On July 3, 1967, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Yu. V. Andropov, sent a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU on the advisability of creating an independent department within the KGB, which would be responsible for combating ideological sabotage.

On July 17, 1967, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered the note by Yu. V. Andropov and adopted resolution No. P 47/97 on the formation of the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

On July 25, 1967, the order of the chairman of the KGB of the USSR No. 0096 was issued, according to which the staff of the 5th department was determined in 201 officials.

On August 11, 1989, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, according to which the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR was transformed into the Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System of the KGB of the USSR.

Structure

• 1st department (established in 1967) - work through the channels of cultural exchange, creative unions, research institutes, medical and cultural institutions, foreigners;
• 2nd department (formed in 1967) - work together with the PSU against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states, suppression of the activities of nationalist and chauvinist elements, as well as the "People's Labor Union";
• 3rd department (established in 1967) - work on the line of student exchange, students and teachers;
• 4th department (formed in 1967) - work in the line of religious organizations; curation of the church;
• 5th department (established in 1967) - searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and leaflets, checking signals about the facts of terrorism, helping local state security agencies to prevent mass anti-social manifestations;
• 6th department (formed in 1967) - planning and information work, analysis of data on ideological sabotage: “generalization and analysis of data on the activities of the enemy to carry out ideological sabotage. Development of measures for forward planning and information work”;
• 7th Department (established in 1969) - "Identification and verification of persons who have intentions to use explosives and explosive devices for anti-Soviet purposes" . This department was also given the functions of searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and checking threat signals against the country's top leaders;
• 8th department (established in 1973) - "identification and suppression of ideological sabotage actions of subversive Zionist centers";
• 9th department (established in 1974) - “conducting the most important developments on persons suspected of organized anti-Soviet activities (except for nationalists, churchmen, sectarians); detection and suppression of the hostile activities of persons producing and distributing anti-Soviet materials; carrying out intelligence and operational measures to uncover the anti-Soviet activities of foreign revisionist centers on the territory of the USSR”;
• 10th department (established in 1974) - "carrying out counterintelligence activities (together with the PGU) against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet organizations (except for hostile organizations of Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists)";
• The 11th department (formed in 1977) - "implementation of operational-Chekist measures to disrupt the subversive actions of the enemy and hostile elements during the preparation and holding of the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow." After the Olympiad, the department was entrusted with the tasks of monitoring scientific, trade union, medical and sports organizations;
• 12th group (as a department) - coordination of the work of the 5th department with the state security agencies of the socialist countries;
• 13th department (established in 1982) - "identification and suppression of manifestations that tend to develop into politically harmful groupings that contribute to the enemy's ideological sabotage against the USSR";
• 14th department (established in 1982) - "work to prevent actions of ideological sabotage aimed at the sphere of the Union of Journalists of the USSR, employees of the media and socio-political organizations";
• 15th department (established in 1983) - work on the objects of the Dynamo sports society;
• Financial department;
• Personnel group;
• Mobilization work group;
• Secretariat.

Vladimir Tolts: Let me remind you how we started this series of programs.
In May 1967 Yuri Andropov was appointed head of the KGB. Having settled in his Lubyanka office, on July 3 he sent his first Chekist message to the Central Committee, which stated in particular:

“The materials available in the State Security Committee testify that the reactionary forces of the imperialist camp, led by the US ruling circles, are constantly stepping up their efforts in terms of stepping up subversive actions against the Soviet Union. At the same time, they consider psychological warfare to be one of the most important elements of the overall system of combating communism.(...)
The enemy seeks to transfer planned operations on the ideological front directly to the territory of the USSR, aiming not only at the ideological decomposition of Soviet society, but also at creating conditions for acquiring sources of political information in our country. (…)
Under the influence of an ideology alien to us, a certain part of the politically immature Soviet citizens, especially among the intelligentsia and young people, develop moods of apoliticality and nihilism, which can be used not only by obviously anti-Soviet elements, but also by political talkers and demagogues, pushing such people to politically harmful actions. (…)"

Vladimir Tolts: This is what things have come to!.. It should be noted that over the long years of the existence of Soviet departments, a certain canon has developed for the newly appointed chief to write his first paper “upstairs”. At first, it was necessary to state the problems and shortcomings that had accumulated during the functioning of the predecessors, as well as their own, of course, new vision of these problems, and then impress the management with their proposals for “eradication”, and also ask for additional funding for this. Andropov's note was in full conformity with these unwritten rules.
Well, Andropov's first proposals boiled down to the following:

The State Security Committee considers it necessary to take measures to strengthen the counterintelligence service of the country and make some changes to its structure. The expediency of this is caused, in particular, by the fact that the current functionality of counterintelligence in the center and in the field provides for the concentration of its main efforts on organizing work among foreigners in the interests of identifying, first of all, their intelligence activities, i.e., it is turned outward. The line of struggle against ideological sabotage and its consequences among the Soviet people has been weakened, and due attention is not paid to this area of ​​work.
In this regard, it is proposed to create an independent Directorate (fifth) in the central apparatus of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the task of organizing counterintelligence work to combat ideological sabotage in the country, entrusting it with the following functions:
organizing work to identify and study processes that could be used by the enemy for the purpose of ideological sabotage;
detection and suppression of the hostile activities of anti-Soviet, nationalist and church-sectarian elements, as well as the prevention (together with the organs of the MOOP) of mass riots;
development in contact with the intelligence of the ideological centers of the enemy, anti-Soviet emigre and nationalist organizations abroad;
organization of counterintelligence work among foreign students studying in the USSR, as well as on foreign delegations and teams entering the USSR through the Ministry of Culture and Creative Organizations.
In the local bodies of the KGB, to form, respectively, the 5th departments-departments-departments

Vladimir Tolts: And already on July 17, 1967, the Politburo of the Central Committee takes a positive decision on these proposals of the new head of the KGB. This is how the Five appeared - 5th Directorate of the KGB, the program about which you are listening now

Almost a year after Andropov's appointment to the Lubyanka, on May 6, 1968, he sends Brezhnev a report " On the results of the work of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies for 1967". (Usually such reports are compiled in December of the reporting year. But Andropov was given a year to master and transform a new field of activity for him.) This document, still little used by researchers, is extremely interesting not only for our topic, but also for studying and understanding the history of the KGB generally.
It specifically stated:

Special place in reporting period took measures to organize active counteraction to the ideological sabotage of the enemy. In pursuance of the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU on this issue of June 17, 1967, the Fifth Directorate in the State Security Committee and the Fifth Directorate - departments - departments in the territorial bodies of the KGB were created.
In order to raise the level of intelligence and operational work of local KGB bodies, Chekist apparatuses have been created in the regions and cities of the country, which have grown economically in recent years or have acquired important defensive significance and are now of intelligence interest to the enemy.

