Central European theater of operations. The restoration and priority development of naval aviation, the Navy, fighter and attack aircraft of the Air Force stationed on the territory of our semi-enclave are able to “close” the problem of ensuring security and protecting the national territory from the sea in this strategic direction.
The advanced restoration and development of naval aviation is expedient in the Northern and Pacific Fleet, especially in Kamchatka and the Kuriles. In the Black Sea Fleet, along with naval aviation, it is necessary to build up the landing capabilities of the marines, including their airlift from the sea. This will require the construction of large airborne assault ships with air assault (airmobile) and fire capabilities, by jointly basing (deploying) on the ship an airborne assault force of the marines and their means of delivery and fire support - transport and attack helicopters.
It is necessary to improve and develop underwater sabotage forces. Just as on land one of the sides, having a significantly superior enemy in front of it, proceeds to guerrilla-sabotage operations, so on the sea, the combat use of submarine-sabotage forces can significantly hinder the enemy from using his military-technical advantage. Marine special forces are capable of solving a number of other important operational tasks.
Realizing this, the Americans went to re-equip their two strategic nuclear submarines, replacing intercontinental ballistic missiles with cruise missiles and deploying Special Operations Forces personnel on board.
Without rejecting this direction, it should be noted that in the USSR midget submarines (SMPL) of the Piranha and Triton types, the so-called "aircraft carrier killers", specially designed for reconnaissance and sabotage operations, were designed and introduced into the Navy. Possessing an almost silent course and having no magnetic field due to the unique technology, our submarines had on board special mine-torpedo weapons, a group of naval special forces and could operate at a distance of up to a thousand miles. Such a radius of combat use and autonomy of about ten days allowed Soviet submarines to successfully carry out reconnaissance and sabotage missions in the Barents, Greenland and Norwegian Seas in the west, in the Arabian Sea in south, in Bering, Okhotsk and Japan seas and in other areas of the Pacific Ocean in the east. Delivered to the western and eastern coasts of the United States, to the Caribbean Sea, ultra-small Soviet sabotage submarines could at any moment significantly impede navigation and disrupt strategic oil transportation. That is why unique submarines, which no country in the world had equal, were destroyed in the very first stage of the "reform" of the Armed Forces. As far as can be understood from open sources, the Intelligence Directorate of the Navy has also been disbanded with the corresponding command structure for naval special forces. They could not, bastards, detect and neutralize our naval underwater special forces from Washington, so they were able to destroy them from Moscow ...
Let's remember.
4. In addition to the four physical media in which the armed struggle is conducted (land, sea, air and space), since the beginning of the 20th century, a fifth, invisible, radio-electronic one has appeared and is expanding more and more. In military literature, it is not yet customary to bring this natural invisible world into a separate sphere of armed struggle, believing that the physical carriers of electronic warfare (EW) are aircraft, ground stations and ships used in traditional areas of military operations. It seems that the time for such an approach to assessing this area is coming to an end. Trends in the changing role and place of electronic warfare in modern wars and armed conflicts, in operations and other forms of use of troops and forces, indicate a rapid increase in the importance of this component in the content of military operations. What caused it?
Firstly, almost the entire process of receiving and transmitting information on command and control of troops and weapons has moved into the radio-electronic sphere: control has become radio-electronic. Systematic and purposeful disruption of the electronic situation in enemy control networks is capable of disorganizing all control.
In addition, individual subjects and objects of the physical battlefield are transformed into a single information combat space, in which the inseparable integrity of the process of detecting, targeting and hitting a target becomes the most important condition and factor for victory. Taken by themselves tactical specifications(TTX) of one or another type of weapons, military and special equipment (AMSE) - an aircraft, helicopter, ship, rocket, tank, artillery gun, etc. cease to play the role of a self-sufficient indicator of their combat capabilities. Means of reconnaissance, communications, target designation, destruction are also increasingly losing their autonomous self-sufficiency. Taken separately from the combat system, the traditional tactical and technical characteristics of individual types of weapons, military and special equipment increasingly reflect only their personal technical characteristics, and not tactical, that is, combat capabilities. Only in a unified combat system can the technical capabilities inherent in a model of armament, military and special equipment be sufficiently realized in combat. But the richer and more complex the combat system, the more its overall combat effectiveness will be determined by the effectiveness of its control system, which exists in the radio-electronic field. Thus, the electronic suppression of the corresponding means in the control systems of the enemy's troops and weapons is becoming the main content and a new operational and strategic task in modern operations.
Secondly, the increasing importance of electronic warfare is caused by the emergence of new, more powerful types of electromagnetic and other types of electronic weapons. In addition to the air-to-radar missiles already traditionally used since the 1960s, and later other samples of electronic-guided aviation and rocket-artillery weapons, in 1999 the Americans used the so-called V-bombs in Yugoslavia. , striking radio-electronic objects with a super-powerful radio-electronic pulse. The United States and its Jewish ally in the Middle East are hastily completing work on the development and adoption of a ground-based laser complex under the THEL (tactical high-energy laser) program, designed to destroy medium and long-range unguided rockets (NUPC). The significant success of Hezbollah's retaliatory missile strikes on Jewish targets in the north of the Jewish state forced the aggressors to speed up work in this direction. Enormous prospects open up before the use of laser weapons in space.
