Vladimir Khomutko

Reading time: 9 minutes

A A

The current situation of oil production in the Caspian

According to geological zoning data, there are three main oil and gas bearing basins at the bottom of the Caspian Sea, namely:

• North Caspian
• Middle Caspian
• South Caspian.

Approximately 10 productive areas are distinguished in these basins.

Russian experts in the field of geology estimate the volume of explored hydrocarbon reserves (oil, natural gas and gas condensate) in this region at 12 billion tons of standard fuel, of which Caspian oil is 7 billion tons.

However, there are other estimates as well. Some experts believe that there are more than 13 billion tons of hydrocarbons in the Caspian Sea, others - more than 22 billion, and the most optimistic generally call the figure of 50 billion tons of hydrocarbon raw materials. American analysts believe that the reserves of the Caspian region are much larger than was thought during the Soviet Union.

In their report to the United States Department of State, these experts note that the potential reserves of the Caspian Sea can reach 27 billion 500 million tons of oil alone, which makes this region a potentially very significant player in the oil hydrocarbon market.

According to the forecasts of American specialists, one fifth of all hydrocarbon reserves in the world is concentrated in the Caspian Sea. In other words, the energy reserves of the Caspian Sea are greater than the combined reserves of such well-known oil-producing countries as Iraq and Kuwait.

Many analysts agree that Caspian oil is enough to have a significant impact on world oil prices, and local hydrocarbon deposits are enough to provide world consumption for at least a hundred years.

How are these reserves distributed among the countries of the region?

The distribution of Caspian oil between the countries that own the coast of this sea-lake strongly depends on how to draw sectors of national influence here. There are two options for creating such a map - the “lake” option and the “closed sea” principle.

In the first case, most of the Caspian oil reserves go to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The second option (“closed sea”), which was secured by the Soviet treaties with Iran, implies a more even distribution of resources between the countries of the region, since according to this concept, each state receives the sovereign right to develop those deposits that are located in a ten-mile zone, and deposits in the central part of the Caspian Sea are being developed by all countries of the region on equal terms.

If we take as a basis the total volume of hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea at 12 billion tons, then the central part of the Caspian Sea contains 9 billion 200 million tons of standard fuel. If we evenly distribute this amount among all five countries of the Caspian region, then each state will get 1 billion 840 million tons.

Below are the data for both options for the distribution of sovereign rights (based on a total figure of 12 billion tons):

• Russia (the length of the state coastline of the Caspian Sea is 695 km):

1. "lake option" - 2 billion tons;
2. "closed sea" - 2 billion 340 million tons (1.84 + 0.5).

1. "lake option" - 4 billion tons;

• Kazakhstan (2300 km):

1. "lake option" - 4.5 billion tons;
2. "closed sea" - 2 billion 840 million tons (1.84 + 1.0).

• Turkmenistan (1200 km):

1. "lake option" - 1 billion 500 million tons;
2. "closed sea" - 2 billion 140 million tons (1.84 + 0.3).

• Iran (900 km):

1. "lake option" - 500 million tons;
2. "closed sea" - 1 billion 940 million tons (1.84 + 0.1).

In parentheses, the first figure is the evenly distributed reserves of the central Caspian, the second is the reserves falling within a ten-mile zone.

The further the studies of the level of oil content in the Caspian region progress, the more often the idea of ​​the volumes of local deposits of hydrocarbon raw materials changes, and the nature of its distribution among the states that own the Caspian coast also changes. For example, back in 1998, Russian geologists caused a real sensation with their report that the Russian sector of the Caspian has oil reserves, the volume of which exceeds the Caspian reserves of Azerbaijan by at least 100 million tons.

Let's face it, this interest is simply manic. The Caspian Sea and its shelf are becoming one of the main centers of global activity of the largest oil companies many states of our planet. To illustrate the level of this activity, we list the corporations that this moment take part in the development of the Caspian oil and gas fields:

• US companies: Chevron Oil, Exxon, Willbroc, Oryx, Unocal, Amoco, DG Seis Overseas, Santa Fe International Services Inc., Western Atlas International, McDermott, Pennozoil, Americo International Trading, Union Texas Petroleum, CCL Oil, Texaco, Enron, Conoco, Moncrief Oil (USA);
• French companies: Total, Technin, Elf Aquitaine, Bouygues offchore;
• South Korean Ramco;
• English British Petroleum, Monument Oil and Gas, British Gas, LASMO plc, JKX Oil and Gas, Broun and Root, British Invisibiz;
• Italian Agip Kio;
• German corporation Mannesmann;
• Japanese companies Mitsubishi, Chioda, Mitsui Corporation, Nichimen, Itochu Corporation;
• Turkish Turkish Petroleum, Gama, Turkish State Oil Company;
• Argentine Bridas;
• Malaysian Petronas;
• Singaporean FELS;
• Norwegian Statoil and Kvarner;
• Saudi Arabian company Delta Nimiz;
• Finnish company Scan-Trans Rail;
• Australian Mac Connel Dowel;
• Dutch Shell Exploration;
• Chinese China National Petroleum;
• company from Oman Oman Oil;
• Romanian Peter;
• Indonesian Central Asia petroleum;
• Israeli Merhav and so on.

The list is, frankly, impressive. In addition, there are many joint ventures:

• international consortium OKIOC (Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company);
• Azerbaijani-American enterprise Caspian Drilling Co;
• Azerbaijani-Turkish company "Azfen";
• Russian-American company "LUKARKO";
• Russian-Italian "LUKAjeep";
• Russian-British Casp Oil Development;
• Dutch-American-Turkmen company "Larmag-Cheleken";
• British-Canadian Commonwealth Oil and Gas, and so on.

The development of Caspian oil reserves is taking place with the active participation of the International Energy Company ITERA, CNPC (China National Oil Company), Iranian Oil Corporation OTES, Turkish state enterprise Botas and others...

Such an influx of large and larger oil companies, as well as influential oil lobbyists, representatives of the highest government circles, businessmen and entrepreneurs, was not seen in any of the world's fields. What is it that attracts the big oil business here?

There are several main reasons why this oil-bearing region is of such intense interest:

• The ever-increasing importance of hydrocarbons in advanced economies makes them concerned about their energy security, which means that these countries enter the struggle for the right to control the world's energy resources, regardless of their location. The collapse of the once-mighty Soviet Union provided the American and European oil monopolies with a golden opportunity to take control of one of the richest oil regions in the world;
• Another important reason for such a stormy activity of foreign monopolies is that at present the countries of the Caspian region are divided. collective agreement about the joint protection of their interests (following the example of OPEC) between them does not exist. In addition, after the collapse of the USSR, all former Soviet republics that became independent states are experiencing certain difficulties of a political and economic nature, which makes it possible for rich oil corporations to take advantage of the current situation and begin to exert economic and, to some extent, political pressure on the governments of these countries. , without the risk of encountering any serious collective resistance;
• modern oil business is one of the most highly profitable types of entrepreneurship, as a result of which economically developed countries are in conditions of fierce competition in the field of investing in the oil industry. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were unprecedented opportunities for placing such investments.

Let's take Azerbaijan as an example. Currently, 33 foreign oil companies are actively operating in this country, ten of which are represented by firms from the United States of America. Such an influx of foreign investors was caused by the strategy of Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, which was dubbed by the media only as a “spark of genius”. This strategy involved dividing shares (and thus responsibility) among the largest number of participants in oil projects, while maintaining unobtrusive control from the Azerbaijani government, which fits perfectly with the market system.

A similar approach was subsequently adopted by such countries as Turkmenistan, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan was among the first countries in the region that ratified the ECT - the Energy Charter Treaty, and this state was also one of the first countries to apply the SDRP - the Shared Production Sharing Agreement. The high income that the oil business is able to provide attracts all the countries of the Caspian oil-bearing region.

Natik Aliyev, President of the State National Company Republic of Azerbaijan (abbreviated as SOCAR), notes the fact that the intensification of the oil and gas industry in the transition period caused by the collapse of the USSR was possible only with the help of attracting foreign investment. It was the attraction of such capital that allowed the republic to cope with the economic crisis. The first international oil contract was signed in this country on September 20, 1994, and since then, the total volume of investments in the oil industry of Azerbaijan first reached 15 billion US dollars, and then began to steadily approach 40 billion.

A serious breakthrough in terms of the amount of attracted foreign capital was also made by Kazakhstan, which also considers the oil of the Caspian Sea as the foundation of its economic freedom and political independence. In the nineties of the last century, foreign companies invested almost 10 billion dollars in this country, which included more than 6 billion direct investments. And this figure promises to grow in the near future.

City of Oil Rocks in the Caspian Sea - one of the first offshore projects

Caspian oil of Russia

AT Russian Federation a favorable political and legal climate has not yet been created that would facilitate an increase in the volume of direct investment in the oil production industry. Suffice it to say that with the annual need of this industry in the amount of 10-13 billion dollars, the amount of investment is less than one billion.

The situation is worse only in Iran, because for a long time it was under international economic sanctions, and all this time it could not conclude contracts for the development of the Caspian shelf with Western companies.

Russia owns 695 kilometers of the Caspian coast, of which:

• 490 kilometers are in the Republic of Dagestan;
• 100 kilometers - in Kalmykia;
• 105 km - in the Astrakhan region.

During the Soviet Union, there was no exploration or production of oil in the Caspian Sea in Russia. The very first tender for oil development in the western zone of the Northern Caspian was won by LUKOIL, which began assembling a drilling platform in 1999. The total reserves of this site are estimated by domestic experts from 150 to 600 million tons of hydrocarbons.

In 1997, an agreement was signed between the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Dagestan on holding a tender for the right to use the subsoil for a five-year geological study and subsequent oil production for 20 years. It was about the oil-bearing areas included in the ten-mile zone of the Caspian shelf, which belongs to Dagestan. The volume of reserves of these areas ranges from 130 to 500 million tons of "black gold".

In 1998, the tender was won by two companies - the CaspOil consortium and JSC Geotermneftegaz. CaspOil includes such organizations as Dagneft, Caspian 2 and the Canadian firm KonArgo. The right to develop the Inche-Sea field with an estimated volume of resources of about five 5 million tons is held by Casp Oil Development, whose shares are owned by three companies - the British J.P.X. (30.5 percent), Russian Roskaspneft (39.5 percent and Dagneft (30 percent).

The sharp drop in oil prices significantly reduced the profitability of the world oil business, which could not but affect the growth rates of production in the Caspian. Capital investments in the exploration of new deposits have significantly decreased, companies have focused on the exploitation of existing fields.

Among the reasons for the fall in oil prices is the armed conflict in Iraq and Syria (ISIS sells oil from there for a pittance), an increase in shale oil production in the United States, an increase in supplies from countries that are not members of OPEC and do not have daily quotas, a general decline in the global economy, which led to followed by a decrease in demand for petroleum products and so on. All these reasons led to the prevalence of supply over demand.

To stabilize oil prices, the OPEC countries and Russia agreed to reduce daily production, which led to some stabilization of the oil market. However, it has not yet been possible to fully return the previous profitability, and it is unlikely to succeed in the near future. The growth of US oil production, which has taken a leading position in this area, seriously affects the situation on the world market for crude oil.

Of interest is the question of who benefits from such a drop in oil prices. Of course, to the states that are the largest consumers of this raw material - the United States, China, Japan and Western European countries, since the low cost of a barrel allows reducing domestic prices for finished petroleum products, which has a beneficial effect on the economic and consumer activity of the population. The population of the oil-producing states, on the contrary, gets the opposite result. Oil companies that suffer losses from export operations are trying to compensate for them on domestic market, increasing the cost of petroleum products, and in the first place, motor fuel (diesel and gasoline).

In addition, the dependence of oil-producing states on oil revenues forces them to look for an opportunity to close the resulting budget holes by reducing government spending. All this cannot but affect the activity of oil companies in the development of new fields. There is simply nothing to carry it on. As a result, the intensity of the growth of Caspian oil production has recently decreased for a number of objective reasons.

Another important factor hindering the development of this oil-bearing region is its geographical location. The remoteness from the main consumers of this raw material makes its delivery difficult.

Since the Caspian is a sea-lake, there is no direct sea route to the main oil consumers from it. After pipelines, sea transport is the cheapest, but its full use (in terms of the size of oil tankers) in this case does not seem possible. The construction of main oil pipelines is associated with colossal capital investments, which at present oil companies cannot provide. And third-party investors, due to the current situation, have lost interest in the oil business.

In addition, the construction of an oil pipeline through the territory of several states (for example, to Western Europe) is associated with difficult and lengthy intergovernmental negotiations, during which each side seeks to win out the best transit conditions for itself with minimal capital investment. Delivery of raw materials by rail leads to a significant increase in its cost, and the profitability of such a sale is very low.

However, everything is not as bad as it seems at first glance. Many analysts predict an increase in oil prices, and not in the very distant future. The world's population is growing steadily world economy(albeit not as rapidly as we would like) is developing, and an increase in energy consumption is inevitable.

There is currently no alternative to hydrocarbons, so there is hope for a fairly quick recovery of the level of oil revenues at an acceptable level for oil-producing countries. If this happens, it will again be profitable to invest money in the industry, and the growth of income and investment will stimulate the development of oil production everywhere, including in the Caspian region. Enormous money has already been invested in this oil-bearing region, and investor companies are not going to just throw it away.

Candidate of Technical Sciences A. OSADCHI.

The giant oil fields discovered in recent years in the northern and central parts of the Caspian Sea are a "tasty pie" for oil producers from countries not only in the Caspian region, but throughout the world. Who is involved in the division of this "pie" and how will Caspian oil be delivered to consumers? The answers are in the published article (see also "Science and Life" No. 12, 2002).

The oil pipeline starts at the zero kilometer, where the pipe goes underground.

The cost of producing one barrel of oil in different regions of the world in 2003

Chevron (USA) ranks first in the development of Caspian oil fields, Exxon Mobil (USA) ranks 2nd, ENI (Italy) 3rd, and British Gas 4th (Great Britain), 5th - LUKOIL (Russia), 6th - British Petroleum (Great Britain).

Use of investments under concluded contracts and growth in oil production over the past 15 years and for the future until 2020 (-expected contracts).

ill. 1. A network of oil pipelines for the transportation of Caspian oil.

The route of the CPC oil pipeline (triangles mark the five pumping stations built in the first place).

ill. 2. Storage tank for 100 thousand cubic meters of oil.

A new source of "black gold" in the Caspian (we will call this not only the sea, but the entire adjacent oil and gas region) attracted the attention of the world's largest oil and gas companies in the late 1990s. Chevron and ExxonMobil (USA), ENI (Italy), British Gas and British Petroleum (Great Britain), and LUKOIL (Russia) made the greatest contribution to offshore exploration and development. They signed contracts for the development of fields, according to which by 2010 it is planned to increase oil production to 4 million barrels per day (about 200 million tons per year), that is, to triple the current volume. To accomplish this task, serious investments are needed. According to calculations, they will amount to 60 billion dollars.

Peculiarities of offshore oil production

If we compare the Caspian with other large oil and gas regions of the planet, it turns out that this is not the most attractive place either in terms of location or production conditions. For example, in the richest oil pantry in the world - the Persian Gulf, where, according to forecasts, up to 80% of "black gold" is concentrated, oil-bearing layers lie in the thickness of the mainland at a relatively shallow depth. Oil is delivered by tankers to all corners of the world through nearby seaports without intermediate reloading. This explains the lowest cost of Persian Gulf oil - less than one dollar per barrel at the port of shipment.

In Russia, the cost of actually extracting oil from a well, including its drilling, last year averaged two dollars per barrel, and pumping the same barrel through a 2,000 km long oil pipeline was about three dollars. And this is without the cost of building roads, arranging deposits and much more.

Most of the newly discovered oil fields in the Caspian are located on the sea shelf. Production costs here are 2-3 times more expensive than on land, since the development of underwater deposits requires other, more complex technologies and other, heavier equipment. First of all, these are mobile drilling rigs for exploration drilling and fixed installations for production, the so-called oil platforms - giant structures with a displacement of up to 5,000 tons, costing about $ 200 million. However, due to the fact that the Caspian Sea is inland, it is impossible to deliver heavy large-sized equipment ready for operation here by convenient and cheap sea routes. All equipment for new oilfields on the Caspian shelf has to be built and assembled on site.

In the shallow northern part of the Caspian Sea, which belongs to Russia and Kazakhstan (it is separated from the main water area by the Mangyshlak threshold), it is naturally more profitable and convenient to extract oil than at depth. But there are a number of problems that increase the cost and complicate the construction and operation of deposits in the region.

Firstly, due to shallow water (depth no more than 20 m), the northern part of the sea is more polluted with oil products. Meanwhile, during the operation of only one well, and this is an average of 40 years, from 30 to 120 tons of oil enters the water. In the Baku region, for example, not far from the oil field "Oil Rocks", the content of hydrocarbons in water exceeds the norm by 30-100 times. As a result, many kilometers of oil slicks with a total area of ​​up to 800 km 2 accumulated in the oil field area. The development of new fields will inevitably lead to even greater pollution of the sea with oil products, so it is necessary to tighten environmental requirements and invest more in improving technologies.

Secondly, difficult ice conditions often form in the northern part of the Caspian Sea in winter. Half a century ago, in December 1953, even an out-of-the-ordinary case occurred when ice fields torn off the coast, driven by the wind, reached Baku and began to destroy oil rigs in the Oil Rocks area. Part of the oil field was then destroyed (see "Science and Life" No. 6, 2002). So, safe oil production on the shelf of the Caspian Sea requires not only ships and drilling rigs with ice protection, but also icebreakers.

Thirdly, in recent years, the intensity of shipping has sharply increased in the Caspian Sea. This is connected both with the rapid development of oil fields and with the fact that the Caspian has become part of the South-North transport corridor (the sea part of the route from the southern regions of Asia through Iran to Astrakhan passes through it). This factor should also be taken into account when developing new deposits.