Vladimir Tolts: Further, in accordance with the traditional style of this kind of annual reports on successes and valor, it was about achievements in intelligence and operational work, in particular - this also applies to the Five - about " disruption of ideological sabotage timed by the enemy to coincide with the 50th anniversary of Soviet power» In the same way, the following paragraph was directly connected with the 5th Directorate:

In order to intercept and control the channels of penetration of the enemy into our country, work continued to ensure the successful implementation of operational games. Currently, 9 such games are being played, including 4 with US intelligence, as well as 8 games with the center of the NTS and 2 with out-of-band centers of Ukrainian nationalists.

Vladimir Tolts: We will talk about what "undercover and operational work" and "operational games" are. In the meantime, let us turn to the next paragraph of the Andropov report for 1967, which concerns not only the successes of the Five, but the entire KGB as a whole.

In 1967, as part of the delegations tourist groups, exhibition participants, 378 operational workers, as well as more than 2,200 agents and 4,400 proxies were sent to the capitalist countries, with the help of which 192 foreigners were identified, connected or suspected of having links with the special services of the enemy, suppressed60 attempts to indoctrinate Soviet citizens not to return to their homeland, 230 people were found to have compromised themselves by misbehavior (18 people were recalled to the USSR ahead of schedule).
The formation of the so-called fifth line subdivisions in the structure of the KGB bodies made it possible to concentrate the necessary efforts and funds on measures to combat ideological sabotage from outside and the emergence of anti-Soviet manifestations within the country. As a result of the measures taken, it was possible to basically paralyze the attempts of the enemy's special services and propaganda centers to carry out a series of ideological sabotage in the Soviet Union, timed to coincide with the half-century anniversary of the Great October Revolution. Along with the exposure of a number of foreigners who came to the USSR on subversive missions, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press exposing the subversive activities of the enemy’s special services, more than 114 thousand letters and parcels with anti-Soviet and politically harmful literature were confiscated in the international postal channel.
Based on the fact that the enemy, in his calculations to undermine socialism from the inside, makes a big bet on the propaganda of nationalism, the KGB agencies took a number of measures to curb attempts to carry out organized nationalist activities in a number of regions of the country (Ukraine, the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkarian, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics).

Vladimir Tolts: You noticed? We are talking only about "organized nationalist activity." Not a word about unorganized here. Meanwhile, the May-June (1967) unrest in Chimkent (Kazakhstan) - the largest unrest of the period of Brezhnev's rule (about a thousand people participated; seven were killed during the suppression, 50 were injured), and unrest in Frunze, where the crowd defeated and burned three police departments - all this was not only vivid episodes of the renewed anti-militia "hooligan war", but also had a noticeable nationalist coloring. In the same way, it is impossible not to notice the nationalist component in the beatings of students in Tiraspol (even the then Prosecutor General Roman Rudenko noted in his special message “upstairs” that only Jews were beaten there), and in the 1967 unrest in Abkhazia, which took place under the slogan “legalization of the Abkhaz toponymy ”and the requirements for granting privileges to Abkhazians when applying for a job and in universities ...
Most of the Soviet people living at that time had never heard of all this. Yes, and Andropov's Soviet secret report does not contain all this specifics. On the other hand, the deaf recognition of "shortcomings" in it is skillfully linked to the "ideological sabotage of the enemy" and the insufficiency of agents.

The fight against the enemy's ideological sabotage is still insufficiently purposeful and effective. Chekist work in this direction has not been fully developed due to the weakness of the agent positions of the KGB in those sections of the population that may turn out to be a favorable environment for carrying out actions of ideological sabotage. This can partly explain the fact that the KGB failed to timely prevent certain anti-Soviet and anti-social manifestations, including the riots that took place in some cities of the country.

Vladimir Tolts: How great was the intelligence apparatus of the KGB, the “weakness of positions” of which did not allow to prevent « individual anti-Soviet and anti-social manifestations, including riots» in 1967? And it should be noted that this is the only year of Brezhnev's rule when firearms were used to suppress unrest. And three times. As a result, according to a certificate presented to Gorbachev in 1988 by KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov, 264 people were killed and 71 wounded. The Andropov report of 1967 gives us the opportunity to imagine the number of KGB agents of that time.

In 1967, the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, which is about 15% of the entire agent apparatus, the number of which, taking into account the agents excluded from it, did not change significantly during the year.

Vladimir Tolts: This means that the total number of agents in the country in 1967 was approximately 166,347 people. This is 55 times more than the figure given in the previous program with reference to General Bobkov by Lieutenant Colonel Popov. Of course, it must be borne in mind that part of these agents worked fruitfully and not very much outside the borders of their homeland. Well, let's say the domestic accounted for half! Yes, even two-thirds! And the Five (which is unlikely) had only a small fraction of this left ... All the same, the remainder of those agents who fought day and night with ideological sabotage and other intrigues of the enemy on the "internal front" significantly exceeds the number named by the above-mentioned ranks of the 5th Directorate. Well, so that you can more clearly imagine the total number of KGB agents in 1967, I will say that this is a little less than the population of modern Novocherkassk and a little more than the population of modern Abakan.

What can be said about our political views and views of that time? When I say "ours", I don't mean wide circles of detectives: we are talking about a small group of friends and acquaintances, mostly young people. In general, it was the service in the KGB that almost from the very beginning narrowed the circle of my attachments: to share what was on my soul, not to mention professional topics, it was possible with only a few. But in the first years of service, we were all merry fellows, lovers of making fun of each other, mimicking the authorities. We were changing before our eyes with terrifying speed.

Vladimir Tolts: This is an excerpt from the book of one of the "five-thirsts", called with some defiance "Yes, I worked there." Despite this "courage" - the book was published in pre-Putin 1997, when the attitude of the reading public towards the fighters of the invisible front in the fight against ideological sabotage was much less benevolent than later - the author disappeared behind the pseudonym "Evg.Grig." However, the pseudonym was so transparent that the authors of the reviews immediately deciphered it. – Colonel Evgeny Grigorievich Semenikhin - "cover" from the 5th department, who worked for a long time under the roof of the VAAP.