Strengthening the offensive component of electronic warfare in the form of electronic suppression and destruction by means of electronic warfare of enemy electronic objects implies the need to protect against similar enemy actions and causes an increase in the importance of electronic protection of friendly troops and forces. However, problems associated with countering technical means reconnaissance of the enemy, both in peacetime and in war time should be handled by the same structures. Unlike all other types of support, except for protection against weapons of mass destruction, the Armed Forces do not have officials, whose official functions would be to organize operational camouflage (there is no “chief of camouflage”), therefore, each military structure must resolve issues of countering reconnaissance technical means in its area under the general supervision of the chief of staff or other military command authority.
Thus, electronic warfare is becoming more and more important role in the content of military operations. The role and place of the forces and means of electronic warfare can now be compared with the role and place of tanks on the eve and during the Second World War. The understanding of electronic warfare as only one of the types of combat operational and strategic support seems to be a dangerous anachronism. An underestimation of the importance of electronic warfare in the form of a refusal to include electronic warfare in the main content of military operations as an important component, and not as a type of support, will inevitably lead to the same catastrophic consequences as earlier misunderstanding of the need to build anti-tank defense: the consequences of electronic breakthroughs and electronic destruction will not less, if not more terrible.
And in these conditions, when in the content of Russia's possible military actions against an enemy informationally and technically superior to it, such as the United States and NATO, electronic warfare becomes decisive, perhaps victorious, the Ministry of Defense suddenly decides to disband the Voronezh Military Institute of Electronic Warfare , which trained electronic warfare specialists and was the leading scientific center in this field. They know, they know across the ocean where to hit, and they hit ruthlessly, taking advantage of the venality of the current military elite. They rush to the deadline they know. We need to hurry up...
In general, the growing role and place of electronic warfare in modern wars and armed conflicts makes it possible to insist on the need to transform the current EW Service into the EW Troops, the emergence of the corresponding type of troops (forces) in all branches of the Armed Forces, and to give the future management of the Chief of the EW Troops part of the functions operational management. The system of administrative and operational control of the air defense troops (forces) can serve as an analogue here. In the future, as EW troops (forces) are deployed and strengthened on land, at sea, in the air and in space, and new means of electronic warfare appear, it will be necessary to consider giving the EW troops the status of a separate branch of the Armed Forces.
5. Priorities in the creation and improvement of groupings of the Ground Forces in to a large extent depend on the nature of land (ground) military threats in a particular theater of operations, and therefore will differ.
Enemy ground invasion threat towards the west appears to be negligible. To be more precise, large-scale, strategic actions by the ground groupings of the Russian Armed Forces to repel the invasion are unlikely. They will not be there for two reasons, since the armored and motorized infantry columns of the US and NATO can also enter the territory of Russia in only two ways.
Firstly, "at the invitation of the Russian President and government to provide international assistance in the defense of democracy" or "to protect nuclear facilities that pose a threat to all mankind." In this case, the Russian Army will receive an order from its commander-in-chief to meet the invaders as friends and allies, which the current corrupt generals will certainly do, willingly or unwillingly, it doesn’t matter. And no matter how nasty and other in vain they say about generals, a soldier cannot fight without a general. The army is an extremely rigid hierarchical structure, within which there can be no independent activity by definition. She either fights or runs home. Small centers of resistance of individual units and subunits will be crushed by NATO aircraft. American, British, Polish tanks will enter Moscow, as they entered Baghdad, firing a couple of victorious volleys at the “religious buildings of Russian Nazis” on the Borodino field and the former defense lines of Moscow by Panfilov’s heroes as a warning. In this scenario, the course and outcome of land battles at the first stage will be decided in the Kremlin. Then - the Third Patriotic War, where partisan and sabotage actions will play a decisive role.
Secondly, in the event of unleashing a war against the new, Russian Russia, the Russian Union, which in itself is unlikely given that we have sufficient nuclear forces. The US and NATO will not dare to launch a large-scale land invasion without a preliminary air campaign with massive air and missile strikes. Russian motorized rifle, tank, artillery and other formations and units of the ground forces will be forced to disperse as much as possible, dig into the ground and wait for the end of systematic air raids. The latter will not stop until all concentrations of troops, more or less visible from the air, have been destroyed by aviation. In this option, the outcome of possible land battles and battles proper will be mainly determined by the degree of readiness of the ground groupings of the Russian Army for the timely and early dispersal and conduct of hostilities as part of small autonomous tactical combat groups of battalion, company and platoon personnel in the regimental and divisional zones of territorial defense , in close cooperation with guerrilla-sabotage formations, and under cover and with the support of dispersed army aviation. Therefore, priorities in the creation of groupings and the training of ground formations, formations and units in the west should be based on the goals and objectives of territorial defense. The outcome of a war or armed conflict in general, as noted earlier, will be determined by our ability to gain and maintain air supremacy over national territory and in the nearest foreign airspace. In such conditions of the air situation, the groupings of the ground forces of the Russian Army will have the opportunity to deliver classic counterattacks, to conduct other counteroffensive actions.