There are also legal difficulties in the region. Soviet laws and agreements are outdated. They were accepted when the Caspian was not yet a sea of ​​​​five countries and little was known about the wealth of its shelf. Today the Caspian Sea needs a special legal status. In addition, uniform environmental standards should be adopted for all countries bordering its shores.

The Caspian in the web of oil pipelines

Experts predict that the length and throughput capacity of oil pipelines originating off the coast of the Caspian Sea should triple in the next seven to ten years. Only in this case, the oil pipeline network will correspond to the growth in production. Kazakhstan, which received 75% of the region's oil reserves, said that after this period it plans to produce 200 million tons of oil per year. Azerbaijan is counting on 75 million tons. Naturally, the question is: how and where to transport it?

The cheapest way to transport oil products over long distances by sea is by supertankers - ships with a displacement of 300,000 tons or more. But the oil still needs to be "dragged" to the port, and the way from the Caspian Sea, surrounded on all sides by land, to the international sea routes is not a short one. So we have to build an extensive network of pipelines.

The starting point of the oil pipelines in the north of the Caspian Sea is a triangle between the Tengiz, Karachaganak (onshore) and Kashagan (offshore) fields, where 50% of the region's oil is produced. From here it goes to the nearest Black Sea port - Novorossiysk. The deposits in the central part of the Caspian Sea are closest to another port on the Black Sea - Batumi, now owned by Georgia. The first pipelines for the transportation of Caspian oil to Novorossiysk and Batumi were laid back in Soviet times, bypassing the Caucasus Range through the territory of the Chechen Republic. When the war broke out there, an additional section of the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline had to be built, bypassing Chechnya. Today, a new powerful oil pipeline Tengiz - Novorossiysk operates in this region, which gave access to the Black Sea for oil from new fields in the northern part of the Caspian Sea.

Further from the Black Sea, the oil route lies through the Bosporus, and this is a "bottleneck", through which tankers with a displacement of no more than 145 thousand tons are allowed to pass. Supertankers cannot turn around in the strait. Already now it is loaded so much that the throughput is approaching the limit. In addition, due to the danger of collisions between ships, which can lead to an oil spill, recently they have been allowed to pass the Bosphorus only during daylight hours, and there is always a queue.

In search of other ways for Caspian oil to reach consumers, specialists are improving and developing the existing network of oil pipelines in Russia. For example, the option of transporting oil by tankers from Novorossiysk to the ports of Bulgaria and further by pipeline to the Adriatic coast is being considered.

After the discovery of the largest fields in the Caspian, the construction of the most powerful oil pipeline in the region, Baku - Ceyhan, began, through which Azerbaijani oil would flow. Initially, it will pass along the route of the completed Baku-Supsa highway (in the Batumi region) and then through a mountain pass 2,800 meters high to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, where there is already a sea terminal that receives oil from Iraq.

The construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline is scheduled to be completed in 2005. In the second turn, oil from Tengiz will be "dragged" to Baku. At first, it will be delivered by tankers, and in the future - by a new pipeline laid along the seabed.

Other ways are planned for the withdrawal of Caspian oil from the territory of Turkmenistan. The first of them - through Afghanistan to Pakistan - was going to be built even before the start of the war in Afghanistan, but so far this oil pipeline remains in the project. Now it will be laid by American companies. The second route is through Iran to the Persian Gulf. Today, one of the virtual oil pipelines operates between Turkmenistan and Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf - the so-called exchange operation, which consists in the fact that Turkmenistan supplies its oil to the northern regions of Iran, and the latter sells the same amount of its oil through ports in the Persian Gulf, mined in the south and considered Turkmen. The capacity is limited only by oil consumption in northern Iran.

In the future, oil pipelines from the Caspian region will stretch towards India and China, where oil consumption is growing at a very fast pace.

Oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Russia is interested in receiving income not only from the sale of oil, but also from its transit - transportation through its territory to other countries. We are talking about billions of dollars. An example of successful cooperation in this area is the construction of an oil pipeline by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). It starts at the Tengiz field, which belongs to Kazakhstan, and ends after 1200 km in Novorossiysk, which after the collapse of the USSR became the main Russian port on the Black Sea.

Construction of the CPC oil pipeline began in 1999. At that time, an oil terminal was already functioning in Novorossiysk, where oil was supplied from Baku and Russia. It was difficult and unsafe to squeeze the huge facilities of the new oil port into the Tsemess Bay near the city. But the place was eventually found. An area of ​​​​about 1 km 2 was taken under it to the east of the village of Yuzhnaya Ozereevka, which became known as Malaya Zemlya during the battles for Novorossiysk. This place, about ten kilometers from the city, fenced off from it by the "hillock" of Cape Myskhako, fully met both engineering-geological and environmental requirements, and, most importantly, the requirement of navigation safety. There was no intensive movement of ships here, and the furious local bora wind did not penetrate from the mountains, paralyzing the work of the main port with enviable regularity. The new offshore oil terminal was named Novorossiysk-2.

A consortium was formed to lay the pipeline. Each country carried out construction on its territory on its own with the involvement of foreign investment, and sometimes builders. Russia has built 748 km, Kazakhstan - 452. According to experts, the $2.5 billion invested in the pipeline will pay off in five years.

It took more than a month to fill the 1200 km long pipe with a diameter of 40 inches (that's a little over a meter). Such are the gigantic scales of the oil pipeline: with a throughput capacity of 28 million tons of oil per year, it simultaneously contains the 30th part of this volume, that is, almost 1 million tons. In order for oil to move through the pipeline at a speed of about 5 km / h, fifteen powerful pumping stations.

Having reached Novorossiysk, oil enters four huge storage tanks with a capacity of 100 thousand m 3 each. Of these, oil is poured into tankers from remote moorings. The contents of the tank are pumped into the vessel's tanks in 8 hours. Today it is the safest tanker loading technology.

Special mention should be made of oil storage facilities. Four huge tanks with a diameter of 94.5 m and a height of 18 m are built at a safe distance from each other with the expectation of resistance to a 9-magnitude seismic effect. To do this, rocky soil was selected under each tank and a multilayer shock absorber cushion was placed instead. Tank walls are custom-made in Sweden and Germany from thick, high-strength, corrosion-resistant steel sheets. Each storage tank is surrounded by a protective shaft, forming a bowl that, in the event of an accident, can contain the entire contents of the container. And finally, in case of a global catastrophe, three dams have been erected down the slope that can hold oil, even if it spills out of all four tanks at the same time. And in order to prevent the accumulation of gas in the tanks, their roofs are made floating, in the form of a huge cellular pontoon. Structures of this size and equipment were built in Russia for the first time.

The route of the CPC oil pipeline crosses several rivers, including two large ones - the Volga and the Kuban. Builders overcame water obstacles using a new technology of directional horizontal drilling. Previously, the laying of a pipeline began with the fact that a deep trench was washed out in the bottom, then a pipe was laid in it and soil was washed from above. According to the new method, drilling is carried out horizontally. The main difficulty is to accurately maintain the given trajectory of the well, in order to then drag a rigid thick-walled pipe into it. To do this, a radio emitter is installed on a guided drilling projectile, and several radio signal receivers are placed above it on the surface of the earth or water at different points, the coordinates of which are known. According to the difference in the time of arrival of signals from the transmitter to the receivers, the coordinates of the drilling tool are calculated. (About the same way the GPS system works, which determines the coordinates of a point from signals from several satellites.) Then they are compared with the calculated ones and the deviation from the given trajectory is obtained. Depending on its value, a signal is generated, which is fed to the actuator - retractable shoes on the drill string. They rest against the wall of the well and deflect the projectile by the calculated value, thereby correcting the trajectory of its movement.

The construction of the crossing over the Volga, where its width reaches 1360 m, took several months. The well was drilled in stages, gradually increasing the diameter. Then a pre-welded 40-inch high-strength pipe with multi-layer anti-corrosion protection was dragged into it. It is designed to work without repair for 50 years. Today it is the longest and deepest pipeline of such a large diameter in the world, laid under the riverbed using horizontal drilling. New technology, although more expensive, allows you to lay the pipeline faster, and work can be carried out at any time of the year, without restricting navigation.

The CPC oil pipeline was built in just two years. In June 2001, the first tanker with Tengiz oil left the port of Novorossiysk. Kazakhstan has an opportunity to double oil production in this region.

Objects like the CPC oil pipeline will continue to be built, as the volume of oil production in the country is steadily growing (only in 2003 it increased by 11%). In the next 8-10 years, it is planned to double the export of Russian oil, which means that it is necessary to build new oil pipelines with a capacity of approximately 150 million tons of fuel per year. Reports have already appeared that options are being considered for laying pipelines from Western Siberia to Murmansk, designed for 60 million tons, and from Angarsk to the port of Nakhodka in the Far East, from where oil will be exported to Japan. The throughput capacity of the pipeline will be 60 million tons, and another 20 million tons of oil will go through the branch to Daqing. It is also planned to lay an oil pipeline from St. Petersburg to Germany along the bottom of the Baltic Sea. As these plans are implemented, oil from the Caspian shelf will flow to all corners of the world.

Figures and facts

The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries - OPEC, which unites the states of the Persian Gulf, Nigeria and Venezuela (OPEC accounts for about 40% of world production) acts as a single group in the formation of oil price policy.

The unit for measuring the volume of oil in the world market - a barrel (in the literal translation "barrel") is equal to 159 liters.

The price of a barrel of oil in Europe is determined at the auction of the world's largest London Oil Exchange, in the US - at the auction of the New York Mercantile Exchange.

In the summer of 2004, the price of oil reached a record high for the past 20 years: over $40 per barrel in Europe and over $45 per barrel in the US.

An increase in the price of oil by $1 per barrel increases Russia's budget by $1 billion.

Conditions for bringing Caspian oil to the market

Unfavorable geographical location of the Caspian region for oil and gas companies (remoteness from the main sales markets, lack of direct access to the sea and the need to transit oil produced through the territories of third countries), numerous interstate and interethnic conflicts and the associated high level and range of risks, especially in the field of transportation dictate stringent requirements for justifying the construction of export pipelines to deliver Caspian oil to consumers. Such a transportation system must meet at least three critical conditions:
1) ensure the possibility of stable supplies in the long term;
2) take into account the current situation in the oil market;
3) be cost effective.
The implementation of the first condition is ensured by the concept of multiple delivery routes, which makes it possible to exclude the dominance of any one state in the transportation of Caspian energy resources - to ensure the stability of supplies in the Caspian, it is necessary to have several alternative routes that balance the risks of each of them separately. Moreover, on the territory of almost every state on the way of existing and proposed export routes there are centers of various ethnic conflicts that exacerbate the risks of deliveries through individual pipelines (Chechnya in Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Kurds in Turkey, Abkhazian separatism in Georgia, etc.).
In principle, all interested parties - producers, consumers, and transit countries - support the concept of multiple delivery routes. The problem here lies in finding a balance between the economic efficiency of pipeline projects and minimizing the risks associated with the delivery of oil to the world market for each of them.
Today, five such projects can be considered actually existing: these are the existing pipelines Baku-Novorossiysk, Baku-Supsa, the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) under construction, free capacities of Transneft with entry into the system through the Atyrau-Samara branch, as well as transactions for the replacement or swaps that do not require a "physical" connection between the producer and the consumer. Plus the possibility of more expensive rail transportation (for example, from Azerbaijan to Georgia). However, the potential declared total capacity of all export pipelines (operating, under construction and prospective) exceeds the production volume in the region that is possible in the near future. Therefore, out of many new transport projects, only one or two projects will be implemented in addition to the existing ones. For the right to "get" in their number and there is a tough competition. At the same time, the winning project needs to become the first in it, and therefore, so that it can absorb (and thereby, in accordance with the "scale effect", provide itself with higher efficiency with other equal conditions) the maximum guaranteed volume of pumping from the future production of Caspian oil, which has not yet been drawn over by competitive transport routes (as they say, "whoever gets up first gets slippers ...").
The second condition follows from the correlation of supply and demand that has developed to date in the main potential markets for Caspian oil. According to forecasts for the next 10-20 years, demand in Asia will grow at the fastest rate, many times overriding the potential growth in production in the Caspian region.
In the pre-crisis (meaning the Asian financial crisis), the base for calculations in 1995, the primary consumption of oil in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) amounted to 800 million tons, in Western Europe - 750 million tons. For 1995-2015 the increase in primary demand for oil (consisting of an increase in consumption plus changes in own production) in Asia will be about 750-800 million tons / year, in Western Europe - 200-250 million tons / year, while the increase at the peak of oil production by The Caspian can be 180-200 million tons / year or a little more.
It would seem that the main flow of Caspian oil should be directed to Asia. However, all the transport routes listed above, as well as a number of new projects (for example, Baku-Ceyhan, Odessa-Brody) bring Caspian oil to the Western European market. The appearance of significant volumes of Caspian oil on it may upset the balance of supply and demand existing here and bring down prices. To avoid this, at least part of the Kazakh or Azerbaijani oil should be sent to alternative markets for Western Europe - to China and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region, or to the new growing markets of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea located in close proximity to the Caspian Sea, or, perhaps, even to the markets of the Western Hemisphere - if such scenarios can be implemented for economic reasons, so as not to collapse prices in Europe.
The third condition assumes that the system of export pipelines should provide, firstly, maximum throughput with minimum capital investment, and secondly, an acceptable tariff for transporting oil produced by companies operating in the region. In other words, so that the overall level of costs of production and transportation of Caspian oil could fit into the existing and, moreover, into the forecast level of world prices. If, for economic reasons, new lobbied routes are not attractive (for example, due to low utilization of their potential throughput due to insufficient proven oil reserves in the region to maximize the load on all routes and ensure the profitability of transportation), then there may be a natural desire among those who support them business and political circles "take away" part of the pumping volumes from existing routes and redistribute them in favor of new directions. Arguments in favor of such a redistribution can be put forward in a variety of ways, including imaginary ones. In my opinion, the "Bosphorus problem" for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project has recently become such an argument, but more on that below.

fourth extra

Despite the fact that the potential declared total capacity of all existing, under construction and prospective export pipelines exceeds the possible production volume in the region in the near future, the current capacity of the existing export pipelines is not enough even to meet the needs of only the first Azerbaijani consortium - AIOC, which will be at its peak. produce 35-40 million tons per year. The question is which route will be the next in a series of existing ones, will it (whether it be able) for the sake of greater efficiency "collect" oil from the entire water area of ​​the Caspian Sea, or will projects only some limited part of the Caspian basin work to fill it, worsening the economic prospects of this pipeline?
It is clear that we are talking primarily about the "main export route" Baku-Ceyhan.
According to our calculations with A. Lobzhanidze, the implementation of the first stage of the CPC project, together with the modernization of the existing Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa pipelines, will meet the needs of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in export infrastructure for at least the next 5-7 years. Therefore, the question arises: is it necessary to start building the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline right now, and if so, for what capacity?
Our calculations showed that the rapid implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan project with the declared (maximally effective from the point of view of the project economy) throughput of 50 million tons per year will lead to the formation of a significant excess of free transport capacities (see Figure 1), which will sharply worsen conditions for the return of investments invested in its construction.

The peak of production growth lagging behind the rate of commissioning of new pipelines will come around 2005, when production in the Caspian Sea as a whole can reach about 70 million tons of oil (hereinafter, only export volumes are discussed, excluding domestic consumption), and the total throughput capacity of export pipelines - 140 million tons. In Azerbaijan, this excess will be even greater than the average for the region: production - 32 million tons, throughput - 87 million tons.
By 2010, the surplus of transport capacities in the Caspian as a whole will decrease from 70 to 20 million tons (production - 130 million tons, pipeline capacity - 150 million tons), in Azerbaijan - from 55 to 32 million tons (55 and 87 million tons, respectively) .
If the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is built without upgrading the Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa routes, the picture will be more balanced: in 2010, the volumes of Azerbaijani oil production and transport capabilities will be approximately equal. However, this option turns out to be inefficient for economic reasons. Firstly, modernization will cost less than new construction. Secondly, the modernized pipelines will take away part of the supplies from those under construction, reducing the design capacity of the latter. Thirdly, in any case, in order to ensure full utilization of the most efficient throughput capacity of the Baku-Ceyhan project, it would hardly be possible to do without loading it with Kazakh (and, possibly, Turkmen) oil, that is, building an extremely expensive and environmentally and seismically unsafe (and means even more expensive construction and its financing - due to additional risks) the trans-Caspian oil pipeline.
In the second case - without a line to Ceyhan - by 2005, the volume of production and throughput capacity of pipelines (70 and 90 million tons, respectively) in the Caspian as a whole are approximately the same, taking into account the effective level of use of the latter (85%), and by 2010, an excess of transport capacities may be replaced by their deficit (130 against 100 million tons). A similar picture will be observed in Azerbaijan: 2005 - 32 million tons and 37 million tons, 2010 - 55 million tons and 37 million tons. In this case, there may be a need for a pipe to Ceyhan, but already significantly less than the maximum capacity and, obviously, without filling it with oil from the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea (see Figure 2).