One of our brigades had to "work" for the late General Grigorenko. I don’t know why, either by chance, or the authorities had some kind of scent, but neither our task force, nor any of my close friends or friends in the outdoor scene have ever received such an “honor” - maybe we were considered , and not without reason, experts in surveillance of foreigners.
As they later said, Grigorenko was quick, observant, and one day, far from being wonderful for the detectives, he approached them and said:
- Aren't you ashamed to follow me, old man?
Passage! Explanatory notes and reports! The "victims" the next day managed not only to have a great drink at the post, but also to catch the eye of the authorities after that! Defeat! One after another, the heads of the detectives flew into the dust to the whistle of the guiding sword from the well-known emblem of the Chekists. No shield from the same emblem could help - reprimands and censures, party "enemas" and analysis at operational meetings fell like a hail of bricks ...
And we received information that the general was not at all crazy, that he was put in a "psychiatric hospital" because he was "painfully smart", that he fought through the whole war and has a "bag of orders", that he is modest in everyday life - or rather, simply poor that he has a kind, intelligent face ...

Vladimir Tolts: This is Evgeny Grigorievich talking about his still “five-hearted” service - in the “seven”, which at that time was in charge of “surveillance” (NN). Hence the name of the employees of the "seven" in Chekist slang - "Nikolai Nikolaichi". (Did Yuz Aleshkovsky know about this when he wrote the story of the same name?) Well, among the people, “outdoor advertising” was called “treadmills”. By the way, a colleague of Colonel Semenikhin, FSB Major General in the reserve, Alexander Mikhailov, “the very first”, according to him, “a PR man in the KGB system” also talks about the work of the topnunov in that distant time.

… One day, information comes that a group of dissidents wants to hold a demonstration in the amount of ... eight people. In those days villainy was unheard of. From the moment this information was received, these eight began to "graze". And there was a young person among them, but impudent. Feeling the "tail", she began to run from this "tail", since she had strength, and sports dexterity. Both on the street and on the subway. She jumped from train to train, rushed up the escalators. And in those years, respectable people worked in outdoor advertising. Many are aged. They are not capable of such marathons. They recruited a team of young people, and by the end of the day they were "tongue on the shoulder." But there was a lady in the brigade. Maria was her name. Athletic and portly. Skin-tight leather coat - well, a girl with an oar from Gorky Park for sure. And it began. The one up the escalator - ours is not far behind. Just an obstacle course. But everything comes to an end. And so, having escaped during rush hours along the escalator at the station of Revolution Square, they actually ended up at a dead end. Help did not come, and therefore Maria, one might say, is face to face with her ward. She pressed the dissident with her leather chest, and whispered the last warning in her ear - "If you still...

Vladimir Tolts: In general, these were "heroes"! You can see for yourselves... Let us return, however, to the memoirs of Evgeny Semenikhin, a five-folder.

I remember how, during a feast, several of our writers, who "upstairs" were classified as "anti-Soviet", were discussing among fellow bookworms.
“No, guys,” someone said. - They are not anti-Soviet. It’s just that they write the truth - that’s what turns out to be anti-Soviet ...

Vladimir Tolts: Say "schizophrenia"? Bifurcation of consciousness and worldview? Well, not without it, of course. But still, I don't think that's the main thing. This, in my opinion, is only a consequence of the collision of the "Soviet", nurtured by the Soviet ideology of consciousness with a life that did not fit into its Soviet ideological explanation. With all the seemingly extensive information of the Chekists about the true diversity of the life of compatriots, the matrix of interpretation of this life hammered into them did not make it possible to independently evaluate it, life. However, Colonel Semenikhin convinces us that the KGB awareness should not be exaggerated.

Vladimir Tolts: Let me remind you: the first half of our program ended with bitter words from the memoirs of one of the employees of the Five (5th KGB Directorate), Colonel Evgeny Grigoryevich Semenikhin

Over the long years of service, I was more than once amazed at how the KGB operational staff was informed about any serious incidents, events, news - I mean, of course, not the generals. It is hard for a civilian to believe this, but ordinary Chekists, as a rule, officially learned about something from the leadership later than many civilians. We, like the whole country, heard about some things only from the reports of “enemy voices”, which were generously thrown with huge money, or from the Western press, when it accidentally fell into the hands of those who knew languages.
So, quite primitively, frankly, we perceived the events of a planetary scale. We diligently performed our duty. Unbelief, doubts, remorse were hidden deep inside those who had them. And in this there was even a considerable common sense. The system was "on" and aimed at stabilizing a faltering society - if only it could be stabilized. It soon turned out that it was possible - for a long 18 years.

Vladimir Tolts: Well, these 18 years have passed. Gorbachev's perestroika began in 1985. And everything seemed to change little by little. In August 1991, much to the dismay of some quintuplets, a conspiracy called a putsch aimed at restoring the foundations of the already irrecoverable Soviet state order ended in complete failure. By that time, the ideology that the Five had so diligently but ineffectively guarded had also completely collapsed. Yes, and she herself to a large extent became an artifact, albeit unexplored by historians, but still of the past. And now I'm calling Semenikhin. I propose to take part in my historical cycle. And he: “I have never betrayed my Motherland, my friends, or my employees…. I'm free to anyone on Radio Liberty, that is -VT) I don't wish you well. Be healthy!”… Some other retired quintuples refuse otherwise. They have changed their views, they are walking in the “democrats” now. Some even stand up for Khodorkovsky, having previously worked at Yukos. And Svoboda is not only listened to, like Semenikhin, but sometimes they appear in its programs. But that's about your Five, so no - not in any! They explain the refusals, sort of even justifying themselves: who cares? Well, I did not deal with dissidents. Well, I worked “on the ground” - I was looking for anonymous people ... Well, in general, I would not want to offend my senior comrades! ..
- What is it? Fear? Who are they afraid of? And how did others preserve this long-standing hatred, these clichés of an ideology that has collapsed into oblivion? I ask retired major general Yuri Kobaladze, a former employee of the First Central Command of the KGB of the USSR and head of the press bureau of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

Yuri Kobaladze: It's also understandable, in my opinion. Indeed, many people still say that I served the Soviet Union and do not recognize any current government. For me, my homeland remains the Soviet Union. There are also such people - these are their beliefs. There are people who, having left, started new life, do not want to remember the past at all. When I headed the press bureau of the Foreign Intelligence Service, I sometimes persuaded former employees. I say: "Well, this is a completely harmless question, why don't you speak to the press, give an interview?" "No, I don't want to remember it at all - this is my past life." There are such people. There are people who are very active in political life. That is, here every person is an island in the ocean, I don’t know what each person’s motives are. But even such a motive is acceptable that I don’t want to offend my current colleagues, I don’t want to reveal things that could indirectly harm them. Understandable human position, I do not blame them for this.