Thus, before gaining air supremacy, the paradigm of military operations on land in the Western theater of operations within the national territory should be based on the concept of territorial defense.
In the direction of Central Asia military operations of the Russian Army on land will most likely acquire the character of counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency, and other special operations. We have accumulated vast experience in such operations in Afghanistan, Angola, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and in other zones of armed conflicts of this type. This invaluable experience must be translated into the language of statutory documents and mastered by the formations, formations and units operationally assigned to a given theater of operations. Here it is imperative to point out the important, if not the decisive role of army aviation in the preparation and conduct of counterguerrilla, counterinsurgency, countersabotage, counterterrorist and other special operations. Off-roads, vast steppe and desert regions, mountains and other vast areas of terrain that are inaccessible or difficult to access for ground combat equipment make army aviation literally indispensable. Therefore, in this region, without a powerful army aviation grouping armed with a sufficient number of modern transport, transport-combat and attack helicopters, no operational and combat missions on the ground can be successfully completed. A significant number of tasks in the interests of the ground forces here can be solved by unmanned reconnaissance and combat aircraft and helicopter systems. It is in this theater of war the greatest efficiency can show a special transport and assault aircraft, combining the combat capabilities of cannon-howitzer weapons to destroy ground targets and the possibility of spending many hours in the air transport aircraft(similar to the American AC-130 "Ganship"). In addition, in the neutralization of land military threats in the Central Asian theater of operations within the borders of the national territory, an important role will be played by the recreated formations and units of the Astrakhan, Ural, Orenburg, Siberian and Semirechensk Cossack Troops, operating in close cooperation with the regular army.
On the Far East the threat of an invasion by a large Chinese ground grouping, if it arises, requires not the creation of a similar and numerous ground grouping of the Russian Army, but a timely and skillful transition to the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the earliest stage of eliminating aggression. Aviation, rocket, artillery and other low-yield and ultra-low-yield nuclear munitions must be used immediately against the second echelons and reserves in the tactical and operational depth of the enemy in the adjacent territory, so that these same objects would not have to be destroyed later on their own land. The right and ability to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a threat of a breakthrough of large masses of infantry and tanks deep into Russian territory should be legally transferred to the commander of the military district (operational-strategic command). The commander of the district troops (operational-strategic command) must firmly know and remember that he is personally responsible for protecting the Fatherland in his area, for the life of Russian soldiers and officers, for ensuring the safety of the population of the region, and not for the environment in the adjacent territory. Best of all, the ethical norm in relation to the enemy was expressed by the great Russian naval commander, admiral and saint F.F. Ushakov: "They don't count enemies - they beat them!". No matter how many enemies you need to destroy, it is important that your soldiers and officers remain alive and the task is completed.
Tactics and operational art in the preparation and conduct of combat operations with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, including in mountainous taiga areas, have long been developed. We must return to them, master them, and be ready to use them in case of aggression. In addition, it is necessary to take emergency measures to eliminate the catastrophic situation that has developed in the Far East in the preparation and conduct of amphibious assault and antiamphibious operations.
To eliminate threats from the sea, in border or internal armed conflicts in the Far Eastern theater of operations, along with the Trans-Baikal and Amur Cossack troops, it is necessary to have a strong grouping of air assault forces and assets, including several separate air assault brigades and separate battalions with the required number of army regiments. aviation (transport, transport-combat and assault helicopters), capable of performing the tasks of the operational airmobile reserve of the commander of the district troops (operational-strategic command) and overlapping the operational areas of individual air assault brigades and battalions with all the most important strategic and operational directions or strategic areas ( Chukotka, Kamchatka, Kuriles).
Thus, the priorities in the creation of ground groupings and in the training of troops in various theaters of military operations are made up of a combination of three main components: territorial defense of regular and Cossack formations and units of the Russian Army; counterguerrilla, counterinsurgency and other special actions and classic defensive actions of groupings of troops with the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons with the increasing role of army aviation everywhere.
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Strategy is a way to achieve victory in war through goal setting, general plan and the systematic implementation of measures to counter the enemy, taking into account constantly changing circumstances and situations.
Strategy includes the art of combining the preparation for war and the successive operations of the armed forces (troops (forces)) in order to achieve the goal of war. The strategy addresses issues related to the use of both the armed forces and all the country's resources to defeat the enemy.
In some foreign countries are divided grand strategy(war strategy in general) and small strategy(issues of planning, preparation and conduct of operations of all kinds of various scales). In the Russian tradition, small strategy is called operational art.
Also stands out continental strategy, involving the main efforts mainly on the defeat of the enemy ground forces and ocean strategy, in which the main goals of the war are achieved by defeating the enemy's navy and destroying their bases. An example of the latter is the war in the Pacific theater of World War II.