It becomes obvious that the competition between different routes for the transportation of Caspian oil has been and remains, in fact, a "preemptive fight", since the commissioning of two or three pipelines at the optimal throughput for the project's economy (or an increase in this throughput in the case of existing pipelines) deprives the construction of the fourth one of its meaning. It is also obvious that today this "fourth extra" - from an economic point of view - is Baku-Ceyhan for the time being. The first phase of the CPC will be put into operation this year. The line bypassing Chechnya has been operating since the spring of 2000, and, according to Transneft management, when necessary, its throughput capacity can be increased to 17 million tons per year in a short time. And the modernization of the Baku-Supsa pipe, also if necessary and without any problems, can be carried out in 2004-05.
Based on the foregoing, it seems doubtful that from the point of view of maintaining a balance between the volume of oil production in the Caspian Sea and the throughput capacity of export pipelines, the Baku-Ceyhan project will be able to harmoniously fit into the emerging system of transporting Caspian oil to world markets, especially without replenishing it with Kazakh oil. At the same time, the second scenario - without Ceyhan - clearly demonstrates all its advantages, the most important of which is the possibility of "divorcing" the main stream of Caspian exports between different markets in the European direction.
Oil from the northern part of the Caspian will be able to flow to Northwestern and Northern Europe. From Novorossiysk or Supsa (where it comes both from the northern - Russian and Kazakh, and from the southern - Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea) Caspian oil can flow not only to the Mediterranean, but also to Ukraine (and then in transit to the markets of Western and Northern Europe) and to the countries of Eastern Europe (to the Black Sea refineries and/or by tankers up the Danube). In case of delivery to Ceyhan, the Caspian oil will be oriented to the much more competitive market of Southern Europe, since there it will compete directly with the Middle East and North African oil.
True, SOCAR representatives believe that an additional advantage of Ceyhan will be that it will be able to load ships with a deadweight of 250,000 tons, which will make it possible to effectively transport oil from here to both North-Western Europe and the United States. In their opinion, the gain in freight rates will be ensured by the difference in the deadweight of ships used for transportation - the same Caspian oil coming to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, as well as Middle Eastern oil coming here through the Suez Canal, will be transported by tankers with a deadweight of not more than more than 150 thousand tons due to the restrictions on the throughput of the Turkish straits and the Suez Canal in terms of the class of ships (the so-called Suezmax class). According to SOCAR, vessels of this class will be limited in the transportation of Caspian (and Middle Eastern) oil exclusively to the Mediterranean market, which will create sufficient competitive advantages terminal in Ceyhan for any oil shipments outside the Mediterranean. However, such savings on freight (due to the difference in vessel deadweight) is only a part of the total cost estimate for production and transportation and does not guarantee the final gain in the sum of all costing items on the way from the wellhead in the Caspian Sea to the consumer in the USA.
The Baku-Ceyhan project can be implemented only if the economics of oil delivery to Ceyhan (and not just the economics of oil delivery from Ceyhan) is better than that of competitors or if it has a lower level of risk, while competitive projects, on the contrary, turn out to be more risky for one reason or another.
An analysis of the two most important parameters of the project's economic efficiency - capital investments and pumping tariffs - showed that both in terms of the volume of required investments and in terms of the expected value of the tariff, Baku-Ceyhan is far behind its competitors. Therefore, let us dwell a little more on the issues of economics (availability of resources for pumping through the pipe) and risk assessment.

The concept of the development of the Caspian Sea: one or two independent ones?

Recently, in the dynamics of the development of the resource base of the Caspian Sea in its various parts, two opposite trends have emerged. Therefore, today, in my opinion, it is legitimate to consider the issue of the disintegration of a single concept of the development of the Caspian Sea (if any) into two independent ones - the development of the Southern and Northern Caspian.
In the southern part of the Caspian (the Azerbaijani sector, the development of which was the first to be developed - even before the settlement of the controversial legal issues of the delimitation of the Caspian Sea), today there is a slowdown in the pace of prospecting and exploration work and an increase in proven oil reserves, mainly as a result of the fact that drilling operations do not confirm the presence or sufficient oil reserves to make the project profitable, or just its (oil) reserves (an example is the transformation of the Shah Deniz field from oil to gas based on the results of exploratory drilling). Therefore, there is a revision in the direction of slowing down and reducing the levels of oil production forecasts in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian (see Figure 3).

SOCAR President N. Aliyev estimates the reserves of the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian at 4 billion tons. Within the framework of 18 out of 20 "Exploration, Development and Production Sharing Agreements" signed with the Azerbaijani side and remaining in force (2 signed SDDDD were subsequently recognized as economically inexpedient, and the international consortiums created for their implementation ceased their activities), only one project is an agreement for the development of the Azeri, Chirag and deepwater Gunashli fields - today it has proven recoverable oil reserves (approximately 630 million tons) and conducts commercial oil production. The rest of the SRDDMS are still either at the stage of seismic surveys or at the stage of prospecting and exploratory drilling. Thus, out of those approximately 1.2 billion tons of oil, in which the reserves of the remaining 17 SDDDs signed by Azerbaijan in 1996-2000 are estimated, nothing has been transferred to the category of proven recoverable reserves (that is, reserves suitable for profitable extraction). Another 160 million tons are reserves of fields developed by SOCAR itself on land and at sea.
Thus, in the bowels of 150 promising hydrocarbon structures discovered in Azerbaijan and not included in the contract zones of the previously signed MTDD, there is still almost 2 billion tons of oil. However, half of these structures (72 out of 150) are located in the deep water part of the Azerbaijani sector. For its development SOCAR, which does not have the necessary financial resources, shows a lively interest, while foreign oil companies, which have such resources, do not. Lack of interest in learning deep sea shelf Azerbaijani sector from foreign companies seems to be quite reasonable.
Firstly, oil companies are in no hurry to implement already signed contracts - there is a natural slowdown in the development of contract areas after a series of failures with the transfer of promising reserves to proven ones. In these conditions, it is unreasonable to take on new obligations.
Secondly, entering into new SRRDRs (in deep water areas) means paying new, rather high bonuses and taking on additional investment obligations, which, in the face of uncertainty with the development of less expensive projects, require additional risk for the investor, but failure to fulfill these obligations also means for him the presence of risk - the risk of termination of the contract by the host party for failure to fulfill contract terms(each of them provides for a detailed program of exploration work). Thus, these investments can mean a high-risk deadening of capital for companies (and capital, as you know, must work).
Third, before investing in a potential build-up of an expensive resource base, companies want to see how effectively they can solve the problem of oil transportation, they want to understand in detail new, more expensive routes. Therefore, within the limits of spending funds for a particular country/prospective project that each company has, today for many companies operating in the Caspian Sea it is more important to determine the prospects for oil delivery routes to the market, so it is more expedient for them to spend a few additional (tens) million dollars on the feasibility study of pipeline projects than on the conclusion of new contracts.
At the same time, in the northern part of the Caspian (the Kazakh and Russian sectors), the situation is exactly the opposite - there is an accelerated increase in the resource base, which was initially held back by the unresolved legal issues of delimiting the Caspian.
The largest Kashagan field was discovered on the Kazakh shelf in the northeast of the Caspian Sea. According to geologists, its reserves (although it is not specified which category) can range from 1.4 to 4 billion tons, which at the peak of production, if all these reserves were proven, could provide from 50 to 140 million tons / year. Kashagan may become the largest oil discovery in the world after the discovery in the late 60s. the Prudhoe Bay fields on the North Slope of Alaska (provided at its peak about a quarter of US oil production).
Work is intensifying on the Russian competition sites in the northern part of the Caspian Sea. Lukoil's first exploratory well produced oil inflow at the Khvalynskaya structure, which is part of the Severny license area, the right to use the subsoil of which the company won in a tender in 1997. Preliminary estimates of the reserves of this license area vary, but are measured in hundreds of millions of tons. Thus, with reference to the President of Lukoil V. Alekperov, forecast reserves are estimated at 300 million tons, preliminary estimated reserves at 500 million tons, and the feasibility study of the project included cumulative production figures for the entire period of the project for the development of the licensed area, exceeding 600 million tons. tons.
Taking into account the major discoveries in the north of the Caspian Sea and the imminent commissioning of the CPC, in my opinion, it is reasonable to expect a further shift in the vector of interest of oil companies in conducting geological exploration in the Caspian Sea from the southern part (Azerbaijani sector) to shallower areas of the north and northeast (Russian and Kazakh sector). At the same time, the front of prospecting and exploration work is also expanding onshore in the Caspian region - in the Russian part of it, the oil content is being assessed at the extremely promising Severo-Astrakhansky license area, etc.
The "single" concept of the development of the Caspian plays (played) into the hands of the supporters of the Baku-Ceyhan route, since, in order to reduce dependence on Russian transit routes, it involves bringing part of Kazakh oil to the market by the southern route - first delivering it (by tankers? by an underwater pipeline?) from Aktau to Baku and further by pipe to Ceyhan. Separate development of the northern and southern Caspian involves the choice of optimization solutions for each of its parts and worsens the economic prospects of the pipe to Ceyhan, because it reduces the size of the available resource base and reduces the throughput of the project, which can be ensured by guaranteed filling.
With the opening of Kashagan, the problem of filling the first stage of the CPC, which will be put into operation in the near future, will most likely be successfully resolved. This will create additional incentives for bringing current and future Kazakh oil from the Caspian to the market by "northern" (CPC plus the existing pipeline system of Transneft), and not by "southern" routes - through the Azerbaijani or other sectors, bypassing the territory of Russia. The use of the Transneft pipeline system makes it possible to export Kazakh oil to Central and North-Western Europe, while simultaneously resolving the issue of a possible overflow of the CPC. If a two-port option for the construction of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) is implemented, that is, a scenario with access to an oil terminal under construction in Russian Primorsk and an operating port and refinery in Finnish Porvoo, then Kazakh oil will also get access to the Northern European market.
I note, by the way, that such a scenario may turn out to be a mutually beneficial outcome for all interested parties, since today the main argument against the two-port BTS scheme on the part of the Russian side is its unwillingness (unwillingness) to ensure the supply of more than 5-6 million tons of oil per year to Porvoo, and with on the condition that these deliveries will be used only for processing at the local refinery. At the same time, the Finnish side states that it is not economically feasible for it to build a pipeline from Primorsk to Porvoo with a capacity of less than 10 million tons/year. Zugzwang? By no means, the missing difference could be covered by transit Kazakh oil supplied for export through Porvoo. And if so, then there are additional incentives for the fastest modernization of the Atyrau-Samara section. And since everything is interconnected in nature and in the economy, in this scenario, the implementation of the BPS project in a two-port version may turn out to be a significant deterrent to the implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan project, thereby presenting additional demand for the pumping of Azerbaijani oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk and Baku-Supsa pipelines.
Thus, the pace of implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline may significantly slow down. Until now, oil from Tengiz and other Kazakh fields is considered by supporters of the "southern" route as a possible element of filling the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in order to improve its competitive position. In mid-February, the head of SOCAR's foreign investment department, V. Aleskerov, one of the main proponents of the construction of the pipeline to Ceyhan, said that he did not exclude the start of work by the interested parties on documents defining the legal basis for extending the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to the Kazakh port of Aktau. Information appears in the press that Kazakhstan is allegedly ready to join this project and supply about 20 million tons annually through it. However, this project looks very doubtful for economic reasons: according to our calculations (see Figure 4), even without an extension to Aktau, the Baku-Ceyhan route loses to its main competitors in the European direction, and with an extension to Aktua, it loses even more.

Thus, the prospects of the Baku-Ceyhan project are becoming tied to a more limited resource base than its supporters initially thought - the proven oil reserves of the exclusively southern part of the Caspian that are slowing down in their growth. This is where the "Bosphorus problem" begins to take on additional meaning.

Literature 1. A. Konoplyanik, A. Lobzhanidze. Caspian oil at the Eurasian crossroads. Preliminary analysis of economic prospects. Moscow: IGiRGI, 1998, 110 p. 2. A. Konoplyanik, A. Lobzhanidze. "Oil and Capital", 2000, No. 10, p. 58-62. 3. A. Konoplyanik, A. Lobzhanidze. Baku-Ceyhan: to build or not to build?"Oil and Capital", 2000, No. 10, p. 58-62. 4. V. Mishin. Will oil reach Ceyhan? (So ​​far, the prospects for the pipe look disappointing). "Oil of Russia", 2001, No. 2, pp. 84-87. 5. Baku-Ceyhan Likely to Extend to Aktau. - "Business Press - The Weekly Economic Newspaper" (Baku), 16-22.02.2001, p.1

* The material is published from

The development of energy capacities and the supply of energy resources in the Caspian depend not only on the problems of developing oil and gas fields in the Caspian and dividing the Caspian. The related problems of transporting these resources to the main energy markets, the problems of the security of energy resources, the problems of pipeline transport systems and the sea, rail and road transport interacting with them have also acquired particular importance. The Caspian has become an arena for clashes between the largest transnational energy, transport and construction corporations. Market access is hampered by political and geographic conditions, including continued Russian influence, limited access to waterways except for the Caspian Sea, and poor export infrastructure.

Currently, the transit of Caspian oil is carried out through several oil pipelines. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline system, with a capacity of more than 1 million barrels per day, has, according to part Russian experts has more political than economic calculations and a risky perspective. "Northern" (Baku-Novorossiysk) and "Western" (Baku-Supsa) oil pipelines, with a capacity of 100,000 to 115,000 barrels per day, respectively. Recently, a route (barge) agreement was signed between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan for the supply of 10 million tons (approximately 733 million barrels) of Kazakh oil annually for the BTC pipeline. The Russian Atyrau-Samara pipeline that runs from Atyrau in Kazakhstan to Samara in Russia. Its capacity is 300,000 barrels a day, but Russia has pledged to increase its capacity to 500,000. To supply oil to China, a Kazakh-Chinese pipeline is being built, the first part of which connects the Kazakh oil fields of Aktobe with the Kazakh oil center Atyptau, which is already ready. The second section, which is still under construction, will run from Atasu (Northwestern Kazakhstan) to Alashkanou (Xinjiang, China) and will cost approximately $850 million, with an initial capacity of 200,000 barrels per day and a maximum capacity of 400,000.

Another route of transportation is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which connects the Kazakh oil fields with the Russian port of Novorossiysk. It is owned and operated by Western private companies and state-owned companies in Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman, with a capacity of 560,000 barrels per day; a pipeline from Shymkent in Kazakhstan to Chardzhou in Turkmenistan (via Uzbekistan); an agreement between Turkmenistan and Iran, according to which Turkmen oil is delivered to the Iranian port of Neka by barges.

In addition, in December 2002 the governments of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a memorandum of intent to build the Central Asian Oil Pipeline, which will pump Uzbek and Turkmen oil to Gwadar, a Pakistani port on the Arabian Sea. However, this project was shelved due to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan. In general, the construction of most of the pipeline systems in the Caspian is directed either to bypass Russia, or in a southerly direction outside of Russia.

Graduate work

"Caspian Oil"

Introduction ................................................ ................................................. ........

1. History of oil production in the Caspian Basin ..............................................

1.1 Discovery of the first deposits............................................................... ..............

1.2 The activities of the Rothschilds and the Nobel brothers ..............................................

1.3 Development of deposits in neighboring regions...............................................

2. "Subjects" of the Caspian region .............................................. .................

2.1 Soviet republics - independent states ..............................

2.2 The real potential of emerging formations ..............................................

2.3 Russia and the states of the Caspian region after the collapse of the USSR.......

2.4 The need for a new legal status for the Caspian Sea...............

2.5 Legal status of the Caspian region............................................................... .....

3. Caspian Oil and the Policy of Interested States..................................

3.1 Oil transit. Directions and oil pipelines ...............................................

3.2 Caspian oil and the US position (“Not only oil”) ..............................

3.3 The Caspian geopolitical "knot" and the policy of the United States..........................

Conclusion................................................. ................................................. .

List of references .............................................................................. .............

The relevance of the topic of this work is determined by several geopolitical factors that are significant for this region. First of all, all the states near the Caspian Sea and close to the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), due to their oil and gas wealth, have the potential for intensive economic development, like some countries of the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain ). The realization of this possibility, while still very sluggish, is nevertheless leading to their separation from economic ties with Russia. And as the reverse side of this process, they are gradually integrated into the network of economic structures created by the southern countries (partially China), as well as Western states, primarily the United States. As a result, a very complex mosaic of international relations is emerging for Russia in the south, reminiscent of the Middle East version for the United States of the 1950s.

The second factor is related to the fact that the growing role and independence of the Caspian and near-Caspian states (former Soviet republics) reduces the strategic importance of Russia in the south for all western and southern states, including the PRC. At best, it will become just one of many subjects of international relations in the region, at worst, it will be completely discounted if it fails to ensure its visible presence there.

The third geopolitical factor may arise if NATO advances (through Turkey) to the shores of the Caspian Sea by involving the Caspian states in structures for the sake of this bloc.

These circumstances determine the specifics of the consideration and analysis of this topic. At the same time, it is necessary to clearly distinguish the concept of the strategic hub of world economic policy from the centers of world politics. In the latter case, we mean such centers of economic power, the relationship between which is built on the basis of economic and political cooperation in the interests of all participants. And although the problem of security, in particular its economic aspects, retains its relevance, it seems to remain in the background. The main thing is the absence of antagonistic contradictions between the participants. This type of relationship is typical for the US-Western Europe-Japan triangle.

The strategic knot of world politics appears where conflicting long-term interests of states collide, the implementation of which creates a hotbed of international tension. Although the consequences of resolving this type of conflict are difficult to predict in advance for each of the participants, it is easy to predict the other: the benefits of one party turn out to be a loss for the rest. At the regional level, such strategic hubs are the Korean Peninsula. Taiwan problem. Middle East, at the global level - relations between the US and China, the US and Russia.

Based on the foregoing, we can assume that the Caspian oil-producing region in the 90s began to acquire the status of a new strategic hub of world politics, which involved about 30 states, including countries of a global scale: the USA, Japan, China, Russia. Thus, the solution of problems in this area of ​​world politics will have an impact on the entire system of international relations.

As it often happens in world practice, the Caspian region owes its emergency status to oil. So, not only the Middle East knot, but also the war in Vietnam, the current disputes over the Senkaku Islands (between Japan and China), Dokdo (Japan-Korea), Spratly, Paracel Islands (China-ASEAN) - they all “smell” of oil. In the case of the Caspian, we must also add natural gas reserves, in which Turkmenistan, according to estimates by the US Energy Agency, ranks third in the world.

Despite the importance of other riches of the region (fish, mineral resources, etc.), it is oil and gas that turn it into a zone of increased economic, political, and military-strategic activity. In this work, therefore, the problem is defined primarily as having geopolitical aspects, predominantly before the problems of technical equipment, ecology, etc.