Vladimir Tolts: The question is not in condemnation, I want to understand these people. I don't quite understand. I see that, of course, everything is changing a lot. You, I recently listened to your old performance in one of my programs, I think, the beginning of the 90s, now you sound and, in terms of worldview, are also a completely different person than you were when I called you from the prompt of your former colleague Gordievsky, who appreciated and appreciated you both then and now. A lot of water has flown. I don’t understand where such fear comes from, what are they afraid of? And where does this surviving fuse, I would say, of delusions and hatred come from?

Yuri Kobaladze: I can not. You know, again, I insist on my version that in each specific case these are their own explanations why one person is afraid, the second may be ashamed, the third is generally dissatisfied with these changes, that from a powerful employee of the State Security Committee he turned into nothing when they disbanded KGB. Different motives, I can't judge all. I am responsible for myself and ready to defend my point of view. But, you see, there are different people. I'm even surprised that you quoted Shebarshin and Kirpichenko - they were two leaders, one was generally the head of intelligence, and the second one of the highest ranks. And the people, too, it would seem, were ideologized and members of the Central Committee and what the hell, but nevertheless, having already left this system and even being in it, they very critically assessed both the then and current activities of the system. Shebarshin, probably read his book, he generally has a very sarcastic perception of reality. Read his book of aphorisms - amazing. That is, a person who continued to think and who, I assure you, if you were talking to him, would not tell you clichés, naming some stencils, but would express his original point of view. But people are different.

Vladimir Tolts: Former employee of the KGB of the USSR and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Major General Yuri Kobaladze.

In the autumn of 1967, rumors spread, which were soon confirmed, about the organization of a new, 5th Directorate in the KGB. Unofficially, it was called "ideological" or "Department for combating ideological sabotage." It was said that the social sciences, culture, and art would be placed under strict counterintelligence control. Some lines of work and "operational service facilities" of the 2nd Main Directorate were to be transferred to the new service. The essence of what was happening was not quite clear to us, the deep processes that took place in the USSR and the countries of "people's democracy" (another freak term) were realized very vaguely. And not only us...
It was rumored that the new department would be recruited only from among the KGB officers and in no case from the "street": they say, only specially proven, "ideologically hardened" personnel would be needed.
My comrades in the "seven" and I believed that the "treadmills" would not be taken into the new management. For some reason, there was a general belief that the 5th Department would rise above the KGB and even check the loyalty of the operational staff of other departments. Even a few years later, when meeting with intelligence and counterintelligence officials, I heard versions from them on this matter: they believed that the “five” was conducting an operational check of the KGB personnel for suitability for further service and loyalty to ideals ...

Vladimir Tolts: This is again from the memoirs of a KGB veteran, Colonel Semenikhin, whose memoirs we have already quoted. A lot of things are recorded in these three paragraphs. There is also an atmosphere of secrecy that gives rise to all sorts of speculation and speculation. (The Five as a project was founded in July, and vague rumors about it spread “among their own” only in the fall.) Here is the corporate feature that Semenikhin described more than once - the belief of the KGB in their superiority over the rest of society, and the dream of getting into a unit that will rise above the rest of this KGB Order of the Sword. Thinking about the generic features of colleagues in the corporation, Evgeny Grigorievich writes:

The consciousness of one's own exclusivity is perhaps the most feature(perhaps a disease?) of the mentality of any intelligence officer. Often it transforms into a feeling of superiority over others, and from that moment on, a person becomes a danger to society. Unfortunately, not all members of the secret services understand this; not everyone retains the ability to look at themselves "from the outside and from above." For some, sober thinking comes after many years of service, others retire without doubting anything for a minute. But there are very few of them.

Vladimir Tolts: Recalling his five-headed service while still in the "outdoor", Colonel Semenikhin again turns to the topic of feeling superiority over others

We were proud of belonging to the Order, we strove to “improve our qualifications”, we studied, achieved success, experienced failures and breakdowns, but only the most limited ones considered our profession (I mean not only outdoor observation) to be exceptional, there were relatively few of them. I met many more people with a penchant for supermanship in Dom-2, and I saw even more such people among intelligence officers

Vladimir Tolts: In order to avoid false connotations, it should be clarified that "House 2" is, in this case not an infamous TV program at all. So the Chekist slang denoted the building on the Lubyanka, where the Pyaterka was located. And the unflattering mention in this text of “intelligence officers” is a reflection of the complex range of feelings experienced by the “five-armers” in relation to their “colleagues” from the First Main Directorate of the KGB (this is how the Soviet espionage service was officially called). Many in the Five, and in the Seven, where Seminihin used to serve, and in other departments of the Organs dreamed of getting into the First Glavk - to feel like secret heroes, to get the opportunity to live abroad, higher earnings, change their attitude ... Many envied the pegushniks. This envy was mixed with self-consoling conversations “among our own” that only relatives of the authorities and thieves get into PSU, that they are idlers there, and we are plowing the land ....
- And how did the employees of the First Headquarters relate to the “five-thirsts”, to their activities and their results? What did they think about it? I ask a retired general from the Foreign Intelligence Service Yuri Kobaladze.

Yuri Kobaladze: You know, unfortunately for you and fortunately for me, we probably didn't think much about them. We somehow lived our lives, physically separated from the Lubyanka. Of course, we knew that there is such a department that is engaged in the activities that it was engaged in, but it did not bother us in any way. Especially since I was in London during the worst years of the persecution of dissidents. I already became aware of the activities of this department when I returned to Moscow in 1984, this was before perestroika. And already in the perestroika years, it became clear that this department was engaged a little, their activities went into the whistle, because they persecuted the most famous people Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, one became almost the conscience of the nation, and one, and the second. And they told monstrous things about how Sakharov was persecuted, how he was isolated in Nizhny Novgorod, how he was followed. And all this, of course, did not arouse a feeling of sympathy for them. Then perestroika, then 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. Then the whole life changed. Then the KGB was disbanded and somehow about the existence of the 5th directorate, they were renamed, their activities personally and my colleagues were not very interested.