Of particular importance is block strategy- the creation in peacetime and wartime of a wide network of military-political alliances for gaining dominance in certain areas of the world, unleashing aggression or waging a defensive war against a more powerful enemy. Associated with her coalition strategy- the strategy of conducting a coalition war, involving the coordinated use of the armed forces of several allied states.
Story
Literature
- Howard M. Big strategy. - Moscow: Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1980. - 464 p.
- Leer GA Significance of preparation for war in general and preparatory strategic operations in particular. St. Petersburg: type. V. Bezobrazov and Co., 1875.
- Leer G. A. Notes of strategy. Issue. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1877-1880 (three editions)
- Leer G. A. Experience of the critical-historical study of the laws of the art of warfare. SPb., 1869
- Robert Green. 33 war strategies; per. from English. E. Ya. Migunova. – M.: RIPOL classic, 2007.
- Strachan H. Carl von Clausewitz "On War". Per. from English. O. Zhukova. - M.: AST: AST MOSCOW: Polygraphizdat, 2010. - 330 p.
- Golovine N.N. , Golovine M.N. Air strategy. - London: Gale & Polden Ltd., 1936.
US military strategy publications
- Konyshev VN War as a means of politics: modern American approaches // Social sciences and modernity. 2004. No. 5
- Konyshev VN, Sergunin AA B. Obama's National Security Strategy: Has a Radical Renewal Taken Place? // Observer. 2010, no. 12
- Konyshev VN, Sergunin AA Barack Obama's National Security Strategy: Old Wine in New Bottles? // USA-Canada: economics, politics, culture. 2011, No. 1.
- Konyshev V. N. US military strategy after graduation cold war. - St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2009. ISBN 978-5-02-025555-5
- Konyshev V.N., Sergunin A.A. Barack Obama's New Military Doctrine and Russia's National Interests // National Interests: Priorities and Security. 2012, No. 14 (155). - P.2-9.
Links
- // Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron: In 86 volumes (82 volumes and 4 additional). - St. Petersburg. , 1890-1907.
- G. Leer. "Strategy Notes" on the Runivers website
- A. Svechin. Strategy. - Moscow: Military Bulletin, 1927.
see also
- Military strategic geography
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010 .
See what "Military strategy" is in other dictionaries:
MILITARY STRATEGY- an integral part of military art, its highest area, covering the theory and practice of ensuring the country's military security, including preventing war, preparing the country and the armed forces to repel aggression, planning and conducting ... ... Legal Encyclopedia
06:18 — REGNUM
The central organ of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, publishes today the main provisions of the report of a well-known military practitioner and analyst, President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army M.A. Gareeva"Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions", with which he spoke at the "round table" at the Military Academy of the Strategic Missile Forces named after Peter the Great. Representatives of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the main headquarters of the Armed Forces, the apparatus of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Military-Industrial Commission, the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, military scientists took part in the work of the "round table". cites the text of this publication:
Strategic Deterrence: Problems and Solutions
National security is the concern of the state
At the present stage, strategic deterrence is becoming one of the most important and urgent problems of ensuring the defense and national security of Russia as a whole. The main feature of the emerging military-political situation is that under the influence of the growing complex process of globalization of international political and economic relations, the objectively developing interdependence of various countries, two interpenetrating and opposing processes are becoming more and more aware.
On the one hand, it is quite obvious that the nature and scale of the economic, environmental, energy, socio-political and spiritual problems faced by the human community are such that their solution, including ensuring reliable security, requires the integration of all available in disposal of different countries and peoples of material and intellectual resources, consideration and respect for at least the most vital interests of each other. It is impossible to cancel economic, technological, informational competition, which gives rise to various kinds of contradictions. But the common interests of survival must unite various countries and peoples in something important. This is the objective basis for a multipolar world.
On the other hand, there are strong circles in the world, connected mainly with transnational financial structures, which seek to establish a monopolar world. Irrefutable data and facts cited by experts who conducted an independent investigation into the causes of the terrorist attack in the United States on September 11, 2001, allow us to conclude that this terrorist attack was the result of a clash between two opposing groups within America, one of which proceeds from the fact that the United States should submit to these transnational structures, while the other believes that it is the United States that should assume the role of "world government".
If we proceed from reality and remember how many fatal miscalculations that contradict their long-term national interests the United States has made over the past 10-15 years (Yugoslavia, Iraq, the unrestrained expansion of NATO, pushing the Georgian provocation in South Ossetia), then it is easy to see that the American government is far does not always act of his own free will and increasingly loses independence.
The most competent scientists, politicians and economists are forced to admit that capitalism, with its society of unlimited consumption, is not eternal either. For example, the United States, with 5 percent of the world's population, consumes about 50 percent of the world's raw materials and 25 percent of petroleum products. If all countries reach this level of consumption, then there will be enough raw materials and energy resources for no more than 5-10 years, which is fraught with economic and environmental disasters. are inexorably shrinking water resources, forests, fertile lands, ecologically landscaped areas.