The place of Russia in the political process taking place in this region is determined by the following circumstances. All the Caspian states (former republics of the USSR) are in a state of deep economic crisis. Since Russia's position is practically no better, they see a way out of the difficult situation in establishing economic cooperation with the West, the countries of the Near and Middle East, and China. This strategic line is ideologically justified by the need to get rid of the imperial policy of Russia, which their leaders never tire of talking about. All together should result in an increase in the geostrategic significance of each of these states in the eyes of potential sponsors.

The leaders of the Caspian region are focusing on attracting foreign capital for oil production and transportation. This does not mean that they are already ready to cut ties with Russia. For this, on the one hand, the time has not yet come, on the other, at this stage they need Russia, since the development of liquid fuel deposits and the transportation of early oil are somehow connected with Russia, its territory, its specialists and the benevolent attitude of Moscow. In addition, they are interested in cooperation with Russian oil companies that are ready to compete with foreigners, which allows the owners to conduct more successful trades with the same foreign companies. Thus, they will need Russia until the massive exploitation of the largest oil and gas fields begins.

In accordance with these circumstances, this paper attempts to answer some important questions for Russia related to the alignment of political and economic forces in the region.

1.1 Discovery of the first deposits

The first discoveries of oil on the territory of the former USSR have been known since ancient times. And above all, the region of Baku on the shores of the Caspian Sea has long been famous throughout the East for its ever-burning gas torches. With the help of pits, several million tons of oil were extracted here even before the drilling of the first wells began in 1870. Thanks to the Caspian deposits, in the period from 1898 to 1902, Russia was in first place in oil production among all oil-producing countries in the world, ahead of the United States. In 1901, it produced 1.5 million tons of oil, mainly from the deposits of the Baku region, which accounted for more than half of the world production.

After falling to 3.5 million tons in 1920, oil production began to gradually increase and in 1938 reached 37 million tons. Then it again decreased to 20 million since the end of World War II, and then began to increase rapidly , exceeding 100 million tons in 1958, 200 million in 1963, 400 million in 1973 and amounting to 615 million tons in 1984 - the highest production in the world. However, the average annual growth rate of oil production, which reached 17% in the period 1955–1960, fell to 5% in 1975–1980. and has been less than 1% since 1980.

In 1901, on the Apsheron Peninsula - the last segment Greater Caucasus before it sank into the Caspian Sea, 11 million tons of oil were produced, which accounted for 95% of all oil produced in Russia and half of world production. This volume of production was provided by 1,900 wells drilled at five fields with a total area of ​​115 square meters. km. The bulk of the oil produced came from the Bibi-Heybat field, one of the first giant oil fields on the globe.

The drilling of the first well in this area dates back to 1871, but oil production here was carried out long before that with the help of hand-dug pits. Signs of oil content in the Baku region have been known since at least the 6th century. BC. Travelers passing through the area in 1737 counted 52 pits, and von Humboldt met 82 in 1829. To improve the quality of petroleum products, a small refinery was built in the area in 1723, probably the oldest in the world. . Surface signs of oil and gas potential here are often associated with mud volcanoes, many of which are quite high hills. So, Turagai volcanic cones. Kinzhi-Dag and Kalmes on the coast of the Caspian Sea rise 400 m above its level.

Serious prospecting and exploration work on the Absheron Peninsula began in 1870. In 1871, the first drilling rig for percussive rod (not cable) drilling was installed and put into operation here. Two years later, the first gusher of oil was received. In 1872, the new system granting concessions for which instead of small plots. allocated for exploration work for a period of 4 years (the procedure that existed since 1821 and caused the disorderly development of deposits), it was envisaged to allocate plots of 4 hectares with the obligatory payment of their rent to the owners in the form of percentage deductions (royalties) from the produced oil.

1.2 Activities of the Rothschilds and the Nobel brothers

With the arrival in the area in 1875 of the Nobel brothers, Robert and Ludwig, this nascent industry was further developed. They started their activities with the purchase of a large Balakhapy field and the construction of an oil refinery. Gradually, they became owners of other fields, modernized equipment, built new refineries and the first pipeline, and in 1877 launched the first oil tanker. The Nobel brothers also headed commercial activity. Their merchant ships supplied the ports of the Caspian Sea with various cargoes and went up the Volga deep into the territory of Russia. Over a quarter of a century, their company has drilled more than 500 wells. At the same time, the depth of the wells gradually increased from 60 m in 1873 to 500 m in 1896. In general, the company of the Nobel brothers produced more than 20 million tons of oil with the number of workers and employees reaching 12,000 people.

However, many wells turned out to be dry, even those that were laid and drilled on the anticlines. The reason, apparently, was that wellbores fell into the vents of mud volcanoes. The wells threw out tons of sand mixed with liquids, 410 caused the collapse of the walls and blockages of the wells.

In 1892, the Rothschilds created the Caspian-Black Sea Society and merged with the firm of the Nobel brothers. Being engaged at first in trading activities, the Rothschilds soon became producers of oil and oil products. They financed the construction railway, then in 1905 - the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku to Batum. From Batum, their ships supplied all of Europe with oil products. In 1911, the Dutch company Royal Dutch joined the Rothschild company and became the second oil producer in the Baku region. At that time, 35 small and large oil companies operated on the Absheron Peninsula.

Oil production in Russia, which at that time was carried out exclusively in the Baku region, increased from 30,000 tons in 1872 to 5 million tons in 1891 and reached a record volume of 12 million i in 1901. Almost 90 "/about the oil produced gave two giant fields: Bibi-Heybat and Balakhani-Sabunchi-Ramany, the initial reserves of which were estimated at 280 and 300–400 million g, respectively. At the Surakhani field (south of the Ramana field), such pure light yellow oil was produced, that it could be used directly in medicine. The deposits are confined to narrow, winding anticlines, often cut through by cores of diapirs (clays), with which the famous mud volcanoes are associated.

Productive reservoirs are Pleistocene sandstones. The abundance of surface sources of oil, usually associated with mud volcanoes, of which at that time there were about 160 on this small peninsula, was considered evidence of a connection between oil and deep volcanism, which was relatively "calm" in the area. For some time, the origin of oil, which often ignited spontaneously here, was associated with the activity of this "source of fire in the bowels of the Earth" - deep volcanic centers.

But a certain part of geologists, among whom the famous Abich should be mentioned, noticed that mud volcanoes are usually found in the axial zones of anticlines, and at the end of the 19th century. a well-founded theory has developed that in this area the accumulation of oil occurs mainly in anticlinal folds. The oil company of the Nobel brothers effectively used this concept, as well as geological data in their exploration drilling, and their successful discoveries in this region owe much to geology as a scientific discipline. And it is all the more annoying to see that there is no Nobel Prize for achievements in the field of geology. After the business trip of the great chemist Mendeleev to the United States, the Nobels also adopted American technology for drilling wells and exploiting deposits.

1.3 Development of deposits in neighboring regions

On the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, almost opposite Baku, there is the island of Cheleken (today a peninsula), which has long attracted the attention of oil explorers. There are 3,500 surface sources of oil on its territory, which in ancient times was used for lighting instead of animal fat.

In 1876, the first fountain of oil was obtained here from a well from a depth of 37 m. During the period from 1900 to 1920, about a million tons of oil were produced at this field, the total reserves of which, according to recent estimates, are 100 million tons.

Since 1823, oil production also began in the Grozny region at a field located about 500 km northwest of Baku. In 1875, more than 3 million tons of oil were extracted here with the help of wells. Then production fell to 40,000 tons in 1890 and later increased to 1.25 million tons in 1910. The drilling of the first well, carried out by the British in 1893, ended with an open fountain of oil. The deposit is located in a zone where geologists in 1900 discovered a surface anticlinal structure. The first systematic geological surveys here revealed several anticlines, often disturbed by normal faults. The geological report on the research, supplemented by sections built according to the drilling data of 27 wells, was in fact one of the first documents describing the structure of the surface and subsoil.

Oil fields were also discovered in the Maykop region, located in the northwestern part of the Caucasus, about a hundred kilometers from the Black Sea coast. After one of the wells received an open fountain of oil from a depth of 75 m with a flow rate of 700 tons per day, in 1909–1910. oil explorers poured into the area. But technical difficulties and unsafe living and working conditions forced them to leave. According to later estimates, this field (Maikop) contained 80 billion m of gas and 10 million tons of liquid hydrocarbons.

However, the oil and gas industry soon entered a period of decline, mainly due to technical reasons. The uncontrolled exploitation of shallow productive horizons, carried out without knowledge of the geological structure of the deposits, has become obsolete.

The wasteful exploitation of the upper productive strata led to their depletion, and the level of drilling technology of that time did not allow penetrating into deeper horizons. The existing system of granting concessions turned out to be a weak incentive for the development of prospecting and exploration. Finally, political reasons, in particular clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, led to a decline in intelligence activities. The volume of oil production in Russia decreased to 9 million tons in 1913 and 3.5 million tons in 1920. By this time, the cumulative oil production in Russia was estimated at about 280 million tons, with most of it coming from the fields of the Apsheronskoye peninsulas. By this time, investments in the oil and gas industry in Russia amounted to almost 214 million dollars in gold, of which 130 million dollars were invested by foreign companies and companies.

Nevertheless, advances in well drilling technology and the use of geophysical exploration methods have made it possible to intensify exploration work here. Thus, in 1928, the giant Karachukhursky oil field was discovered on the continuation of the Surakhani tectonic axis, the oil reserves of which, later estimated, amounted to 100 million tons. Russia was essentially the first country where seismic exploration began to be used to search for oil. The first discoveries made by the end of the 1930s, in addition to field geological survey data and core drilling, were often based on sections constructed based on the results of refraction seismic surveys (RWM), which made it possible to map the structure of post-salt deposits (overlying the Permian salt strata). By that time, original methods of correlation were already being used in Russia. Since 1936, seismic exploration by the method of reflected waves (MOB) began. However, the equipment used for this purpose left much to be desired. In 1940, there were 20 seismic parties in Russia. It was by this time, more precisely in the early 1930s, that the geophysical methods of the French company Schlumberger were widely used on the territory of the USSR. As early as 1929, Russian geophysicists and geologists appreciated the advantages of electric logging for the needs of the oil industry, while American specialists were convinced of this only five years later.

In 1930, 11 geophysicists from the French company Schlumberger worked in the USSR, and in 1931 there were already 15 of the 24 who worked on a permanent basis in this company. In 1935, with their help, 7,000 electrical loggings were carried out, and an area of ​​50,000 square meters was covered by electrical exploration. km. However, the political situation deteriorated sharply, and in 1937 the last Schlumberger specialist left the USSR. In the meantime, the Americans were reconsidering their attitude to electric logging, and the methods of geophysical surveys of the Schlumberger firm were widely used in America.

The discovery of deposits on the Apsheron Peninsula protruding into the Caspian Sea naturally prompted exploration of offshore structures. In 1925, a well was drilled on an alluvial dam in the Caspian Sea in order to explore the continuation of the Bibi-Heybat field. Gradually, prospecting and exploration work began to be carried out farther and farther from the coast of the Caspian Sea. Wells were drilled from alluvial dams and overpasses or on natural or artificial islands and islets. The large oil field Oil Rocks, located in the open sea 100 km from the coast, was discovered in the Pliocene sands in 1949. Over the entire period of its operation, more than 150 million tons of oil were produced from it.

Oil production in the Baku region, which reached 22 million tons in 1940, was kept at the level of 15 million tons / year throughout the 50s, which at that time was slightly less than a quarter of the entire production of the USSR. In 1966, the Apsheron jack-up drilling platform began to be used to drill wells in the Caspian Sea, after the collapse of the first platform four years before that date. In 1970, 10 offshore fields were discovered; they currently account for the bulk of the oil produced in the Baku region.

Until 1991, the Soviet republics of the Caspian basin - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia - were part of the USSR and did not have the right to conduct independent foreign policy and foreign economic activity. All international communications were carried out exclusively by the central government of the USSR in Moscow. Therefore, the Caspian (like all other) republics did not play any independent role in international affairs.

The Caspian Sea (lake), according to the agreements between the RSFSR / USSR and Persia / Iran in 1921 and 1940, was considered an object of their joint use and the activities of third countries were prohibited in it. Officially, there was no border on the Caspian Sea, the USSR and Iran had equal rights to navigation and fishing throughout its entire water area. However, in practice it was divided between the USSR and Iran. Since 1934, the USSR unilaterally established an unofficial border on the Caspian Sea along the Astara-Gasan-Kuli line. The delimitation along this line was tacitly respected by both sides, although it was not officially recognized by Iran. Each state carried out economic activity only in its sector.

Thus, the USSR, taking advantage of the position of a great power, infringed on the legitimate rights of Iran. Firstly, the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea was about 44 thousand square kilometers (12 percent of the entire water area), while the Soviet sector was about 334 thousand square kilometers (88 percent). Secondly, since the USSR controlled most of the water area, the Iranian cargo, passenger and fishing fleets in the Caspian Sea remained undeveloped. Thirdly, since these treaties contained a provision that the Caspian Sea is exclusively Soviet-Iranian, the USSR protested against Iran attracting third countries to assist in the exploration and production of oil from its bottom. As a result, Iran was practically deprived of the opportunity to develop oil fields in its area, while the USSR was actively extracting it in its sector. Naturally, Iran was dissatisfied with such an unequal position, but could not change it as long as the Soviet Union existed.

2.2 The real potential of emerging formations

The countries of the Caspian basin have huge reserves of oil and gas. Thus, only in the bed of the Caspian Sea, proven oil reserves are about 10 billion tons (73 billion barrels). In addition, large reserves of oil and gas have been discovered onshore in the Caspian countries. For example, in Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya river basin contains more than 15 trillion cubic meters of gas and over 6 billion tons of oil. In terms of gas production (95.6 billion cubic meters in 1991), this republic ranked fourth in the world after the USA, Russia and Canada. Iran's reserves are 89.3 billion barrels of oil (12.23 billion tons) and 24 trillion cubic meters of gas (19 percent of its world reserves). Russia ranks first in the world in terms of gas reserves (48.1 trillion cubic meters, 38 percent of world reserves). As for its oil reserves, according to domestic experts, explored reserves are 12 billion tons, according to OPEC - 6.6 billion tons, according to US analytical centers - 21 billion tons. Most experts believe that 21 percent of the world's projected oil reserves are concentrated in Russia.

In Kazakhstan, the reserves of only two fields on land - Tengiz and Karachaganak - are estimated at about 3.4 billion tons of oil. According to Western experts, its proven oil reserves are 5.2 billion tons; local experts estimate them at 15.6 billion tons, and gas reserves are estimated at 2.5 trillion cubic meters. According to the calculations of the Kazakhstan Geological Institute, the probable reserves of the Caspian basin alone can amount to about 50 billion tons of oil, 15 billion tons of gas condensate and 10 trillion cubic meters of gas.

Only in Azerbaijan are oil reserves on land almost exhausted, which makes it extremely dependent on production in the Caspian Sea. Reserves in the "Azerbaijani sector" are estimated at about 2 billion tons.

Together, the oil and gas production of the five Caspian states makes up a significant share of their world production (over 17 percent for oil last year).

If we consider these countries separately, then they differ quite significantly in their economic and geopolitical position. The leading role here is played by Russia - the largest and most industrialized country. It has access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Black and Baltic Seas, as well as to the Pacific Ocean. With huge oil and gas reserves in Siberia and a system of export oil and gas pipelines, it is little dependent on Caspian oil.

Iran now has a relatively developed industry, including metallurgy, engineering, petrochemistry, and light industries. The main oil and gas reserves are located on land and in the Persian Gulf, which allows it not to depend on Caspian oil. The transport network has access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In recent years, Iran has been actively developing trade relations with European countries. At the same time, its relations with the United States remain extremely tense, which negatively affects Iran's position both on the world stage and in the Middle East region, where American influence and military-political presence are strong.

As for the three new Caspian states - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, their economy is in a very difficult situation. Only the oil industry is actually developed in Azerbaijan. The export of petroleum products gives him 75 percent of all foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, oil production in 1995 was more than halved compared to the mid-1960s, when the peak of its production was reached - 22 million tons per year (442 thousand barrels per day). The republic's economy has been depleted as a result of the armed Karabakh conflict. During the years of independence, the country has experienced several coup d'état. All this makes Azerbaijan extremely dependent on Caspian oil, because only revenues from it can improve the economy and stabilize the political situation.

Among all CIS countries, Turkmenistan is the least industrially developed. The share of industry in its net material product is only 20 percent, the economy is practically based on the production of two types of raw materials: cotton and gas. Moreover, gas production has declined sharply in recent years. If in 1991 it amounted to 95.6 billion cubic meters, then in 1995 it dropped to 32.3 billion cubic meters. The main reason for this is that due to lack of funds, the CIS countries, which were the main consumers of Turkmen gas, have sharply reduced its purchases. (Oil production also decreased from 6 million tons in 1990 to 4.7 million tons in 1997.) Therefore, the improvement of the financial situation of Turkmenistan depends on whether it can redirect gas exports to the south - to Iran, India, Pakistan, Turkey and also to Europe.

Kazakhstan has rich reserves of coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, chromium and silver. Ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, heavy engineering have been developed in the republic. The share of industry in the net material product is 42 percent. There are also produced significant quantities grain and other agricultural products. In the northern part of the country, 35 million hectares are occupied by wheat crops. In recent years, grain harvest reached 25 million tons.

The oil and gas industry is developed in the republic. At the same time, there are no domestic oil pipelines in the country and oil is supplied to Russian refineries, and the Chimkent refinery located in the southeast of the country operates on Uzbek oil, since the main oil fields of Kazakhstan are located in its northwestern part. This leads to a high degree of attachment of the Kazakhstani economy to Russia, which remains its main supplier of industrial equipment and electricity and a consumer of its raw materials.