Vladimir Tolts: You know, in preparation for this cycle, I re-read the memoirs and publications of your colleagues and senior comrades in the First Central Committee. I remember that Leonid Shebarshin wrote about the special attitude, firstly, in the KGB towards the employees of the first main department, it was, in his opinion, respectful, but with a touch of coldness and envy, Shebarshin wrote, partly because they did not have to deal with dirty work, that is, to fight internal subversive elements, the circle of which, writes Shebarshin, never narrowed. Yes, and Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, talking about the activities, about the effectiveness of the KGB, also wrote that the bitter truth is that it was not the US CIA and its agents of influence that destroyed our great state, but we ourselves. And all our party and state institutions, continuing to ride on chimeras, did not want to distinguish myths from reality and were afraid to carry out full-blooded democratic reforms.
Tell me, while working in London, did you ever think about these problems of the functioning of the KGB in general, as part of the state machine?

Yuri Kobaladze: First of all, I must say that I knew both Shebarshin and Kirpichenko well, and in recent years, when they had already retired, I, one might say, was friends with both. We recently buried Shebarshin. The people were wonderful. I must say that I strongly agree with their assessment. What they say about who is to blame for the collapse of the Soviet Union is no conspiracies and the CIA, but we ourselves, our entire system, I don’t want to repeat all this now. So I want to record this, that I absolutely share their point of view. In answer to your question, of course, in London, especially in London, you can imagine, in the midst of " cold war"When the problem of dissidents, their persecution, occupied the lion's share of the assessment of the activities of the Soviet Union, when the British press was full of these materials, of course, this caused us bewilderment: what kind of people are they who need to be persecuted and who are able to destroy a great country, if are we a great country? Of course, the excessive efforts of the law enforcement system, the same KGB was obvious. Moreover, the most stupid things that we did were obvious. For example, we kept some dissident in some kind of psychiatric hospital, in some camps, and then they released him to the West, to the same England, as if telling him: well, now do what you want. Naturally, when he came to England, he told monstrous things that only undermined the prestige of the country. And this is with us, with intelligence officers could not but cause bewilderment, indignation, anything.Of course, it was.

Vladimir Tolts: At the time when you were working in England, after all, Vladimir Bukovsky was already there. What impression did his performances in England and the reaction of the English public to them make on you, as an outside observer?

Yuri Kobaladze: You know, it’s hard for me to judge now, so many years have passed, I, frankly, don’t really remember exactly what Bukovsky said and how we reacted. But in general, I want to repeat that yes, indeed, the attitude of the state towards these dissidents caused bewilderment, if you like, by the excessive struggle against them. I had other cases, however, not quite a dissident, but director Lyubimov. You know this story that happened in England, I was involved in it by the will of fate. Of course, this whole story was also strange, why the outstanding director had to stay in the West and why he did not suit and threatened the system - this was also completely incomprehensible, it caused a feeling of protest. Orlov, I remember.

Vladimir Tolts: Tell us about Orlov.

Yuri Kobaladze: I vaguely remember episodes of Orlov's arrival in England. I remember these photographs, where he gave the impression of a very intelligent, noble person. It was not clear what he was doing so monstrous, that he needed to be isolated and generally expelled from the country. And then, years later, perestroika, Gorbachev returned Sakharov from Nizhny Novgorod, when Solzhenitsyn returned triumphantly completely and became one of the most prominent, one might say, political figures who influenced, among other things, the country's leadership, of course, it became clear that all this the fight against dissidents is monkey work. It was not necessary to fight with them, but it was not necessary to do stupid things.

Vladimir Tolts: Yuri, after all, you are a professionally analytical person, like your colleagues from the First Main Directorate, you couldn’t help but understand that the concept of ideological sabotage, developed in practice since Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov joined the KGB, is a later concept of his successor about agents of influence, the concept of Vladimir Kryuchkov, they come from the very top of your organization. How did this affect your attitude towards your leadership?

Yuri Kobaladze: You see, we are talking about the era of total confrontation between East and West, the Soviet Union and the United States, communism and capitalism, that is, this struggle went in all directions. Of course, ideology was one of the directions of this struggle. Therefore, the fact that such concepts arose, and not only in the Soviet Union, but also in the United States, was not lacking, and in the West, there is nothing surprising in this. Another thing is that when the law enforcement system, the KGB, absolutely fell out of the control of society and the state and was subordinate to the Communist Party and was completely ideologized, it is natural that such crazy ideas appeared in such conditions. By the way, many things that were hammered into us before a trip, for example, to England, I came to England, I realized: either I'm crazy, or those people who taught me something, they don't understand something. Of course, our eyes were opened to the realities of life there, but this did not mean that we became dissidents and were ready to join the struggle. And thank God. If the whole society consisted of dissidents, for example, I am a conformist, thank God that the majority of society is conformists. But I emphasize that neither I, nor my friends, nor my inner circle have any hatred or understanding and approval, what is right, that’s what they need, let’s crush them, let’s keep them in prisons and psychiatric hospitals, let’s expel them abroad, that’s it we didn't, I'm being completely frank about that. And those quotes that you cited from Shebarshin and Kirpichenko, they just reflect the general opinion that prevailed in the ranks of intelligence.

Vladimir Tolts: A former employee of the KGB of the USSR and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, and now, according to him, a conformist, as well as a professor at MGIMO, an employee of Ekho Moskvy and businessman Major General Yuri Kobaladze.

In conclusion of today's broadcast, a fragment of the recording of my conversation with the publicist and historian of the security forces Leonid Mlechin.
What, I ask Leonid, are the reasons for the inefficiency of the organs? What's the matter? In ideological blindness and aggressiveness? Perhaps in the absence of the necessary professional qualifications? At an intellectual level that does not correspond to the given tasks? Why, despite all their reports to the top that the Committee and the 5th department were vigilant and guarded, why were they unable to solve the tasks assigned to them? Why did these military people, who did not fulfill their sworn obligations to defend the Soviet state and social system to the last drop of blood, lack the courage at the decisive moment to undertake the fulfillment of the promised, and now the honor to admit this, in fact, a military crime ? Why even today, instead of such, at least, repentance, most of them come out only empty boasting of non-existent achievements of the past, and aggression, as old as rheumatism?