The world is undergoing a structural restructuring of the global economic system, when the predominant role is played not by the real economy based on natural resources, industrial and agricultural production, but by its virtual model, based on credit and financial technologies that make it possible to receive profits from the management process itself, not supported by anything. financial transactions. Transnational companies get the opportunity to put pressure on other countries, to artificially create financial and other crisis conditions in unwanted countries. The anti-Russian orientation of this policy is obvious. As Zbigniew Brzezinski put it frankly, "in the 21st century, America will develop against Russia, at the expense of Russia, and on the ruins of Russia."
In military terms, the United States is placing its main bet on obtaining a predominant superiority in space and strategic nuclear forces, focusing on delivering preventive, preemptive strikes, developing long-range precision weapons, information and other high-tech means of warfare. At the same time, the creation of global anti-missile defense systems is being accelerated. The calculation is being made to deprive the opposing countries of their main missile and nuclear weapons by a preemptive strike, and to destroy the rest for sure with the missile defense system.
This is the main point of installing strategic missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and other countries. Geopolitically, the United States seeks to oust Russia from the entire post-Soviet space, tear the CIS countries away from it, draw them into the endlessly expanding NATO system and block Russia from all sides, deprive China of access to the energy resources of Central Asia.
In the light of the foregoing, Russia will face a stubborn struggle to assert its worthy place in the world. In this area, it is no longer possible to continue to act according to long-established patterns, but radically new approaches are needed.
First of all, a more consistent and systematic approach to ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation is required. Since the threats to Russia are not only military, but also largely non-military in nature and these threats are closely intertwined, it is necessary to ensure the organic unity and coherence of the measures taken by the state to counter these threats, close coordination of the activities of all state and public organizations in ensuring reliable defense security. Because of the lack of such coherence in actions, we lost the Cold War.
The primary task of ensuring national security is to counteract political, economic, ideological, psychological, informational, intelligence and counterintelligence, terrorist and other actions of other states aimed at undermining the national security of Russia, and to make the fullest use of all non-military means to ensure national security.
It should be noted that at present the volume and interpenetration of economic ties between the US and China are such that they restrain the American leadership from any sharp actions against China. In this regard, the economy becomes the main deterrent.
Strategic containment strategy
In the implementation of defense, including military security, a more meaningful and purposeful approach is required. In wartime we have a strictly consistent system of strategic actions: strategic deployment of the armed forces, combat use of the Armed Forces in various forms of strategic actions. All of them are united by a single plan, the sequence of actions of the control bodies and all types of the Armed Forces and combat arms is determined.
The activities of the Armed Forces in peacetime are planned mainly from the point of view of preparing for the performance of combat missions in the course of the strategic actions mentioned above. In the past, it was all about confronting opposing threats in a straightforward manner. Excessive zeal in this area often only intensified and exacerbated these threats. For example, when we responded not asymmetrically, but straightforwardly to each round of the arms race.
In some cases at that time it was justified. For example, I still believe that sending missiles and nuclear weapons to Cuba on our part was not a gamble, as they are now trying to portray. With this risky but bold step, we warned America that she, too, should not bury herself. They forced the Americans to remove the missiles from Turkish territory, wrested from them the obligation not to attack Cuba.
But in our time, when the economic and military power of Russia is incomparable with the capabilities of the USSR and America, and in order to achieve greater rationality of actions, we must respond to emerging threats more flexibly and, if possible, not direct, but asymmetric measures. All these measures must also be united by a single goal and plan of action.
To this end, it is proposed to introduce the concept of "strategic deterrence". In practice, it is already being used, but is not always understood in the same way or is reduced only to strategic nuclear deterrence.
In our understanding, strategic deterrence is a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, informational, economic, military and other measures aimed at deterring, reducing and preventing threats and aggressive actions from any state (coalition of states) through retaliatory measures that reduce the fear of the opposite party or an adequate threat of unacceptable consequences for it as a result of retaliatory actions.
Strategic deterrence is carried out by the efforts and defense power of the entire state.
From the side of the state as a whole ( government agencies) it provides:
Creation of the necessary defense power of the state, based on ever-increasing economic opportunities, high-tech defense industry. Equipping the Armed Forces and other troops modern views weapons and military equipment, the formation of the defense consciousness of society. Nationwide support for the state's defense efforts. Preparing young people for military service;
Active proactive political, diplomatic and informational activities to prevent and resolve conflict situations by peaceful, political means. Organization of effective information confrontation;
From the Ministry of Defense (Armed Forces) and other law enforcement agencies:
Maintenance, reinforcement by military means of political, diplomatic, economic, informational and other actions to ensure defense security by non-military means. If necessary, a demonstration of military presence and military force;
Maintaining the necessary combat readiness, combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops to fulfill assigned and suddenly arising tasks;
Intelligence, counter-intelligence and information activities in order to timely identify threats and possible aggressive terrorist actions against our country;
Implementation of peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorist operations;
Military cooperation with other countries;
Air defense of the country, protection and protection of the state border in the airspace, underwater environment and protection of the state border on land and sea by military means;
Preparation of the country's infrastructure and possible theaters of military operations for the defense of the country. Organization of territorial and civil defense;
Actions to assist the bodies, troops and military formations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations in solving problems of neutralizing internal conflicts, protecting and defending critical facilities and the state border.