Unlike Russia and Iran, the new Caspian republics do not have access to the open seas. Therefore, their foreign economic activity and connection with the world market are completely dependent on the possibilities and conditions for the transit of goods through the territories of neighboring countries. At the same time, until 1997, the Central Asian states did not have a railway connection with their southern neighbors. The only railway linking the USSR with Iran through the Caucasus was blocked after Chechnya declared itself independent in 1991.

As you know, the USSR, despite the formal division into republics, was actually a unitary state, and its economy was a single national economic complex, controlled from Moscow. At the same time, the economy of all Soviet republics, with the exception of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Azerbaijan, was unprofitable, that is, they produced less than they consumed. And this deficit was compensated by redistributing the revenues of these four republics through the central budget. According to the calculations of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, only 6.6 percent of its national income was taken from Russia and transferred to unprofitable republics. For example, a subsidy to Kazakhstan was 28 percent of its national income, to Uzbekistan - 25 percent.

After oil prices on the world market fell from $40 per barrel in 1981 to $10 in 1986, Russia's income as the main oil exporter to the USSR fell sharply. As a result, it could no longer give part of its income to unprofitable republics. This served as an additional argument for them in favor of declaring independence, since there was nothing left to take from Russia. Of course, there were other, more serious reasons for the collapse of the USSR, but this one also played a role.

The economic crisis of the 1980s, the difficulties caused by the process of transition from a centralized to a market economy model, the rupture of many economic ties after the declaration of independence by the former Soviet republics sharply worsened the economic situation throughout the post-Soviet space. The volume of the gross national product in 1995 was 62 percent of the 1990 level in Russia, 45 percent in Kazakhstan, and 38 percent in Azerbaijan.

However, Russia's relations with other Caspian states developed rather complicatedly. She has tense relations with Azerbaijan due to the fact that she has taken (supposedly) pro-Armenian positions in the Karabakh conflict. This was dictated by the fact that after the overthrow of President A. Mutalibov, who stood on a "pro-Russian" platform, A. Elchibey became president, who took anti-Russian, pro-Western positions and began negotiations with Western powers on concluding a contract for exploration and production of oil in the Caspian Sea.

2.3 Russia and the states of the Caspian region after the collapse of the USSR

The Central Asian republics had the opportunity to gain "complete independence", as did the Baltic countries. However, after December 8, 1991, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed the Belovezhskaya agreements on the creation of the Commonwealth Independent States, four days later the leaders of the Asian republics gathered for a meeting in Ashgabat (December 12-13), where they spoke in favor of joining the CIS; somewhat later, the republics of Transcaucasia joined it. Their voluntary joining was dictated by the understanding that they alone could not survive and overcome economic difficulties.

Friction arose between Russia and Kazakhstan. One of the reasons was the problem of the Baikonur cosmodrome, which the Kazakhs declared their property. The loss of Baikonur could cause irreparable damage to the Russian cosmonautics. Disagreements also arose on the issues of Kazakhstan's entry into a single ruble zone. The conditions put forward by Russia proved unacceptable to him, and he introduced his own currency, which complicated their trade relations. Disagreements also arose over the price of oil supplied by Kazakhstan for processing to Russia.

Relations were also complicated by manifestations of nationalism in the Central Asian, including the Caspian, republics, which led to a significant emigration of the Russian population from them. As of October 1, 1995, the number of officially registered refugees from the Central Asian republics amounted to 915.3 thousand people. Only from Kazakhstan in 1993 221 thousand people left, and in 1994 - another 400 thousand people.

In addition, in the first years after the declaration of sovereignty, Russia was more concerned with establishing relations with the West and did not pay due attention to solving problems arising in relations with the Central Asian states, which could not but cause them to feel disappointed with its policies.

As a result, a favorable situation developed for Iran, which sought to establish close economic and cultural relations with the newly independent states. In conditions when the world has turned from a bipolar to a unipolar one, Iran put forward the idea of ​​uniting primarily Muslim states to create a new pole of power designed to resist American domination. It is quite natural that the young states, which have not yet fully determined their political orientations, have become the object of increased attention on the part of Iran. Already in February 1992, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani proposed the creation of an Organization for Regional Cooperation of the Caspian States.

At their regular regional meeting in Tehran in October 1992, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan insisted that during this meeting they discuss and approve a draft agreement on the creation of such an organization. Russia, on the other hand, proposed first to carefully discuss all issues at the level of experts, then at meetings of deputy ministers, foreign ministers, and only after all issues were agreed upon, prepare the final text of the treaty and submit it for signing to the heads of state at a special conference. Iran and Kazakhstan generally agreed with the opinion of Russia.

Iran hoped that the creation of an organization based on the principle of equality of rights of all members would allow it to change the unequal position in which it was during the existence of the USSR. Azerbaijan (in view of the flaring conflict with Armenia) was in dire need of allies and therefore was interested in getting Iran's support, including as a counterbalance to Russia.

However, after Azerbaijan began discussing with Western countries the possibility of joint development of oil fields in the Caspian Sea, the positions of the parties changed. In order to have a basis for negotiations, Azerbaijan declared its ownership of the "Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea." Azerbaijan's position is understandable. The catastrophic financial situation forced him to look for sources of investment in the development of new fields in order to increase oil production and export. Since Russia and Iran were themselves experiencing financial difficulties, Azerbaijan was forced to turn to Western countries. Nobody challenged his right to involve foreign companies in cooperation. But the method that Azerbaijan chose to attract them undermined the entire system legal relations on the Caspian Sea and caused a chain reaction of unilateral actions by other Caspian states.

In 1993, Turkmenistan passed a border law that declared a 12-mile zone as its territorial waters, and also established the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone. Kazakhstan, which has also begun negotiations with Western oil companies, has declared its claim to the "sector" and offered to divide the Caspian Sea in accordance with the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. These unilateral actions were contrary to international legal norms that determine the procedure for changing the legal regime of a border reservoir in the event of an increase in the number of its users, and created the danger of legal chaos in the Caspian basin.

2.4 The need for a new legal status for the Caspian Sea

Russia strongly protested against such unilateral actions. She officially expressed her point of view in the document “The position of the Russian Federation on the legal status of the Caspian Sea”, distributed by the UN on October 6, 1994. The document stated that, in accordance with the norms of international law, the legal regime of the Caspian Sea is determined by the Treaties of 1921 and 1940 between the USSR and Iran until all the Caspian countries reach an agreement on changing this status. In the meantime, any unilateral actions aimed at seizing certain sections of the Caspian Sea are illegal.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides for the automatic division of the boundary sea into territorial waters, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, cannot be applied to the Caspian Sea. In accordance with Article 122 of the Convention, an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea is a bay, body of water or sea connected to another sea or ocean by means of a narrow strait. The Caspian Sea is not connected to the world ocean either through a narrow strait or through other seas. Therefore, from the international legal point of view, it is not a sea and should be considered as a border lake. In accordance with world practice, the vast majority of border lakes are divided among coastal states, although there is no international legal norm obliging coastal states to carry out such a division. In particular, Peru and Bolivia decided not to share Lake Titicaca, but to keep it in common use. Thus, the riparian states themselves have the right to determine what the legal regime of a border lake should be. Using this right, Russia proposed to consider the Caspian Sea as an object of joint use by all five Caspian states and opposed its division into national sectors. This position was due to the fact that the Caspian Sea is a unique body of water with a very vulnerable ecosystem. That's why economic activity should be carried out in concert and under strict control so that no state causes damage to other states and does not violate the ecological balance in the Caspian Sea.

Russia proposed to conclude a number of agreements concerning those issues of the legal regime of the Caspian Sea that were not reflected in the Treaties of 1921 and 1940, in particular, an agreement on the conservation and use of biological resources, an agreement on the protection of the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea. Thus, Russia has taken a constructive position, proposing the path of negotiations, the search for mutually acceptable solutions and compromises, and a phased solution to the problem of the new legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

Alma-Ata and Baku, unfortunately, embarked on the path of violating the norms of international law, seeking by any means to divide and secure sections of the sea for themselves without taking into account the negative consequences.

2.5 Legal status of the Caspian region

Signed in July of this year by the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan, the Agreement on the delimitation of the bottom of the northern part of the Caspian Sea in order to exercise sovereign rights to use its subsoil has sharply increased interest in the problems of the Caspian Sea. Many publications have appeared in the press covering various aspects of these problems, including political and legal, oil, pipeline and environmental issues. The authors of some of them painted a rather gloomy picture, from which it followed that by agreeing to the division of the seabed, Russia allegedly completely lost its positions in the Caspian, lost its hydrocarbon resources and, as a result, will not be able to become the main transit country for large Caspian oil. And if we add to this rare references to the really critical state of the Caspian sturgeon stocks, then the reader could generally get the impression that the situation for Russia is developing here catastrophically. It seems that an objective analysis of the above aspects will make it possible to come to less pessimistic conclusions.

Most of the Caspian's problems are directly related to the unresolved issue of its legal status. Let us briefly recall its history. The legal regime of the Caspian Sea, established by the Soviet-Iranian treaties of 1921 and 1940, provided for common ownership and joint use. But these treaties regulate only the issues of navigation and fishing. They establish freedom of navigation throughout the sea for coastal states (vessels flying the flags of third countries cannot sail in the Caspian) and freedom of fishing, with the exception of a 10-mile coastal zone, which was reserved for fishing vessels of the corresponding coastal state. In 1962, an agreement was reached between the USSR and Iran on a ban on the industrial fishing of sturgeons in the sea and their catch only according to quotas in rivers when migrating for spawning.

It can be assumed with a fair degree of certainty that the new members of the Caspian club that appeared after the collapse of the USSR - Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan - would not have raised the issue of developing a new legal status for the Caspian Sea if there were not significant hydrocarbon resources under its bottom. According to the latest Russian estimates, the predicted resources of this raw material under the bottom of the Caspian Sea amount to 15-17 billion tons of standard fuel. Nature decreed that their main reserves, explored in the 70-80s, are concentrated mainly off the coast of these three countries. In this regard, the deep-water bottom of the South Caspian near Iran is considered unpromising. And the bottom of the Caspian Sea south of the Volga delta) near the Russian coast is generally the least studied, since in accordance with the decree of the government of the RSFSR of 1975 on the creation of a protected area in the Northern Caspian Sea for the reproduction of sturgeons, any geological exploration using drilling and seismic equipment were prohibited here.

By the way, a few months earlier, the same zone was formed in the entire maritime space off the coast of Kazakhstan to the north of the Mangyshlak peninsula, when it became clear that due to the presence of salt domes filled with hydrogen sulfide, exploration and development of oil is associated with an increased environmental risk. In the mid-90s, Kazakhstan reviewed the regime of its protected area and, referring to the perfection of modern offshore oil production technology, allowed oil exploration and development in it.

Naturally, the new Caspian states did not want to hand over "their" hydrocarbon resources to the "pan-Caspian boiler" for production through a joint company of five coastal states. It should be recognized that the economic practice that has developed over 70 years, when the Caspian Sea was the Soviet-Iranian, gave them certain grounds to consider these resources as their own. Firstly, in 1935, by a secret order of the People's Commissar of the NKVD, G. Yagoda, the Caspian Sea was divided into two parts along the Astara-Gasan-Kuli line, which was designated on all Soviet maps as the state border of the USSR, although it was never such in international legal terms. . Secondly, in 1949 the USSR started offshore oil production at Oil Rocks without any consultations with Iran. In the 50s, Iran began to do the same along its coast without agreement with the USSR. Moreover, the official publications of both countries claimed that the resources of the bottom of the Caspian Sea, within the limits in which it adjoins their coast, belong to each of them.

Finally, in 1970, the Ministry of the Oil Industry of the USSR, guided by its departmental interests (mainly to calculate the republican forecast resources), divided the bottom of the "Soviet" part of the Caspian Sea into sectors between the union republics. At the same time, the middle line was taken as a basis, although this was done without reference to coordinates.

Attempts by Russia and Iran in the course of ongoing negotiations since 1992 on the development of a new legal status of the Caspian Sea to extend the regime of common ownership and joint use to the mineral resources of its bottom were not successful. Azerbaijan came out for the division of the Caspian Sea (bottom, water and air space with all their natural resources) to national sectors under the full sovereignty of the respective coastal state, and included in its constitution an article declaring the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea as part of the territory of Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan proposed to apply the norms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Caspian Sea, dividing the sea into territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Turkmenistan stated that, pending the development of a new legal status, it would adhere to both the Soviet-Iranian agreements and the sectoral division established by the aforementioned decision of the USSR Ministry of the Oil Industry, while at the same time adopting a law on 12-mile territorial waters and based on the presence of the "Turkmen shelf" of the Caspian seas.

Negotiations on the legal status of the Caspian were more of a theoretical nature until Azerbaijan began to develop offshore fields by entering into production sharing agreements with foreign oil companies. The leading positions in the formed consortiums were taken by American corporations. However, Russia's Lukoil and Rosneft and the Iranian state oil company have also received a share in the development of a number of offshore fields, although both countries, as well as Turkmenistan, have refused to acknowledge that these fields are in the "Azerbaijani sector" of the Caspian Sea.

So, the position of Russia and Iran regarding the legal status of the Caspian did not prevent the emergence of American oil companies here, acting as partners of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan. Somewhat later, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan took the path of announcing international tenders for seabed areas near their shores for the purpose of exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. These states also link their plans to raise the economy and the living standards of the population with the speedy production of Caspian oil, and they cannot do this quickly without Western capital and technology.

Did this violate the legal status of the Caspian, established by the Soviet-Iranian treaties? The Iranian side answers this question in the affirmative. According to its interpretation, not being able to independently develop offshore fields, any Caspian state is obliged to first invite the rest of the coastal states to participate in this process on an equal share basis (20 percent each), and only after they refuse to accept companies from third countries. In the absence of such a preferential regime for the Caspian states, any of them has the right to start exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources anywhere in the Caspian.

In the opinion of the Russian side, which at first was inclined to support the Iranian approach, but soon realized its futility in the conditions of the process of developing the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea that had already begun by other Caspian states, something was violated. Of course, the development of offshore fields through a joint stock company of the five Caspian states would be the best solution, but practice shows that this is unrealistic. In accordance with the current legal status, the Caspian is open for economic use by any littoral state throughout its entire length. But what would the literal implementation of this legal principle mean in the conditions of uneven distribution of hydrocarbon resources under its bottom? The appearance of an Iranian oil platform opposite the Baku embankment or a Russian drilling rig south of the mouth of the Ural River, with all the ensuing consequences for interstate relations and the military-political situation in the region. Therefore, it is necessary to look for some kind of compromise variant leading to the achievement of a general agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.

Such a compromise option was proposed by Russia in November 1996 during a meeting in Ashgabat of the foreign ministers of the five Caspian states. Its essence boiled down to the fact that in the 45-mile coastal zone, each state would have exclusive or sovereign rights to the mineral resources of the seabed, that is, resource jurisdiction. Where offshore mining has already been carried out by some coastal state outside the 45-mile zone or was about to begin, such a state would have “point” resource jurisdiction over the corresponding deposits. At the same time, the central part of the sea would remain in common ownership, and its hydrocarbon resources would be developed by a joint stock company of the five Caspian states.

However, despite the fact that the "point" jurisdiction fully met the interests of Azerbaijan, which was preparing to start developing the Chirag field outside the 45-mile zone, this proposal was rejected by it. Kazakhstan did not support him either. An attempt by Russia, Turkmenistan and Iran to create a tripartite joint-stock company for the exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources of the seabed ended in vain, because Turkmenistan, near the coast of which such a company was supposed to start work, decided instead to put the corresponding sections of the seabed up for international tender.

In the year that has passed since the Ashgabat meeting, none of the Caspian states has put forward a new proposal on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Everyone remained on their original positions, and Russia again had to take on the role of a “locomotive” in reaching a compromise.

In January 1998, following the results of an informal meeting in the suburbs of Presidents B.N. Yeltsin and N.A. Nazarbayev, a joint statement was published, which expressed the opinion that with regard to the legal status, “a consensus must be reached on the terms of a fair division of the bottom of the Caspian Sea while maintaining common use water surface, including ensuring freedom of navigation, agreed fishing standards and protection environment". After that, within six months, the Russian government delegation headed by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs B.N. Pastukhov held several rounds of negotiations with the Kazakh side and consultations with other Caspian states. In general, their results are as follows.

Thanks to a common approach with Kazakhstan to the development of a legal status, it was possible to prepare and sign an Agreement on the delimitation of the bottom of the Northern Caspian in a short time. It seems that it not only ensures the interests of Russia and its oil companies, but can also serve as a good basis for the preparation of a Convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, if everyone agrees to seek consensus on the conditions of an equitable division of the seabed with its mineral resources while preserving the water area with its biological resources in common use.

What would the Caspian look like in this case? From the coastal edge of each state there will be a 12-mile or other agreed-upon width zone of border, customs, sanitary and other control, which will be a kind of analogue of territorial waters. Let's call it conditionally the control zone. Again, an offshore fishing zone up to 20 miles wide will be established from the shoreline as agreed, in which only boats will fish. under the flag of the respective coastal state. And that's all. Further - no zones, no borders on the water. Freedom of navigation, biological resources ~ common, agreed fisheries norms, uniform environmental standards and coordinated control over them in accordance with separate five-party agreements.

The bottom and its subsoil are delimited by agreement between neighboring and opposite states. This process can be bilateral or tripartite in the case of the South Caspian. The five-sided process of delimitation is not ruled out, although the delimitation itself will still be carried out by immediate neighbors. The distinction is made on the basis of internationally recognized principles of fairness and the agreement of the parties, which in 80 percent of cases known to world practice means the use of a median line.

Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed that the demarcation between them will be carried out along a modified median line, which will be built taking into account the islands, geological structures, other special circumstances and geological costs already incurred.

Within the seabed areas, or "bottom sectors", formed by such a delimitation, the coastal states exercise sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration, development and management of the mineral resources of the seabed and subsoil.