Leonid Mlechin: Not so long ago I attended a meeting of veterans in such a narrow circle, they all repeated the same thing: we are just an instrument in the hands of the party, this is the party's fault. We would, if we were trusted, everything would be different, we would have saved a single country. This is what they think now. You see, there were many reasons. The entire state apparatus was inefficient, the Soviet system was inefficient, the existence of the State Security Committee was meaningless, there was no need for it at all. Khrushchev understood this for a moment. And Shelepin, the chairman of the KGB, fulfilling his will, he also destroyed the district apparatus in huge numbers. We had a state security apparatus in areas where there have never been and could not be foreigners in the entire history of this territory, and this KGB apparatus was kept there. Shelepin abolished all this, they blame him for it, but Andropov restored it. That is, the existence of the State Security Committee in itself did not make any sense. We needed intelligence, we needed counterintelligence, we needed a security service, but this gigantic monster was not needed, he could not help the country in any way, he only invented work for himself. And 5 management, in principle, was not needed. That is, it should not exist at all. They have come up with a job for themselves. What kind of job? Identify dubious people. What dubious people? These are those who, in a narrow circle at home or somewhere else, said something that they did not like, or who wanted to go abroad, or who wanted to stay abroad, and so on. The senseless existence of a huge apparatus. What could they do about it? They frightened people, people were talking, shutting themselves in the kitchens, closing the windows, talking more quietly, that's all they could do. Great amount The problems that tore apart the Soviet Union, primarily national ones, of course, remained outside the scope of attention, because it could not be recognized. And how to treat the disease, if it is even forbidden to diagnose? So it's a natural thing, unfortunately.

Vladimir Tolts: Leonid Mlechin, whose reasoning we complete this program from the series "Five and Fives" - 5 KGB Directorate

KGB of the USSR. 1954–1991 Secrets of the death of the Great Power Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

The same 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

The same 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

Due to the fact that the activities of the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, especially in an incompetent or dishonest interpretation, are often tried to be used for critical and even slanderous accusations against Andropov, it seems appropriate to dwell on the history of this issue in more detail.

For example, in the discussions of the international conference "KGB: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow", held in our country in the 1990s on the initiative of the former "dissident" S.I. Grigoryants, more than 90% of the time, speeches and attention was paid to the activities of the 5th department and the fifth divisions territorial bodies Committee, which, of course, could not but deform the ideas of those present about the appointment and tasks of the state security agencies.

July 17, 1967 at the initiative of Yu.V. Andropov, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to form an independent 5th department in the KGB to combat the ideological sabotage of the enemy.

The decision to create this new unit - "political counterintelligence" - Andropov was prompted both by his experience as secretary of the Central Committee and the materials available in the Second Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

In a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU with the justification for the expediency of creating this body dated July 3, 1967 N 1631 - A, the chairman of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov emphasized:

“The materials available in the State Security Committee testify that the reactionary forces of the imperialist camp, led by the US ruling circles, are constantly stepping up their efforts in terms of intensifying subversive actions against the Soviet Union. At the same time, they consider psychological warfare to be one of the most important elements of the overall system of combating communism ...

The enemy seeks to transfer planned operations on the ideological front directly to the territory of the USSR, aiming not only at the ideological decomposition of Soviet society, but also at creating conditions for acquiring sources of political information in our country ....

Propaganda centers, special services and ideological saboteurs who come to the USSR carefully study the social processes taking place in the country and identify the environment where their subversive plans could be realized. The emphasis is on the creation of anti-Soviet underground groups, incitement of nationalist tendencies, revival of the reactionary activity of churchmen and sectarians.

In 1965–1966 State security agencies in a number of republics uncovered about 50 nationalist groups, which included over 500 people. In Moscow, Leningrad, and some other places, anti-Soviet groups have been exposed, whose members, in so-called program documents, have declared ideas of political restoration.

Judging by the available materials, the initiators and leaders of individual hostile groups on the path of organized anti-Soviet activity became influenced by bourgeois ideology, some of them supported, or sought to establish contact with foreign emigre anti-Soviet organizations, among which the so-called. People's Labor Union (NTS).

In recent years, state security agencies on the territory of the USSR have captured several emissaries of the NTS, including from among foreigners.

When analyzing the enemy's aspirations in the field of ideological sabotage and the specific conditions in which work has to be carried out to curb it, one should take into account a number of internal circumstances.

After the war, about 5.5 million Soviet citizens returned from fascist Germany and other countries, including a large number of prisoners of war (about 1 million 800 thousand people). The vast majority of these people were and remain patriots of our Motherland.

However, a certain part collaborated with the Nazis (including the Vlasovites), some were recruited by American and British intelligence.

After 1953, tens of thousands of people were released from places of detention, including those who in the past had committed especially dangerous state crimes, but were amnestied (German punishers, bandits and gang accomplices, members of anti-Soviet nationalist groups, etc.). Some people from this category again take the path of anti-Soviet activity.

Under the influence of an ideology alien to us, a certain part of the politically immature Soviet citizens, especially among the intelligentsia and young people, develop moods of apoliticality and nihilism, which can be used not only by obviously anti-Soviet elements, but also by political talkers and demagogues, pushing such people to politically harmful actions.

A significant number of Soviet citizens still commit criminal offenses. The presence of criminal elements creates an unhealthy situation in a number of places. Recently, mass riots have taken place in some cities of the country, accompanied by attacks on police officers and pogroms of buildings occupied by public order.

When analyzing these facts, especially in Shymkent, it becomes obvious that outwardly spontaneous events, which, at first glance, had an anti-police orientation, were in fact the result of certain social processes that contributed to the maturation of unauthorized actions.

Taking into account the above factors, the state security agencies are taking measures aimed at improving the organization of counterintelligence work in the country to curb ideological sabotage.

At the same time, the Committee considers it necessary to take measures to strengthen the country's counterintelligence service and introduce some changes into its structure. The expediency of this is caused, in particular, by the fact that the current functionality of counterintelligence in the center and in the field provides for the concentration of its main efforts on organizing work among foreigners in the interests of identifying, first of all, their intelligence activities, i.e., it is turned outward. The line of struggle against ideological sabotage and its consequences among the Soviet people has been weakened, and due attention is not paid to this area of ​​work.