All these measures and defense tasks are known, and they are generally carried out in practice. We need to think about what needs to be done to improve the efficiency of solving these problems, taking into account the lessons and conclusions flowing from the experience of the so-called "five-day war" in the Caucasus.
First of all, in our opinion, a balanced foreign policy course should be continued in accordance with the adopted concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Only peaceful development will allow Russia to achieve its main goal of economic, nanotechnological and socio-political modernization of the country.
Internationally, it is expedient to deal with the approaches and norms of the way of life of various peoples. Now in the world press the main emphasis is on the observance of the principle of preserving the territorial integrity of states. Of course, this principle must first of all be respected, it is impossible to grant statehood to every small nation.
But besides the principle of the integrity of states, there is also the right of peoples to self-determination. When this or that nation is not provided with normal conditions for the exercise of its national identity, and even more so when it is subjected to oppression, genocide, in such cases, any nation has the right to claim state self-determination. This is what happened in South Ossetia. The aspect of the division of the united Ossetian people is also important.
From this point of view, the actions of the Russian leadership and military command in response to the Georgian aggression are quite justified, legitimate and necessary. If Russia swallowed this "pill" this time and limited itself to indignations, as it happened more than once in the past, it would lose its face as a great state and few people would reckon with it either in the West or in the CIS. She would have lost a lot in the eyes of Russian society.
According to the captured Georgian plans, a simultaneous attack on Abkhazia was envisaged, as well as the implementation of a number of terrorist and provocative actions in other regions of the Caucasus (for example, in Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia and others) under the false slogans of the deployment of a national liberation movement. All this suggests that serious trials are still waiting for Russia in the Caucasus.
All these issues are directly related not only to foreign or defense policy, but also directly affect domestic policy in Russia. In our multinational, federal state, there should be a long-term national policy, and the affairs of interethnic relations should be dealt with systematically. In this regard, it is impossible not to characterize as provocative all sorts of proposals for the abolition of national autonomies. Russia, as a multinational state, can maintain its stability only if it is built on the basis of the consistent implementation of the principles of federalism...
Purposeful, thorough work with the CIS countries is extremely important for us. For example, a sharp conflict is now brewing between the Central Asian countries over water sources. They are found mainly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. But Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan cannot do without them. Under the conditions of the general national economy in the USSR, this was all regulated. Now this is not always possible, and the United States is beginning to offer its intermediary services, and therefore preemptive actions by the state bodies of the Russian Federation are required.
It is necessary to coordinate the efforts of all state bodies that ensure the national security of the state by political, diplomatic, economic and information means. In our opinion, this matter should primarily be dealt with by the apparatus of the Security Council (with appropriate clarification of its functions and structure). To coordinate efforts in the study and development of these problems, the creation of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on defense issues has long been suggested.
The question of the relationship between politics and military strategy arises again. The primacy of politics over military strategy is obvious to everyone. Any war - an armed conflict - is a continuation of politics. But politics in its pure form does not exist, it is vital only if it takes into account political, economic and, last but not least, military-strategic considerations in an organic unity. Therefore, in the development political decisions specialists of various profiles should participate, and the military, primarily the General Staff, are obliged to submit their proposals.
The task of politics and diplomacy is to create favorable conditions for the use of armed forces. But for more than 150 years, before every war, the army and navy have been placed in an extremely unfavorable position. Suffice it to recall the Crimean, Russian-Japanese, World War I, and finally, 1941. And when, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1979, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov spoke out against the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, referring to the fact that this could cause serious political complications in the world, one of the influential members of the Politburo sharply "sieged" him: "We have someone to do politics. You think about how to solve your military tasks. We know how it all ended. There are lessons to be learned from all of this.
Under all circumstances, our plans for the combat use of the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces, must be developed and practically worked out in such a way that in the event of aggression or a clear attack by the enemy, the command of all levels is clearly defined how it should act, without waiting for special additional orders.
In general, in modern conditions - with high speeds of missiles, aviation, increased troop mobility, especially in the system of strategic nuclear forces, air force, air defense, command and control combat activity will increasingly take on the character of implementing pre-designed options for solving, programming and modeling upcoming military operations. A high level of planning of operations and combat operations will become the main prerequisite for successful command and control. As the experience of the war shows, the better this or that operation is thought out and organized, the less intervention of the higher command in the actions of subordinate commanders during the operation is required. This found its most striking manifestation in the Manchurian strategic offensive operation in 1945.