In the event that the dividing line passes through promising hydrocarbon structures and deposits, the respective coastal states will have the exclusive right to their joint exploration and development. Their equity participation will be determined on the basis of established world practice and taking into account good neighborly relations.

And finally, the coastal state, whose individuals or legal entities have discovered hydrocarbon deposits or identified structures that are promising for the accumulation of hydrocarbons in the area where the boundary line passes before it is agreed with a neighboring or opposite state, has a priority right to obtain a license for their exploration and development with the obligatory involvement of representatives of that adjacent or opposite state.

By the way, this provision, enshrined in the Russian-Kazakhstan agreement, allows the Lukoil oil company to continue, under the conditions of legal certainty, exploration of the hydrocarbon resources of the Northern Caspian, in which the company has already invested more than $70 million, and provides legal protection for these investments.

Special mention should be made of Article 5 of the Russian-Kazakhstan agreement, which provides that various types of economic use of the Caspian Sea, including the laying of underwater pipelines, will be regulated by separate agreements after the conclusion of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and on its basis. Thus, the issue of building a trans-Caspian underwater pipeline from Kazakhstan to Baku has been removed from the agenda, and the oil pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium remains the priority route for the export of Kazakh oil, the construction of which is scheduled to begin on Russian territory in early 1999. And without an injection of Kazakh oil, the planned Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which is the main competitor of the existing Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline as the main export pipeline, is not economically viable.

According to preliminary estimates, as a result of delimiting the bottom with the Caspian neighbors, Russia will receive at least 17 percent of its area and about 10 percent of hydrocarbon resources. This is obviously less than the share of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but we should not forget that, remaining in the position of common ownership, Russia could claim a maximum of a fifth of these resources, that is, 20 percent. The difference of 10 percentage points can be “made up” through the participation of Russian oil companies in the development of offshore fields on the bottom of neighbors, as Lukoil is already doing in Azerbaijan. The Russian Caspian Consortium, which is being created as part of the Lukoil oil company, the Yukos oil company and Gazprom, will obviously have opportunities for this.

How was the proposal to divide the bottom of the Caspian while keeping the water space in common use by other Caspian states received? Azerbaijan welcomed Russia's consent to the division of the bottom, but still stands for the division into national sectors of both the bottom and the water area. Turkmenistan, giving preference to the previous Russian proposal for 45-mile coastal zones, has declared its readiness to accept only the division of the bottom, if this suits the other coastal countries.

Even in Tehran, for the first time, words were heard about the Iranian side's agreement in principle with the "equal and fair" division of the Caspian Sea between the five coastal states. True, Iran understands by this such a distinction that would give each of the Caspian states a national sector of the same area. This is already a more realistic approach than the equal sharing of resources previously proposed by Iran. Russia invited Iran to present a methodology for such an equal division of the bottom, acceptable to all five Caspian states, drawing its attention to the fact that it will have to convince of its fairness, first of all, those states that, in the event of demarcation along the median line, will have more than 20 percent of the bottom area. These are Kazakhstan (about 29 percent) and Turkmenistan (about 22 percent).

Thus, the idea of ​​dividing the bottom of the Caspian Sea is not rejected by any other Caspian state. This is an important step towards reaching a consensus on the legal status of the Caspian. Now we have to decide on water.

Why does Russia categorically reject the idea of ​​dividing both the bottom and the water area of ​​the Caspian Sea into national sectors under the full sovereignty of the coastal states? Mainly because of the critical situation with the Caspian sturgeons. Due to mass poaching and one-sided excess of the total allowable catches, their stocks are catastrophically reduced and in 5 years they can completely dry up. The situation can still be salvaged if an agreement on the conservation and use of the biological resources of the Caspian Sea, long agreed upon by the fisheries authorities of most of the Caspian states, is immediately signed. But political decision on this score, no. Russia is directly told: "First - status and oil, then - fish and ecology."

Sometimes supporters of national sectors say: “We will divide the Caspian into five national sectors, in which all resources, including fish, will belong to the respective coastal states, and then we will agree on national fishing standards), we will make exemptions from national jurisdiction and we will sign an appropriate agreement.” The same is offered for ecology. But harmonizing the five national laws will be much more difficult than adopting uniform norms already approved by all. Someone may even refuse to subordinate their national norms to the pan-Caspian ones. This is the danger of dividing the Caspian into national sectors from the point of view of preserving bioresources and ecology.

Russia's constant focus on finding a compromise on the issue of the legal status of the Caspian is largely due to the desire to do everything possible in the current conditions to save the Caspian sturgeons.

The implementation of the Russian proposal to divide the bottom of the Caspian while maintaining the water space in common use would basically leave the legal regime of its economic use unchanged, which has developed over 70 years, when the sea was Soviet-Iranian. On the contrary, the division of the Caspian into national sectors would not only mean a complete revision of this legal regime, but would also give rise to a host of new problems, primarily territorial disputes. After all, in the case of the national sector, we will talk about the delimitation of territorial jurisdiction, and territorial disputes, where the bill sometimes goes by meters, are much more difficult to resolve than disputes about resource jurisdiction, where many problems are resolved through equity participation. For example, it is one thing when Azerbaijan, from the position of the national sector, argues with Turkmenistan about the territorial ownership of the Kyapaz-Serdar field, and it is quite another thing to try to agree on its joint exploitation on the basis of common exclusive rights. Perhaps when the oil reserves on it are exhausted, the subject of the dispute will also disappear.

National sectors in the Caspian are also unacceptable because they allow their "owners" to restrict the freedom of navigation in the Caspian under the pretext of ensuring national security. Or laying trans-Caspian pipelines without hindrance and recklessness, fraught with a huge environmental danger due to the extremely active geodynamics in this region.

Any objective observer of the negotiation process will agree that on the issue of legal status, Russia has gone more than halfway towards the wishes of its Caspian neighbors. In less than two years, the Russian side has put forward the second fundamentally new compromise proposal, for the third time radically reconsidering its initial position of undesirability to divide the Caspian in any form.

3. Caspian oil and the policy of interested states

3.1 Oil transit. Directions and oil pipelines

The desire of the countries of the region, members of the CIS, to get rid of Moscow's dependence on transportation, including in the field of pipeline transport, and to create a large east-west transport corridor, bypassing the territory of Russia, also coincides with the desire of the US ruling circles to isolate the Central Asian countries as effectively as possible. and the Transcaucasian republics of the CIS from Russia. Propaganda, as noted above, all this is presented as the restoration of the traditional trade "silk road". The countries of the Central Asian region, together with Azerbaijan and Georgia, are now actively implementing the idea of ​​alternative rail and road transport bypassing Russia.

One such project is the TRACECA project ( transport system Europe-Caucasus-Asia), the implementation of which was facilitated by a meeting of interested countries in Brussels in 1993. Within the framework of this common project, foreign consultants in 1993-1997. implemented 20 specific projects aimed at the development of the port economy of the Black and Caspian Seas, including the organization of new and modernization of existing ferry crossings and port facilities.

Kyrgyzstan and Bulgaria joined the quadripartite agreement on railway cooperation signed by Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Georgia. Turkmenistan has already connected its railway network. from Iranian. The Tejen-Serakhs-Mashhad railway has become, in the words of the President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov, the "golden link" of the Istanbul-Beijing trans-Asian highway. It provided the states of the region with a convenient access to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Turkmenistan also built a gas pipeline to Iran, despite the disapproval of the United States.

At the beginning of September 1998, another conference was held in Baku within the framework of the TRACECA program, held under the auspices of the European Union. It was attended by official representatives of 32 countries, including the presidents of Bulgaria, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Armenia and representatives of 13 international organizations. The main outcome of the conference was the signing of the "Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport and the Development of the Europe-Caucasus-Asia Corridor". According to this document, each of the signatory countries undertook to provide other participants with the right to transit international Vehicle, goods and passengers through their territory, to ensure effective facilitation of transit traffic, and also to establish tariffs on preferential terms for services in providing transit traffic (although the parties to the agreement decided not to charge a fee for the transportation themselves). The Russian delegation headed by the Deputy Minister of Transport E. Kazantsev did not sign the document.

Thus, the solution of the issue of reducing the dependence of the countries of the region on the Russian Trans-Siberian Railway has been put on a practical plane. They are energetically assisted by China, encouraged in this by Washington. Today, cargo flows from South China to the northwest to the Trans-Siberian Railway follow the Trans-Chinese railway through Mongolia and Kazakhstan, bypassing the Far Eastern part of the Trans-Siberian Railway. In parallel, China is building a railway along the Great Silk Road. When completed in 2000, customers will have a route from Asia to Europe several thousand kilometers shorter than the 10,000-kilometer Trans-Siberian Railway.

Noting all these “new trends”, leading Kazakh political scientist Nur-bulat Masanov emphasizes: “Transnational companies from Western countries and the United States are actively developing the resources of Central Asia, and they are very interested in reducing Russia's influence in Central Asia. When these routes, for example, the Transcaucasian corridor, become fully operational, serious consequences await Russia.

The fact is that the export commodity flow moving from Central Asia through Russia sews together the Urals, the Volga region, Western Siberia, Far East into a whole. If this flow goes through alternative routes, it is likely that the problem of Russia's territorial integrity will worsen. . And with the growing role of China in the eastern part of Russia, this process is fraught with even greater troubles.”

However, the main transport problem in the Central Asian-Caspian region at the moment is the problem of transporting new oil intended for export, the volume of production of which in this region in the next 7-10 years can reach 60-80 million tons per year. The essence of this problem lies in the choice of routes for the main oil pipelines.

At one time, it was believed in Russia that the main pipeline for pumping oil to Western markets from the giant Tengiz field in Kazakhstan, as well as from a number of other oil fields in the Central Asian republics, would be an oil pipeline being built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) under the auspices of the Russian governments, Kazakhstan and Oman with the participation of several international oil companies, including the Russian Lukoil and the American Chevron, Arko, Mobil, Amoko, Oryx. The 1,500-kilometer pipeline is to run primarily through Russia and end at a new oil export terminal in Novorossiysk. Endless discussions about the CPC in the Russian media have been going on for several years, but its construction has actually stalled: the composition of the consortium and the shares of its individual participants in it have changed more than once, and no real progress in its construction itself is yet visible. According to the statement CEO CPC, construction of the pipeline is due to start in 1999. The pipeline's initial capacity will be 28 million tons of oil per year.

The plans of the Russian leadership also included putting under their control the transportation of new oil from the Azerbaijani shelf of the Caspian Sea. Russia's first successful step in this matter was the organization of transportation of the so-called early Baku oil through the quickly restored Baku-Groeny-Tikhoretsk-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, which began operating in April 1998.

However, it has recently become clear that the main flow of new oil from both sides of the Caspian Sea will bypass Russia, depriving it not only of the profits for pumping, but, most importantly, of control over the most important new oil arteries.

The point is, firstly, that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have actually already leaned towards transporting a significant part of their oil through the Caspian Sea to Baku and further west through the oil pipeline currently being designed along the bottom of the Caspian Sea. This project is strongly supported by the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as the United States. As noted in the Russian press, “we must face the truth: Azerbaijan is not only not interested in the opinion of Russia, it acts contrary to this opinion and is increasingly oriented towards the United States and Turkey. As Heydar Aliyev stated during the meeting with the US Ambassador to Baku Stanley Escudero, Azerbaijan gave official consent to laying the pipeline. This consent, he said, was in response to a request from the US administration. In March 1998, at a meeting of regional foreign ministers in Istanbul, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (Russia was not represented at the meeting) approved in a joint communiqué the idea of ​​an east-west corridor for the export of Caspian oil, including pipelines across the Caspian. (Now the term "east-west corridor" is a euphemism for "bypassing Russia"!) In particular, in April of this year, the US Trade and Development Agency (APR) allocated $750,000 to the government of Turkmenistan to finance a preliminary feasibility study substantiation of the project for laying a gas pipeline along the bottom of Kaepiya.

It is not without interest that the Turkmen government chose the American oil and gas concern Enron to prepare the feasibility study, which caused deep satisfaction of the State Department.

Thus, it can be stated that Baku is turning into main center forming an anti-Russian geopolitical alliance between the US and Turkey and the “newly independent” states”.

As far as can be judged, the US wants to use this gas pipeline in order to pave the way for Turkmen gas to Ukraine and to the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and gradually force Russian gas out of these markets, thereby undermining the position of Gazprom. Under the conditions of the formal division of the bottom of the Caspian Sea between the adjacent states, initiated by an agreement on this score between B. Yeltsin and N. Nazarbayev dated July 6, 1998, Russia is unlikely to be able to prevent the laying of these pipelines.

Secondly, the laying of a new oil pipeline from Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea is nearing completion.

Thirdly, there are a number of serious projects for pumping oil and gas from the Central Asian region in the southwestern and southeastern directions. As noted above, despite the fact that the United States is actively blocking any deals of the CIS republics with Iran, Turkmenistan has already laid a gas pipeline to Iran. Given the fact that Ashgabat is unable to agree with Moscow on mutually acceptable terms for the transportation of its main product - gas - through Russian territory, the Turkmen government is actively looking for importers for its gas in other directions. An intensive dialogue with foreign investors gives him reason to assert that already at the end of 1998 the construction of a 1,500-kilometer-long gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistani consumers will begin. "The fighting in Afghanistan will not interfere with the construction of the Davlatabad (Turkmenistan) - Afghanistan - Multan (Pakistan) gas pipeline," said the permanent representative of the Turkmen government in this project, the former minister of the oil and gas industry of Turkmenistan, Gojmurad Nazdzhanov. He told ITAR-TASS that "the leaders of the Taliban and the Northern Alliance expressed their readiness to assist in the implementation of the project." The gas pipeline will be built by the international company Sentgaz, whose shareholders are mainly companies from far abroad, including the American company Unocal Central Asia, which owns 36.5%.

During a visit to China by President of Turkmenistan S. Niyazov in early September 1998, he discussed in detail with the Chinese leadership plans for the implementation of the largest gas pipeline Turkmenistan-China-Japan, with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters. m per year and a length of 6700 km. The feasibility study for this “project of the century” is being developed by the China Petroleum Engineering and Construction Corporation, which has been operating in Turkmenistan since 1992. Now the Japanese Mitsubishi Corporation and the American company Exxon have joined this project. The leaders of these companies consider the export of gas from Turkmenistan to Southeast Asia a more profitable and reliable option than similar supplies from Russia.

In the autumn of 1997, Kazakhstan signed two intergovernmental agreements with the PRC - "On cooperation in the field of oil and gas" and "On laying two oil pipelines" - from Western Kazakhstan to Western China and Iran. We are talking about the transportation of oil from the two largest fields: Aktobem-naigas and Uzenmunaigaz. Controlling stakes in both of these enterprises belong to the Chinese. At the signing of the agreements, Li Peng, who was at that time the premier of the State Council of China, announced that the construction period of the oil pipeline from the Uzen field to Xincayang, 3,000 km long, would be 60 months and its development would begin immediately.

However, the main issue of transporting new oil in the region is the route of the Main Export Pipeline, which has been discussed for several years. Apparently, by now this issue has been finally resolved. Preference was given to the Turkish-Georgian project on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline (a deep-water Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea). Its length will be about 2,000 km, and the estimated cost will be $3.5 billion. Naturally, none of the exporting countries that will use this oil pipeline has that kind of money. Only Western investors can give it. The US and Turkey strongly lobbied for this project. In fact, Washington considers its implementation as its most important foreign policy and foreign economic task. To this end, in the United States, several working groups have long been created at the government level under the auspices of the National Security Council, dealing with the foreign policy, energy and commercial aspects of this project. Its final choice was made at a conference of representatives of interested states and oil and gas companies held in Istanbul at the end of May 1998, entitled "Crossroads of the World." It was organized by the Turkish government in cooperation with the US Trade and Development Agency and the Ministries of Commerce, Energy, Transportation and the US Department of State. The main speaker at the conference was President of Georgia E. Shevardnadze.

Speaking in Istanbul, F. Peña, then the US Secretary of Energy, officially announced a new "Caspian Sea Initiative", the essence of which is the decision that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be the main pipeline for exporting oil from both sides of the Caspian , laid through the territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Emphasizing the significance of this decision taken in Washington, Peña noted that for the first time in their history, three US government agencies associated with lending to such projects and guaranteeing private investments made in them, namely the Trade and Development Agency, the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank ) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will work together on this project within the framework of a specially created working group on Caspian financing. Moreover, as follows from the US minister's speech, the US president takes this project under his direct control, since the specified working group will report to the interdepartmental group on the Caspian, created at the White House. "Such attention from high-level politicians will help ensure that in the Caspian region, American commercial interests work in harmony with American diplomatic interests," Peña said.

Eximbank President J. Horman said at a conference that more than a quarter of his bank's budget in 1999 would be related to the Caspian region. According to him, the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will cost about 3 billion dollars. However, he stressed, answering journalists' questions, “there is no limit to the amount of money that we are ready to allocate for this project. J. Munos, Director of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, emphasized that investment proposals in the region, including investments in pipelines, already registered with the corporation, amount to $10 billion.

The schedule of further work provides for the soonest final determination of the route, as well as tariffs, taxes, etc. At the same time, the US representatives are pressing hard on the governments of the respective countries in order to achieve the most preferential conditions.

The launch of the "Caspian Sea Initiative" means unequivocally that the United States, together with its new friends in the CIS, has effectively pushed Russia away from the main export pipeline. Although Peña and his American colleagues talked soothingly about the unconditional “Russian presence” in the whole affair, referring to the participation of Lukoil in the development of Caspian oil, it was clear to everyone at the Crossroads of the World conference that hopes Russian leaders to let the main flow of new Caspian oil through the territory of Russia turned out to be just Manilov projects.