In this regard, in the cited note of the chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it was proposed to create an independent department (fifth) in the central office of the Committee with the task of organizing counterintelligence work to combat ideological sabotage in the country, entrusting it with the following functions:

Organization of work to identify and study processes that could be used by the enemy for the purpose of ideological sabotage;

Identification and suppression of the hostile activities of anti-Soviet, nationalist and church-sectarian elements, as well as prevention (together with the bodies of the MOOP - the Ministries for the Protection of Public Order, as the Ministry of Internal Affairs was called at that time) riots;

Developments in contact with the intelligence of the ideological centers of the enemy, anti-Soviet emigrant and nationalist organizations abroad;

Organization of counterintelligence work among foreign students studying in the USSR, as well as on foreign delegations and teams entering the USSR through the Ministry of Culture and Creative Organizations.

At the same time, it was also envisaged to create appropriate units "in the field", that is, in the Directorates and city departments of the KGB of the USSR.

At the same time, in this note to the Politburo of the Central Committee, Yu.V. And in this regard, the new chairman asked to increase the staff of the Committee by 2,250 units, including 1,750 officer and 500 civilian positions.

In accordance with the existing procedure for making organizational and personnel decisions, this note was considered by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on July 17 and the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was approved, which was adopted on the same day (N 676-222 of July 17, 1967).

As General of the Army F.D. Bobkov recalled, explaining the tasks of the KGB unit being created, Andropov emphasized that Chekists must know the enemy’s plans and methods of work, “see the processes taking place in the country, know the mood of the people ... It is necessary to constantly compare counterintelligence data with respect to the enemy’s plans and his actions in our country with data on the real processes that are taking place in our country. So far no one has made such a comparison: no one wanted to take on the thankless task of informing the leadership about the dangers lurking not only in highly classified, but also in open propaganda actions of the enemy.

The order of the Chairman of the KGB No. 0097 dated July 25, 1967 "On introducing changes to the structure of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies" read:

“The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted resolutions on the creation of counterintelligence units in the central apparatus of the KGB and its local bodies to combat the ideological sabotage of the enemy. This decision of the party and the government is a manifestation of the party's further concern for strengthening the state security of the country.

In pursuance of the said resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR - I order:

1. Create an independent (fifth) department in the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, entrusting it with the organization of counterintelligence work to combat the ideological sabotage of the enemy, transferring these functions from the 2nd Main Directorate of the KGB.

The Personnel Department, together with the 2nd Main Directorate, within three days, submit for approval the structure and staffing of the 5th Directorate and a list of changes in the structure and staffing of the 2nd Main Directorate ... ".

In the state security committees of the Union republics of the USSR and the KGB departments in the territories and regions, it was ordered to “form, respectively, 5 departments - departments - departments to combat the ideological sabotage of the enemy, providing for appropriate changes in the functionality of 2 departments- departments ... ".

Years will pass, the author of one of the interesting works devoted to the issues we are considering, “and a bunch of labels and stereotypes will be hung on the 5th department:“ gendarme ”,“ detective ”,“ dirty ”,“ provocative ”, etc., and so on”, which is why it is necessary to dwell on the history of its activities in more detail.

The validity of the decision to establish the Directorate for Combating Ideological Subversion, in our opinion, is evidenced by the following fact.

In December 1968, the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU a note from the legal committee of the US Senate "Means and methods of Soviet propaganda."

It noted, in particular, that the Soviet Union considers "propaganda, influencing public opinion, the main means of struggle in the Cold War. While the West is doing everything to create an effective nuclear power in order to maintain the "balance of fear", the Soviet Union, above all, is stepping up its work ideologically. In the modern dispute between the "free world" and the communist camp, much attention is paid to the front of the ideological struggle, and not to the military front.

And if the above statement characterizes the policy of peaceful existence openly proclaimed by the USSR, then the “foreign response” to this challenge was an expanded program of “psychological warfare” that was implemented in subsequent years. Something that should not be forgotten even today.

In this regard, we present the final part of the document, which contains proposals for organizing an "ideological offensive" against the USSR.

“… To effectively repel the communist challenge, military efforts alone are not enough. The West must develop such measures, the scope and impact of which would make it possible to successfully carry out the struggle against the huge enemy apparatus. To this end, it would be advisable to create:

1. Institute for Combating Communist Propaganda within NATO. Before this institute, which will operate on a scientific basis, tasks should be set ... (the tasks of this institute of "anti-communist propaganda" we have already indicated earlier).

2. The World Federation of Freedom, which should not work within the framework of the government, but as an independent private corporation that directly influences public opinion. The main task of the world federation of freedom should be active counter-propaganda. Relying on modern media - print, radio, television, publishing houses, the world federation could take on the following tasks already existing organizations with their consent and cooperation...

The World Federation of Freedom must be combat-ready, its speeches must be well-aimed and persuasive. Its goal is to change the current situation, that is, for the free world to accuse, and not sit in the dock.

The Institute for Combating Communist Propaganda and the World Federation of Freedom will jointly open in all free countries a network of schools of various directions, in which men and women of all nationalities would be taught the methods of political warfare of the Soviets and the methods of defending freedom.

At the same time, it is necessary to organize on a large scale moral and material assistance to open or disguised resistance to totalitarian communism on the part of enslaved nations (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me - O.Kh.)

The above centers could, observing the necessary secrecy, use all the latest technical means to deliver messages and information behind the Iron Curtain... In addition, these institutions could prepare materials for Soviet citizens traveling abroad, as well as form "interview teams" with these citizens....

20 thousand missionaries- freedom fighters who would win the trust of local residents could be a more effective and cheaper dam in the fight against the communist trend than 10 thousand long-range guns in the arsenals of the West, although they are also needed.

...While the "free world" is working hard in the military and economic fields and spending the main funds on this, the most an important battlefield - political propaganda, the "struggle of wits" - remains firmly in the hands of the enemies.

It is much more difficult, but much more important, to refute the theses of communist dialectical propaganda in the eyes of the "free world" ... than to fill our arsenals with weapons and passively watch how the enemy disarms us ideologically.

It seems necessary to emphasize that the American experts, in contrast to our current "subverters of communism", by no means denied the validity, reasoning and effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy propaganda.