Of all the tasks on a national scale, the most important is the development of the economy, since without this it is impossible to solve a single task in the field of national security. We perceive with satisfaction the positive shifts in the economic development of the country, the implementation of some national programs and projects. But it is impossible not to see that not all possibilities are used yet. There are no proper investments in long-term programs, for example, in the creation of alternative energy resources, space facilities. The standard of living of the population is low; economic and, especially, food security is not fully ensured. As the "five-day Georgian" war showed, the task of equipping the army and navy with new types of weapons and military equipment is being solved slowly. The field equipment and security of personnel remain unsatisfactory.
The problems of spiritual and information security. This is especially important in light of the fact that against the background of the general distortion of history, the discrediting of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. In this regard, perhaps, we should think about creating a separate department in the structures of the highest executive power, which will be responsible for coordinating information activities on a state scale.
The military power of the state
In ensuring national security, the military power of the state retains its importance. But in the implementation of strategic deterrence to military force should be resorted to only in cases where the possibilities of other means have really been exhausted. For threats must not only be counteracted, but everything possible must be done to prevent them. This imposes new requirements on the entire activity of the Armed Forces, on maintaining their combat readiness. It is also necessary to define more clearly the question of what kind of wars and what defense tasks it is necessary to build and train the Armed Forces and other troops.
V.V. Putin, in his last Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, clearly stated that "the modern Russia there must be Armed Forces capable of simultaneously fighting in global, regional, and, if necessary, in several local conflicts. We must always be ready to repel a potential external threat and acts of international terrorism." It would seem that this is the starting point. But in practice, not only in the press, but also in some statements, they try to reduce all defense tasks to the fight against terrorism or drugs.
It is impossible to simplify the fight against terrorism, reducing it only to the actions of special forces. In real life, we see that the so-called terrorists can take over entire countries, as was the case in Afghanistan, Kosovo. To counter them, the actions of regular troops will be required. This was confirmed in the "five-day war" in the Caucasus. Therefore, in military construction, when determining the possible composition of groupings of troops (forces) in the most important theaters of operations, it is advisable to proceed not only from the situation that has developed today and the forces available, but from what may be required in the future, in the most unfavorable situation. The traditional American formula for assessing the balance of power says: "Judge not by the intentions of the other side, but by its capabilities."
A few words about our nuclear potential. For Russia, with an extremely unfavorable correlation of forces in all strategic directions, it remains the most important, most reliable means of strategic deterrence of external aggression and ensuring its security. But we have recently been more and more insistently told that without progress towards nuclear disarmament the multipolar world will turn into an expanding "nuclear club", and proposals are being made to establish international control over Russia's nuclear potential. All this, of course, must be resolutely rejected. At the same time, persistent negotiations on mutual limitation and control of nuclear arms must be continued.
For the reliable defense of the country in modern conditions, along with strategic nuclear forces, the creation of a unified system of aerospace defense of the country is of paramount importance. At the same time, during the hostilities in the Tskhinvali direction in August this year. weaknesses in the technical equipment and combat use Air Force and Air Defense. Once again, our long-known lag in communications, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and target designation in the use of space facilities has made itself felt. These issues, in our opinion, require special and urgent consideration by the Military Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation.
There are acute problems of qualitative improvement and basing of the Navy, and first of all - Black Sea Fleet.
We have to admit that real defense spending, which was 2.8 percent of GDP, fell to 2.4 percent. More and more funds are formally allocated for armaments, but we receive less and less weapons. It is obvious that there is a need for a cardinal concentration of scientific forces, financial and material and technical means for a breakthrough in the field of the element base, promising technologies in the interests of creating means of communication, detection, guidance, control automation, electronic warfare ...
In the development of weapons, it is desirable to focus on the creation of certain types weapons, but weapons systems. Modern conditions are such that the capabilities of even the most advanced weapons, the most equipped groupings of troops can be most fully realized when they are integrated into a single combat systems. And the main efforts in the armed struggle will be directed not at the physical destruction of each weapon, but at the destruction of their common information space, intelligence sources, navigation channels, guidance, communication and control systems as a whole.
In the military command and control system, in principle, the idea of closer integration of all forces and means (including the rear) in the theater under the leadership of regional commands deserves approval and support. In principle, it does not really matter what they will be called: "commands" or "military districts" endowed with operational-strategic functions. Two points are fundamentally important here.
Firstly, there should not be a new intermediate link between the Supreme High Command - the General Staff and the command on the theater of operations, because this will complicate and reduce the efficiency of command and control. And it is inexpedient under any circumstances to have military districts and regional commands at the same time.
Secondly, in any case, it is obligatory to subordinate to the regional command (district) the forces and means of all types of the Armed Forces and departments involved in solving defense problems. This requires a strong-willed decision of top management and appropriate regulations and positions.
The withdrawal from the Ground Forces of their combined arms formations of army aviation does not justify itself. Front-line aviation must also be preserved, with operational subordination to its commanders of troops in the most important strategic directions. The High Command of the Air Force does not have the ability to constantly monitor the situation in the theater of operations and directly control aviation on the battlefield.
It is necessary to equip and organize the service of aviation gunners in combined-arms formations, to fine-tune the close interaction of aviation with other branches and branches of the armed forces.