Somewhat earlier, explaining in one of the subcommittees of the Senate the impossibility of directing the main oil flow through Iran, a representative of the administration spoke very frankly about Russia: “Iran is a competitor, not a partner when it comes to exporting oil and gas ... Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which have experienced difficulties in exporting their energy resources through one of their competitors in Russia should not allow their independence and their economic well-being to become a hostage to another.”

3.2 Caspian oil and the US position ("Not just oil")

In the current conditions, when the US leadership sets itself the almost impossible task of dominating the Eurasian continent (stepping back from the more modest traditional American goal of preventing the domination of Eurasia by any one individual power in the region), domination in Central Asia is necessary for the United States not to "divide » it with the PRC, but to create a geopolitical bastion against Russia, and to contain the possible future expansionist ambitions of a growing China. And in this regard, the geopolitical precepts of Mackinder certainly play a role.

With all his own revisions of his famous concept of the Eurasian "heartland" - according to his theory, the key territory for dominating the Eurasian continent and the whole world - he always included the Caspian region in the "heartland", i.e. "core" territory of the Russian-Soviet empire. Moreover, in a number of geopolitical layouts of Mackinder and his followers, this region was considered as the most important component of the so-called axial region of the Heartland. It is this kind of consideration that plays a significant role in the development of Washington 's geostrategy in Asia .

Initially, the leadership of the United States chose Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as the main bases of its influence and activities in the new states of Central (in the United States this name is used in contrast to the name “Middle” familiar to the Soviet era) as the countries supposedly the most advanced along the path of post-Soviet democratization. However, pretty soon it became absolutely clear not so much to the American leadership as to American specialists in this region that no democratization (apart from the “democratic” veil thrown over the slightly modified state institutions of the Soviet period) was happening in them, that, despite the varying degree of demagogy about “progressive democratization”, all five countries of Central Asia are governed by authoritarian, if not totalitarian, methods based not on “class”, but on the basis of a clan structure that has long been deeply rooted here. Precisely preserved clan structure government controlled, which de facto existed in these republics even under Soviet rule, gave them the opportunity, more or less painlessly, to carry out "some economic reforms of the capitalist type after the formal liquidation of the party system of government and keep their industry afloat, which turned out to be unbearable for Russia, which did not have a traditional clan structure, with the exception of individual national republics in its composition.

Gregory Gleason, an American specialist on Central Asia, notes: “Recent political events have shown that the rhetoric of the Central Asian political leadership about adherence to the principles of democracy turns out to be nothing more than rhetoric. All the states of Central Asia are now governed mainly by orders. executive power. The constitutions of the Central Asian states proclaim the separation of powers, but in fact the parliamentary and legal institutions in the region function only as branches of the executive…”

When foreign observers evaluate the prospects for democracy in Central Asia, reference is inevitably made to the backwardness of culture, to the "feudal institutions" of traditional Central Asia, or to the more general conclusion that, in general, the countries of Central Asia seem to be moving in the direction of despotism.

Nevertheless, contrary to statements about its commitment to democracy and human rights, the United States, as well as other states of the far abroad, are guided in this region primarily by assessments of political and economic stability. Political stability in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan gives a guarantee of return on investment - and this is the main thing. Investments in the Quartet's economy are mainly focused on raw materials. At the same time, Tajikistan, with its ongoing long-term civil war, remains outside the sphere of economic interests of Western states.

In Kazakhstan, Western companies, including American ones, have firmly established themselves, despite the rather uneven style of the Kazakh authorities' relations with foreign investors. More than 80% of the strategic enterprises of Kazakhstan have already been transferred to the management of companies from far abroad. The extraction of chromium ores was transferred to Japan, uranium - to Belgium. American companies, such as Chevron, Mobil and a number of others, have established themselves in the main fields of Kazakh oil. Oil and gas production accounts for 70% of foreign investment. “The government of Kazakhstan practically no longer controls the strategic sectors of the economy: the extraction and export of oil, uranium, non-ferrous metals, grain production. The leadership of the country left in its competence only issues related to the preservation of power and the distribution of material resources received from the sale of resources.

In Kyrgyzstan, foreign capital flows mainly into the extraction of gold and non-ferrous metals. In the Kyrgyz gold business, in addition to enterprises of the state concern Kyrgyzaltyn, there are three largest gold mining companies in the world, in particular, the American Intertek. Total foreign investment in Kyrgyz gold mining exceeds $1 billion. In 1997, Kyrgyz gold miners produced 17 tons of gold worth 3 billion soms ($176 million). According to many experts, Kyrgyzstan is now firmly on the "dollar needle". Without subsidies, the economy of Kyrgyzstan will not be able to keep afloat.

A very favorable climate for foreign investment has been created in Turkmenistan. In July 1996, Turkmenistan and the Malaysian company Petronas signed an agreement on the exploration and development of three oil fields on the Turkmen shelf of the Caspian Sea under the terms of production sharing for a period of 26 years. The English oil company Monument received in 1996 the right to explore and produce oil on the territory of Nebit-Dag in western Turkmenistan for 25 years. The company itself finances this project and within seven years will receive 60% of the oil produced here. Later, the American company Mobil, a recognized world authority in the oil and gas business, joined the British. Under the agreement, Mobil received a 40% equity interest. During the visit of the President of Turkmenistan Niyazov to the United States, an agreement was signed on a strategic alliance between Mobil, Monument and the state concern Turkmenneft for the exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources of the Garashsyeylk block, which already produces about 80% of the total oil production in the country .

However, a realistic analysis of the situation showed American specialists, and then the government, that only Uzbekistan could be the only reliable support for long-term American policy in the region, despite the fact that its President Islam Karimov's human rights policy was one of the toughest among the CIS republics. causing loud international protests from human rights organizations.

Examining in detail the question of why no other Central Asian republic "is drawn" to the role of a regional stabilizer, the famous American "Kremlinologist" Frederick Starr noted: its territory after the collapse of the Union. It will be a country to be reckoned with due to its huge oil reserves... And yet, Kazakhstan's prospects are seriously limited by the ethnic and territorial division of the country between Russians and Kazakhs, the weakness of local institutions, the lack of scientific intelligentsia and underdeveloped industry...

As for Kyrgyzstan, despite President Askar Akaev's claims to turn the country into the "Switzerland of Central Asia" and his easy access to the Clinton White House, this small, mountainous country does not meet most of the criteria for a regional power. It is poor in resources; its public life is riddled with inter-clan rivalries, regional strife, and corruption; and since Russians make up 20% of its population, it faces ethnic tensions that could eventually threaten its very existence...

Among those late for the beginning of the division of the Turkmen "oil and gas pie" were primarily Russian companies, although the head of Turkmenistan has repeatedly stated that they are expected here and are ready to provide the same conditions that Mobil and Monument receive, for example. “However, we cannot wait indefinitely,” stressed S. Nyayaev.

Turkmenistan has already become so prosperous from selling its natural gas that the government of this otherwise poor country provides all residents with free electricity. However, with a large desert area, a population of less than four million, and a literally tiny intellectual elite, Turkmenistan will depend on others for its security, like the United Arab Emirates or Kuwait.”

Tajikistan, with its civil war and ethnic strife, cannot even think about the role of a regional leader, just like Afghanistan, which is at war and sells drugs. "This makes Uzbekistan the only candidate for a regional anchor".

After a series of economic failures of American business in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, American business leaders, as well as US leaders, finally decided to heed the advice of their experts and make Uzbekistan their mainstay in the region as the most economically efficient and most stable regime in Central Asia. They declared Uzbekistan their strategic partner. At the same time, they took into account that politically active Uzbek national minorities exist in all other states of the region.

Suffice it to say that Uzbekistan is the only one of the CIS republics in which the volume of GDP, compared with the indicators recorded at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, decreased not by half or two thirds, as in all the others, but by only 13 %. But already in 1995, Uzbekistan reached the level of production in 1990 and since then has been increasing its volumes. At the same time, the republic not only trades in oil, uranium and cotton - it is developing as an industrial state. Unlike other former Central Asian republics of the USSR, Uzbekistan is implementing its own model of economic development, which is based on the planning and guiding role of the state in the implementation of market reforms with the priority of industrial growth. In the six years since 1991, Uzbekistan has achieved energy and grain independence and at the same time retained the fourth place in the world in the cultivation of cotton.

The country has established a solid the legislative framework providing commercial interests of foreign investors. The risk when investing in Uzbekistan is the lowest in comparison with other former republics of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in recent years, the republic, in cooperation with foreign firms, has managed to create its own automotive industry (passenger cars, buses and Mercedes tractors are produced there), put the Tashkent Tractor Plant into full operation, and ensure the development of a number of other industrial productions. The growth of oil production became possible due to the investments of American and Japanese companies. After the commissioning of the Uzbek-American gold mining joint venture Zarafshan-Newmont, gold production increased to 78 tons per year.

If back in 1992 Uzbekistan imported up to 5 million tons of oil products from Russia, then since 1997 it itself began to export 2 million tons of oil products per year to neighboring countries.

In an effort to consolidate and expand political, economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the United States and other Western states, President Karimov since 1996 has changed his attitude towards the opposition and the media, creating conditions for more or less free expression of opinion. Uzbekistan has ratified international human rights treaties. For good behavior, Tashkent was encouraged in 1998 by a visit to the Republic by Hillary Clinton, who spent three days in Uzbekistan.

However, the most important encouragement for Karimov and confirmation of Uzbekistan's new close ties with the United States was the creation in February 1998 of a special joint US-Uzbek commission, which became an important forum for high-level contacts between the two countries. From the Uzbek side, the commission is headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kamilov, from the American side - Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the US Secretary of State for CIS Affairs S. Sestanovich. Four committees have been set up within the commission: political, military, economic reform and assistance, and an energy committee.

The first session of the commission took place on February 26-27, 1998 in Washington. In the Final Report published at its end, the parties stressed their satisfaction with the development of US-Uzbek relations in the six years since Uzbekistan gained independence. Both sides reaffirmed the “strong and dynamic nature of their relationship” and especially welcomed “successful consultations and coordination of actions on many foreign policy and security issues of mutual interest… Both sides reaffirmed the desirability of strengthening bilateral and multilateral support for common foreign policy goals, including strengthening regional cooperation between the states of Central Asia.

Uzbekistan agreed with the United States that the elections to the National Assembly (parliament) of Uzbekistan in 1999 and the President in 2000 should be free and fair in accordance with international standards and with the participation of international observers.

Americans praised Uzbekistan for passing a media law in December 1997 that bans censorship and guarantees journalists freedom of expression, investigation, and confidentiality of their sources of information.

Uzbekistan pledged to join the procedures established by the Center for Science and Technology established by the United States in Ukraine and to the Center itself, the main task of which is to use scientists and engineers from the CIS countries who previously worked in the defense sector, ostensibly for peaceful research, but in reality to recruit them to work on American assignments (in particular, in the field of fundamental “peaceful” research, which is of great interest to the US military and intelligence agencies). Naturally, this form of work (in which the Americans are even ready to supply the necessary equipment) costs the United States much less than inviting the relevant specialists to work in the United States at American wage rates. The Americans have long been practicing this kind of "scientific cooperation" with a number of Western European countries from those that are poorer.

As follows from the Final Report, American monopolies have already penetrated quite deeply into the republic's economy. It operates such giants of American business as Texaco, Newmont Mining, Case, Boeing, Caterpillar, Kellogg, Cheye Manhattan Bank. Legislative activity in the Republic is actually directed and controlled by the US Government Agency for international development helping local legislators to draw up a budget, reform the pension system, and “improve” legislation in the field of foreign investment in the economy of Uzbekistan.

A very important aspect of bilateral US-Uzbek relations is the military one. As early as October 13, 1995, a memorandum of understanding and cooperation was signed between the Ministries of Defense of the United States and Uzbekistan. And every year this kind of cooperation expands and deepens.

At the aforementioned session of the bilateral commission, the parties “noted the importance that their relations in the military and defense spheres play within the framework of general relations between the US and Uzbekistan. Given this kind of ties, the parties signed the 1998 Plan for Defense Cooperation, which describes in detail all activities in the field of military cooperation. The American side stated that by the decision of the US President, Uzbekistan is defined as a country that has the right to acquire defense materials of a certain category and related services at the expense of US funds of foreign military financing. Uzbekistan also participates in the American program of international military education and training and in a special broad program for training Uzbek special forces units. Thus, US-Uzbek cooperation in the military sphere has advanced quite far.

Special mention should be made of the so-called Centrazbat, a unit consisting of servicemen from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Formed two years ago, this military unit is attracting increasing attention from both NATO and the US military. During the meetings of the American-Uzbek commission, plans were agreed on for the further construction and exercises of this, so to speak, peacekeeping battalion. In June 1998, Tsentrazbat took part in the 20-day Cooperative Out-Sway-98 exercise in the US state of North Carolina, conducted under the NATO Partnership for Peace program. According to the Pentagon, the purpose of these exercises was "to improve the interaction on the ground between the military forces of NATO countries and their partners" in peacekeeping operations. The military units of the United States, Canada and the Netherlands and 13 partner countries took part in the exercise. (After the exercises, the Albanian unit almost in its entirety asked for political asylum in the United States.) However, the main exercises of the Central Battalion took place in September of this year in three stages in the territories of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. For the first time, a company of Russian servicemen from the 201st division stationed in Tajikistan also took part in such exercises. However, it is quite obvious that with or without Russian participation, NATO, primarily the United States, are training their local mercenaries in the Russian “underbelly”, designed to protect American interests in this region. At the same time, there is a very active competition between the US and Germany for control over the Uzbek military complex.

Removed from the lucrative oil and gas business in the region, Germany is slowly but surely strengthening its military and political positions here. At the same time, German politicians and the military attach particular importance to strengthening relations with Tashkent. "Uzbekistan is Germany's main partner in Central Asia," said Burkard Hirsch, Vice Speaker of the Bundestag, during his visit to Tashkent in April 1997. Dozens of representative offices of German firms and public organizations. But Bonn pays special attention to the construction of the Uzbek national army. Within the framework of a special program of the Bundeswehr, Uzbek tankers, artillerymen, signalmen, air defense officers, holding positions up to the deputy minister of defense, are now being trained in a number of German cities. Colonel of the German General Staff Burkhard Künapfel made it clear that in the near future officers of the Bundeswehr would be seconded to the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan as advisers.

Increasingly active attention to Uzbekistan has recently been shown by Turkey and China.

Thus, the countries of the former Central Asia are now becoming not only the second in fact, after NATO, the field of anti-Russian activity, but also a new node of rivalry between the states of the West and the East for control over this strategically extremely important region.

“If we look at the bigger geo-economic picture,” writes the paper, “we realize that there is more at stake than just one industry, one region, or one market. The big panorama includes more than just oil and gas.” The complete inactivity of Moscow, and sometimes even its incorrect negative actions against the countries of the region and the indifference of Russian capital to them, make it easier for the countries that are Russia's competitors to achieve their goals of turning the region into a semi-colonial appendage and an anti-Russian outpost of the West.

As you know, the most fashionable topic in the propaganda campaign of the United States and its allies in the anti-Russian coalition is the continuous exaggeration of the topic that the newly independent states have finally got rid of “Russian colonialism”. The Clinton administration's chief specialist on the Russian question, Deputy Secretary of State S. Talbott, once said, referring to the new republics of the Caspian region: "Today they have a chance to leave behind their experience of pawns on a fight each other for wealth and influence at their expense.

However, all of the above convincingly indicates that an unenviable role is destined for the republics of the region in the global "chess party" now being played out by the Western powers and their emissaries.

3.3 The Caspian geopolitical "knot" and US policy

The economic crisis in Russia largely determined the tone of the policy pursued by the Americans in the post-Soviet space. Washington's desire to actively use the increased opportunities, to pursue its interests aggressively, without regard to Moscow's reaction, is becoming more and more obvious. At the same time, we are talking not only about “pulling” the former Soviet republics to Western or Western-oriented international and regional structures, but also about building up our own presence in them in order to directly influence the internal political situation in these countries.

As Secretary of State M. Albright stated, “the task of the United States is to manage the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet empire ... This means that we still need to relentlessly defend our principles, interests and goals. It also means supporting Russia as long as it moves in the right direction. Our efforts have brought tangible results.”

The most priority in US foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is the Caucasian direction, opening the way to the promising energy resources of the Caspian Sea, which Washington seeks to take under its control.

The Caspian region in the 21st century promises to become the main supplier of energy resources to the world market. The reserves of hydrocarbon resources available here are estimated differently, but all experts agree that this region can take the 3rd place in the world in terms of energy production (after the Middle East and Siberia). The largest predicted regional oil and gas reserves are concentrated in Turkmenistan (6.5 billion tons of oil and 5.5 trillion cubic meters of gas - 4th place in the world in terms of explored gas reserves), Kazakhstan (6 billion tons of oil and 2 trillion cubic meters of gas) and Azerbaijan (3.5–5 billion tons of oil and 600 billion cubic meters of gas). Russian oil reserves in the Caspian (before the discovery in January 1998 of potentially oil-bearing structures in the northern sector of the sea - about 600 million tons on an area of ​​800 square kilometers) were estimated at 1 billion tons. Iranian stocks are even smaller. On the Caspian shelf itself, explored reserves amount to 12 billion tons of standard fuel, and if the sea is divided into national sectors, Kazakhstan will receive 4.5 billion tons, Azerbaijan - 4 billion tons, Russia - 2 billion tons, Turkmenistan - 1.5 billion tons and Iran - 0.9 billion tons. In addition, Baku claims that in "their" sector there are more than 3 billion tons of hydrocarbons that have not yet been discovered, and Akmola says that there are more than 3.5 billion tons off its coast. Even if the real resource potential of the region is deliberately overestimated, American companies, entering into grandiose contracts today, provide themselves with energy resources for 50–60 years in advance, because the monopoly they establish in the oil and gas regions of the Caspian makes it possible to regulate the pace of their development and control world oil prices.