In connection with the hostilities in Tskhinvali, much is written and discussed about the effectiveness of our intelligence. We don't know what really happened. Therefore, we will not rush to conclusions. But taking into account what happened in 1941, and in subsequent local wars, I wanted to say only one thing. Intelligence involves not only obtaining data about the situation, but also very complex analytical work, comparing and analyzing conflicting information, the ability to distinguish genuine information from misinformation, and draw objective conclusions and suggestions for making informed decisions. We have always lacked this and, probably, do not have enough today ...
Despite some errors that are inevitable in a combat situation, on the whole, the actions of the command, troops and fleet forces in the North Caucasus were, in my opinion, expedient and skillful. Life has once again shown the naivety of the statements of false innovators in military affairs, that now tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and the Ground Forces in general have become obsolete and that it is possible to decide the fate of a battle and operation with air strikes alone. Of course, air support and air strikes are important, and in some cases decisive, but the role of combined arms formations and formations, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery, does not lose its significance. In South Ossetia, they played a major role in repelling aggression and defeating the enemy. In order for the troops to suffer fewer losses, it is necessary to improve the combat equipment of the Ground Forces, the security of personnel and equipment.
But a number of articles have now appeared in the press stating that our troops fought in the old way and did not use modern ways combat operations characteristic of "democratic countries" and their armies. The aggression of the United States and other NATO countries against Yugoslavia in 1999 is still considered a model, when power plants, hospitals, bridges, and other infrastructure of the country were destroyed by rocket and bomb attacks on cities, which forced the country's leadership to capitulate, and the Ground Forces were practically not involved .
If we follow this example and fight purely "democratically", then the Russian army should have bombed Tbilisi, Batumi, Kutaisi, Poti, the entire infrastructure of the country and forced Georgia to capitulate. But this is not a "democratic", but a barbaric way of waging war, which was widely used by the Nazis and, to some extent, continued by the Americans and the British, bombing the residential areas of Dresden in 1945, dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today Saakashvili did the same in Tskhinval.
Russian troops fought not with the population, but with Georgian troops and special forces trained by the Americans. Therefore, our soldiers had to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces, launch attacks and pursue the enemy, inflict air strikes on enemy military targets, and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet had to cover the sea coast of Abkhazia.
In the Russian army, in addition to equipping them with modern weapons and controls, it is advisable to pay special attention to improving the quality of operational and combat training. In recent years, there have been many international, joint exercises with other countries. Clearly, they are important from a diplomatic point of view, as a demonstration of positive trends in the sphere of interstate relations. But at the same time, it must be recognized that these, like some other exercises, are often ostentatious in nature, where all upcoming actions are known in advance. Such exercises, in my opinion, are of little use from a military point of view. By the way, in terms of the methods of conducting exercises in the American army, where division commanders conduct exercises themselves with their formations, there is nothing to learn from them. If the commander himself develops and conducts the exercise, knows everything for his side and the other side, he cannot get any practice in real command and control of troops. Therefore, Marshal G.K. Zhukov called such exercises pampering.
It is necessary that the experience of local wars and conflicts (including the Afghan and Chechen ones) be more fully reflected in the content and methods of training command and control agencies and troops. It is known, for example, from the experience of these wars, how much attention was paid to the protection and defense of communications. Not only reconnaissance units and patrols were sent out, but also constant combat guards and outposts along the most important routes. But the case of the commander of the 58th Army in South Ossetia suggests that this experience has been forgotten. This also applies to many other issues, including the use of unmanned vehicles and the creation of reconnaissance and strike systems.
How many "PR exhibitions" we had, where a new form of clothing was demonstrated. But we have not seen the necessary on the battlefield, well-protected and comfortable clothing for soldiers and officers. On this issue, it is necessary, apparently, to consult first of all with soldiers and sergeants who have extensive experience.
Based on the results of the August events in the Caucasus, the highest assessment of the morale of the Russian troops, which was given by the President of the Russian Federation D.A. Medvedev. If after all the anti-army campaigns, the discrediting of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War and in general military service If, after all the actions to desecrate our military past and military service, soldiers and officers showed themselves worthy on the battlefield, then this suggests that the margin of safety of the moral foundations in society and the army, accumulated by the traditions of previous generations, is still quite large.
An example of veterans, ongoing military-patriotic work is still yielding results. But we must remember that for this moral force, morale, there is also a kind of "motor hours", they cannot be exploited endlessly without renewing and constantly replenishing the resource of the human factor. Therefore, not only the state, but also society is obliged to constantly take care of the formation of the defense consciousness of citizens, the approval of the ideas of defending the Fatherland, patriotic education young people, to raise the incentives and prestige of military service in every possible way.
After Russia's decisive actions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the entire West came out against us, the CIS countries are still wavering, and against this general background, the old truth has once again been clearly highlighted: under all circumstances, in difficult times, Russia always has only two allies: the army and fleet. Let's bow again and say thank you to those who served and continue to serve in the ranks of the most faithful people of our Motherland.