During the period 1997-1998, the US administration significantly intensified contacts with the Caucasian states on various levels. Presidents G. Aliyev and E. Shevardnadze, as well as almost all other leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, paid official visits to Washington. In turn, high-ranking American officials from the State Department, the Department of Defense, economic departments, senators and congressmen, as well as representatives of the US business world are constantly sent to these countries. Such an intense dialogue, often characterized by the presence of anti-Russian elements in it, contributes to the implementation of the tasks set by the Clinton administration in the region and strengthens American influence there. The states of the Transcaucasus and the Caspian region are actively expanding the legal framework of relations with the United States, competing with each other in attracting American investment in the economy, and participating in the NATO program "Partnership for Peace".

The strengthening of the US position in the Caucasus is facilitated by a network of various American foundations and non-governmental organizations operating in the region (the Soros Foundation, the American National Democratic Institute, the Partnership Foundation, etc.), as well as representative offices of international organizations controlled by Washington. financial institutions. Extensive and developed connections in governments, the state apparatus, parliaments allow Americans to collect necessary information and even influence the preparation and decision-making by the leaders of the Caucasian countries. The activities of these American institutions (lectures and speeches, conferences, symposiums, seminars) are also effective tool impact on public opinion in the states of the Caucasus.

At the end of October 1998, President Clinton signed the so-called Model Law, which includes the Budgetary Law on Appropriations for Financial Assistance to Foreign States, which confirmed the intention of the US administration to allocate $801 million to the CIS countries for the period up to September 30, 2000. Of these, at least 228 million dollars will fall to the share of the Caucasian states. At the same time, 17.5 percent of this amount will be directed to activities "for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in this region, primarily in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh." Georgia and Armenia are provided with 37 and 35 per cent respectively of the specified amount.

In their official statements, the Americans emphasize that their policy in the Caucasus is aimed at strengthening the political and economic mechanisms existing here, advancing market democracy, resolving conflict situations, developing energy and creating an energy transport corridor between East and West, and cooperation in security issues.

According to Stephen Sestanovich, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Newly Independent States, "the Caspian energy strategy is a key element of the US administration's efforts to support the independence, sovereignty, and prosperity of the Caucasus countries."

Azerbaijan's strategic position in the center of the Caspian region predetermines its growing importance in the scale of American foreign policy priorities. Baku's key role in the implementation of projects for the development and transportation of Caspian energy resources, a clear line on establishing allied relations with Turkey and the West make Azerbaijan an attractive candidate for the US as a regional leader, a promising stronghold for consolidating the American presence in the region.

Hence, a noticeable intensification of the US administration's efforts to eliminate the factors hindering the political rapprochement between the US and Azerbaijan. We are talking, first of all, about the repeal of Amendment 907 of the Freedom Support Act (adopted by the US Congress in 1992 as a result of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh), which prohibits the provision of state aid to Azerbaijan and is the main “sore point” in bilateral relations.

In the fall of 1998, the State Department and the American oil lobby failed to get through Congress a decision to repeal it. However, in passing the FY1999 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, the US Congress added to the four 1997 exceptions to Amendment 907 (aid for humanitarian needs, for the promotion of democracy, for the prevention of weapons of mass destruction, and for Trade and Development Agencies) two new ones. Additional "exceptions" allow to implement programs of Eximbank and Foreign Private Investment Insurance Corporation (OPIC) in Azerbaijan. Thus, the restrictions imposed by Amendment 907 remain in force only in relation to direct economic and military assistance to the government of Azerbaijan. The narrowing of the scope of the amendment 907 was positively perceived by the Azerbaijani side .

Giving free hand in Azerbaijan to the main US financial and credit agencies is unambiguously associated with their role as the main mechanism for financing the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project, if the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium makes a corresponding decision.

After the conclusion of the “contract of the century” on January 20, 1994 for the development of the Azeri, Chirag and Gunashli fields in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea, the “Azerbaijani investment package” has grown significantly. At the moment it includes 12 international contracts with the largest oil companies in the amount of about 45 billion dollars. Investors include American oil companies Atoso, Ramco, Exhop, Unocal, Chevron, brie tang british petroleum, Norwegian Statoil, french "total".

In many contracts, American companies play the role of the operator, and therefore the controller of the transaction. It is on them that the "speed" of development of energy resources, the timing of the appearance of Caspian oil on world markets depend. It should be noted that so far the implementation of projects controlled by the Americans is proceeding slowly. This causes dissatisfaction on the part of Azerbaijanis and even reproaches that, supposedly, companies are deliberately holding back the development of oil fields, striving not so much to develop oil production, but to control it.

In fairness, however, it must be said that due to investments in the oil sector, Azerbaijan's GDP for 8 months of 1998 increased by 9.2 percent compared to the same period last year and amounted to $2.46 billion. The volumes of oil production increased noticeably (for 9 months of 1998 - 8374.5 thousand tons, which is by 24.1 percent higher than in January-September 1997). Foreign investments amounted to 724.2 million dollars, an increase of 61 percent.

Given the growing involvement of American capital in Azerbaijan, Washington is very concerned about the "margin of safety" of the regime existing in the country, promoting at the official level the thesis that political stability in Azerbaijan should be ensured not only by the authority of its current president, but also by a normally functioning, a reliable political system based on democratic reforms.

The creation of the Eurasian Transport Corridor, which includes main pipelines and trade routes from the Caspian Sea through the Transcaucasus and further to the Mediterranean Sea through Turkish territory, is one of the key priorities in the US policy in the Caucasus. Increasingly drawn into Caspian affairs, the United States, together with Turkey, is persistently advocating the passage of the main export oil pipeline along the route Baku - the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, since this allows excluding the territory of Iran from the transportation of energy resources, as well as reducing the dependence of the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus on Russia.

More than 300 specialists in the administration are developing Washington's "Caspian strategy". Congress and research centers of the USA. In 1998, about 40 major conferences and hearings in both houses of Congress were held with their participation, aimed at determining the most effective methods for implementing the "Caspian course" .

Speaking on September 9, 1998 at the Washington Institute for Central Asia, R. Morningstar, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Energy Policy in the Caspian Basin, formally confirming the commitment to the multi-variant pipeline scheme declared earlier by the Americans, stated that the projects of laying the Baku oil pipeline should be the first to be implemented - Ceyhan and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey. Repeating the traditional assurances of readiness to cooperate with Russia, he actually rejected the option of using the transit capabilities of Ukraine and Romania, citing the fact that it may take from 5 to 10 years.

Speaking before him from the same podium, Director of the Department of Transcaucasian and Central Asian States S. Yang emphasized the "strategic importance" for the United States of presence in the region and the need for interaction between the countries of this zone in order to counter the dominance of "any one large state." The creation of the East-West transport corridor with the commissioning of its "key Even" - the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline should, in his words, help to weaken the dependence of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian states on Russia and "strengthen their ability to maintain equal relations with their northern neighbor." As for the United States, as Yang emphasized, they "not only can, but must" influence the processes taking place in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, as he acknowledged, the main motives for American activity in the Caspian zone are not so much economic as US geostrategic interests.

If the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is put into operation, the estimated cost of pumping oil through it will be $17 per ton (against $25 expected through the "Novorossiysk pipeline"). Although the Turkish side expects significant revenues from the transit of Caspian oil (the estimated annual volume of pumping is about 60 million tons), the construction of pipeline infrastructure in the highlands is a technologically complex and very capital-intensive process, and its quick payback is doubtful. In addition, the high percentage of active hydrogen sulfide in Caspian oil requires the use of expensive anti-corrosion pipes, and the difference in the structures of Kazakh and Azerbaijani oil (the former contains a lot of tar-asphalt substances and paraffin, which requires its additional purification) significantly limits the possibility of their joint transportation.

It should be noted that economic considerations do not play a priority role for Washington. The American position is dictated primarily by geostrategic considerations and, above all, by the desire to strengthen the position of Turkey, its main ally in the region, by tying to it the Caucasian and Central Asian "little brothers" from the former Soviet Union. In the future, this means the establishment of regional integration, covering a much wider range of interests than just oil. One of the main goals is the actual weakening of Russia's position on its southern borders.

The American administration (with the support of Baku, Tbilisi and Ankara) has politicized the Baku-Ceyhan project so much that now, despite the arguments of the companies financing it about the untimeliness of construction and the “unbearable burden of costs”, it is no longer able to reverse. In this situation, Washington is forced to use all its influence in order to persuade oil companies in favor of the Turkish route, promising them that it will provide maximum assistance through the state line to its economic profitability. To this end, efforts are being made to create a favorable legal and commercial framework in transit countries (i.e., Georgia and Azerbaijan), to resolve the Azerbaijani-Turkmen dispute over the ownership of disputed fields in the Caspian Sea, to secure the necessary funding and political risk insurance from US financial institutions, and obtaining guarantees from Kazakhstan regarding the export of its oil through the future Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

The economic crisis in Russia is also used as another argument in favor of the Turkish route. Expressing doubts about the possibility of implementing the Blue Stream project in the current economic situation to lay a gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea, the Americans say that Russia could supply gas to Turkey by connecting to the future trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan.

American representatives assess as "progress" the confirmation of the commitment of the two countries to a multivariate pipeline system made at the last Russian-American summit and speak in favor of holding Russian-American consultations on Caspian affairs on this basis. This shows the understanding that without Russia, especially with its resistance, the implementation of large-scale projects in the Caspian region is doomed to failure. Therefore, calls are being made at all levels for cooperation with Moscow in the development of Caspian energy resources, including the implementation of plans for the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

Significant amounts of funds already invested or planned by American companies to invest in the oil business in the Caspian determine the trend towards building up the US political and, after that, military presence in the Transcaucasus. In essence, the inclusion of the Caspian region into the sphere of "vital US interests" is taking place on a whim.

The undertaken research allows to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Caspian region has the potential to become the second Middle East within 15–20 years. Moreover, we are talking about an analogy associated not only with the scale of energy resources, but also with the ethno-confessional composition of the population. Hence the inter-civilizational, ethnic and religious collisions woven into the fabric of the classical struggle for oil. All this inevitably turns the region into another seething cauldron of world politics. In other words, a strategic center of international tension is emerging in the south of Russia, complicating the country's security in geostrategic terms. Its impact will also be felt in the sense that the importance of our own oil fields, say, in Siberia, will decrease. Russia willy-nilly finds itself in a network of very complex relations with its neighbors - the countries of the Caspian Sea, as well as with extra-regional powers. Russia, with its ruined economy and unclear political and social prospects, will find it very difficult to defend its own strategic interests, which most countries of the region are interested in infringing. It is also paradoxical that the part of domestic businessmen who are trying to lure Western investors into the development of Caspian energy resources to the detriment of state interests is playing against Russia. Such a course of events will lead to the fact that Russia will have to move the line of national security to the borders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Such a prospect is inevitable while maintaining the current direction of the reforms and the country's foreign policy.

2. The independent Central Asian countries of the CIS - Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, as well as Kazakhstan, with a total population of 50 million people, together with Afghanistan adjoining them, represent an important Central Asian geopolitical "node" of the modern world. First of all, these five countries, which used to be part of the USSR, are just beginning to make their own. new history as sovereign states.

3. This circumstance is of cardinal importance for their domestic and foreign policy. In terms of foreign policy, the main point is that, although these republics are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the current complete amorphousness of the Commonwealth allows and even, one might say, encourages other states to actively fight for influence in this region as a whole and in each of his countries separately. This struggle is waged to a certain extent against Russia, which considers itself the patron-guardian of these countries, and the entire region as its undisputed sphere of influence.

4. Geopolitically, the region is at the crossroads of traditional routes from Europe to Asia. It was through Central Asia that the famous medieval "Silk Road" of trade relations between the two continents passed. The expansion of Russia in the 19th century, and then the formation of the communist Soviet Union, blocked this path. Continental trade and transport links between Europe and Asia began to pass through the southern territory of Russia itself, and the Central Asian region of the empire remained, as it were, on the sidelines. And now the states of this region, closed in their space, are actively striving to break out of geographic and economic isolation and establish direct communications with their southeastern, southern and western neighbors, bypassing Russia. Hence the idea of ​​reviving the old "Silk Road" at a new transport and technical level and active efforts to quickly restore this kind of transport corridor.

5. The second most important geopolitical circumstance lies in the resource wealth of the Central Asian states, primarily in their emerging role as suppliers of hydrocarbon raw materials (oil and gas) to the world market. So far there have only been two largest exporter hydrocarbon fuels on a global scale: the Middle East and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union).

The Middle East has been and remains the main supplier of oil to Europe, Asia and, to a certain extent, the United States. Despite the radical redistribution of ownership of foreign oil companies in favor of local regimes (and the corresponding redistribution of income) in the Middle East almost a quarter of a century ago, Western oil monopolies, primarily American ones, have largely retained overall control over the extraction and transportation of oil by the countries of the Middle East. . This circumstance gives the US a colossal lever of influence on the policies of Western European and many Asian countries.

6. The second world region of large-scale oil (and also gas) exports - Russia - has so far been outside the direct influence of foreign oil and gas monopolies, which, to a certain extent, gave Moscow greater freedom of political action on the world stage. The proceeds from oil and gas exports largely financed the social articles of the Soviet, and now Russian, federal budget. And although, according to foreign sources, oil production in Russia has decreased by 50% over the past 10 years, it still manages to maintain oil exports at a level of over 80% "pre-perestroika", since domestic consumption of oil and oil products in Russia is also strong. fell.

The relatively recently discovered colossal reserves of hydrocarbon fuel in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (including reserves under the bottom of the Caspian Sea) and the projected significant increase in oil production by these countries, as well as Azerbaijan, on the Caspian shelf, as well as the expanding fuel and energy capabilities of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is turning the Central Asian region together with Azerbaijan into a new, most important source of oil and gas. For this source - the Central Asian-Caspian one - a colossal political and economic struggle has unfolded, in which the United States and its oil and gas companies play the first violin.

7. It is the struggle for unconditional control over these oil and gas reserves (as well as over Uzbek and Kyrgyz uranium, Kyrgyz and Tajik gold, Turkmen and Uzbek cotton and other raw materials and agricultural resources of these states) that determines Washington's assertive strategy in the Caspian-Central Asian region . For the stakes, according to Washington, are extremely high.

1.Abich H.W. von. - Etude sur les presquiles de Kertsch et de Taman.-Bull. soc. geol. France, (2)21 , 259–279, 1984.

2.Abich H.W. von.-Ueber die Produktivitat und die geotektonischen Verhaitnisse der kaspischen Naphtare-gion.-Jb. k.k. geol. Reichsanst., 29, 1, 165–189, 1989.

3.Andrews E.AT. – Rock oil, its geological relations and distribution.-Amer. J.Sci. (2), 32, 85–93, 1981.

4.Cooper AS.-The genesis of petroleum and asphaltum in California.-Bull. California State Mining Bur.,16 , 3–66, 1989.

5.Coustau I.-Strategie de l "exploration. - Rapport interne, 1986.

6.Demaison G. The generative basin concept. – mem. amer. Assoc. Petroleum Geol., 35, 114, 1994.

7.Desprairies P. - Le nouveau visage de la crise petroliere.-Total Information,95 , 20–24, 1993.

8.Dienes L. and Shabad T - The Soviet energy system.-Wiley, Washington, 1979.

9.GadonJ. L.- Perspectives petrolieres de I "U.R.S.S. Revue Energie,365 , 337–341, 1984.

10.Gruner Schtumberger A. – La botte magic. – Fayard, Paris, 1987.

11.Halbouty M.T. – The time is now for all explorations to purpose fully search for the subtle traps. – mem. amer. Assoc. Petroleum Geol., 32, 1–10, 1982. Hildreth. - Observations on the bituminous coal deposits of the valley of Ohio, and the accompanying rock strata.-Amer. J.Sci.,29 , 1–154, 1986.

12.Klemme H. Field size distribution related to basin characteristics. - Oil and Gas, Dec. 26, 176, 1993.

13.Levorsen A. 1. Relationship of oil and gas to unconformities in the Midcontinent region. In: Wrather and Lahee (eds.): Problems of Petroleum Geology, 761–784, 1934.

14.Levorsen A.J.- Geology of Petroleum.-Freeman, San Francisco, 1956.

15.Meverhoff A.A. Developments in mainland China 1949–1968.-Bull. amer. Assoc. Petroleum GeoL, 54, 8, 1567–1580, 1970.

16.Meyerhoff A.A.– Soviet petroleum: history, technology, geology, reserves, potential and policy.-Assoc. amer. Geogr., Project on Soviet natural resources,10 , 1980.

17.Owen E. W. - Trek of the oil finders.-Mem. amer. Assoc. Petrol. Geol., 6, 1985.

18.Schlumheryer A.G.-La boite magique ou les resources du petrole.-Fayard, Paris, 1987.

19.P. – Rapport de mission en U.R.S.S. (rapport interne), 1964.

20.Odom, W.E. (Lt.-Gen» USA, Ret.) US Policy Toward Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. – Caspian Crossroads, Vol. 3, Num. I, Slimmer 1997.

21. Cohen, A. The new "great game". Oil politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder No. 1065, January 25, 1996.

22.Gusher, A. Pacer's run. On Sat. "Near Abroad as a new foreign policy factor", M.1998.

23.Kukushkin, V. Competitors or partners? On Sat. " Actual problems politics and economics”, M., 1998.

24.Merzlyakov, Yu. Legal status of the Caspian Sea. On Sat. "Actual problems of politics and economics", M., 1998.

25.Tkachenko, A. Who will occupy the Russian niche? On Sat. "Russia in a new geopolitical situation", M., 1998.

26.Trofimenko, G.A. Central Asian region: US policy and problems of oil and gas exports., in Sat. "USA and Russia: a paradigm shift", M., 1998

27. Trofimuk A.A. Some important lessons from the discovery of the West Siberian oil and gas province. Geology and Geophysics, 15, 5, 1994.

28.Chernyavsky, S.I. Caucasian strategy of Washington. - "Independent newspaper" , October 16, 1998