Initially, 6 departments were formed in the 5th Directorate of the KGB, and their functions were as follows:

1 department - counterintelligence work on the channels of cultural exchange, the development of foreigners, work through creative unions, research institutes, cultural institutions and medical institutions;

2nd department - planning and implementation of counterintelligence measures, together with the PGU, against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states, suppression of the activities of the NTS, nationalist and chauvinist elements;

3rd department - counterintelligence work on the channel of student exchange, suppression of hostile activities of students and faculty;

4th department - counterintelligence work among religious, Zionist and sectarian elements and against foreign religious centers;

5th department - practical assistance to local KGB bodies in preventing mass antisocial manifestations; search for authors of anti-Soviet anonymous documents and leaflets; checking signals for terror;

6th department - generalization and analysis of data on the activities of the enemy in the implementation of ideological sabotage; development of measures for long-term planning and information work.

In addition to the above departments, the staff of the department included the secretariat, the financial department, the personnel group and the mobilization work group, and the initial total number of its employees, according to the order of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR N 0096 of July 27, 1967, was 201 people. The curator of the 5th department of the KGB through the leadership of the Committee was the first deputy chairman S.K. Tsvigun (since 1971 - V.M. Chebrikov).

The heads of the department during the period of its existence were A.F. Kadyshev, F.D. Bobkov (from May 23, 1969 to January 18, 1983, when he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the KGB), I.P. Abramov, E.F. Ivanov, who later also became the first head of department "3" ("Protection of the constitutional order", created on the basis of the 5th Department of the KGB of the USSR on August 13, 1989), V.P. Vorotnikov.

In August 1969, the 7th department was formed, in which the functions of identifying and searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents containing threats of a terrorist nature, as well as the operational development and prevention of hostile activities of persons who harbored terrorist intentions, were removed from the 5th department.

In June 1973, the 8th department was formed to combat the subversive activities of foreign Zionist centers, and in next year- 9th department with the task of operational development of anti-Soviet groups that have connections with foreign centers of ideological sabotage and the 10th departments. The latter department, together with the PGU KGB, dealt with the issues of penetration, revealing the plans and intentions of foreign special services and centers of ideological sabotage and the implementation of measures to paralyze and neutralize their activities.

In June 1977, on the eve of the XXII Olympic Games in Moscow, the 11th department was created, designed to carry out "the implementation of operational-Chekist measures to disrupt the ideological actions of the enemy and hostile elements during the preparation and holding of the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow." This department closely contacted its work with the 11th department of the VSU, which was also involved in the fight against international terrorism.

The 12th control group - as an independent department - ensured the coordination of work with the "friends' security agencies", as the special services of the socialist states were called.

In February 1982, the 13th department was formed to identify and suppress "negative processes that tend to develop into politically harmful manifestations", including the study of unhealthy youth formations - mystical, occult, pro-fascist, rockers, punks, football "fans" and like them. Also, the department was entrusted with the task of ensuring the safety of holding mass public events in Moscow - festivals, forums, various congresses, symposiums, etc.

The 14th department was engaged in the prevention of ideological sabotage actions aimed at journalists, media workers, and socio-political organizations.

In connection with the formation of new departments, the management staff by 1982 increased to 424 people.

In total, as F.D. Bobkov, 2.5 thousand employees served in the KGB through the activities of the 5th Directorate, the "fifth line". On average, 10 people worked in the 5th service or department in the region. The agent apparatus was also optimal, on average there were 200 agents per region.

It should be noted that with the formation of the 5th Directorate of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, by order of the chairman, all arrests and prosecutions under article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (“for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”) by territorial state security bodies were prohibited without the sanction of the new department.

In the same time, mandatory conditions for a possible arrest and initiation of a criminal case, there were other sources of evidence - material evidence, statements of eyewitnesses and testimonies of witnesses, not excluding the recognition by the accused of their own guilt.

As F.D.Bobkov noted, “we quite consciously and justifiably decided to take responsibility for the consequences of the decisions made to bring to criminal responsibility. And I must say that this demand of ours, announced by the order of the chairman of the KGB for the territorial bodies (although it did not concern the rights and powers of the military counterintelligence units - 3 of the KGB Main Directorate), was very disapprovingly received by the heads of the KGB departments, who saw it as an "assassination attempt" to their own prerogatives and powers.

Although, objectively, this decision, which was strictly enforced, only contributed to improving the quality of investigative work, which, of course, was carried out under prosecutorial supervision.

And there were few arrests. Basically, they accounted for such megacities as Moscow, Leningrad, and in the republics of the USSR there were literally a few of them.

Without anticipating the specific statistical data that we will present to readers below, we immediately make a reservation that this statement is also confirmed by one of the most informative works on this issue -

Monograph of the Chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) L.M. Alekseeva "History of dissent in the USSR: the latest period." (M., 2001).

Secondly, in 1972 Andropov banned the search for the authors of various kinds of anonymous appeals, appeals and letters, except in those cases when they contained threats of violent anti-state actions, or calls to commit state crimes directed against the constitutional order of the USSR.

In the report of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR for 1967 in connection with the creation fifth units it was noted that it “made it possible to concentrate the necessary efforts and funds on measures to combat ideological sabotage from outside and the emergence of anti-Soviet manifestations within the country. As a result of the measures taken, it was possible to basically paralyze the attempts of the enemy's special services and propaganda centers to carry out a series of ideological sabotage in the Soviet Union, timed to coincide with the half-century anniversary of the Great October Revolution. Along with exposing a number of foreigners who came to the USSR with tasks of a subversive nature, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press exposing the subversive activities of the enemy’s special services ...

Based on the fact that the enemy, in his calculations to undermine socialism from the inside, makes a big bet on the propaganda of nationalism, the KGB took a number of measures to curb attempts to carry out organized nationalist activities in a number of regions of the country (Ukraine, the Baltic States, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics).

Measures to identify and suppress the hostile activities of anti-Soviet elements from among the churchmen and sectarians were carried out taking into account the available data on the intensification of the hostile and ideologically harmful activities of religious and Zionist centers. 122 agents of the KGB agencies were sent abroad to reveal their plans, disrupt the subversive actions they were preparing and carry out other counterintelligence tasks abroad. At the same time, it was possible to shackle and stop the hostile activities of emissaries of foreign religious centers sent to the USSR, as well as to expose and bring a number of active sectarians to criminal liability for illegal activities.

In 1967, the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet documents was registered on the territory of the USSR ... The KGB authorities identified 1,198 anonymous authors. Most of them took this path because of their political immaturity, and also because of the lack of proper educational work in the teams where they work or study. At the same time, individual hostile elements used this path to combat Soviet power. In connection with the increased number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents because of their hostile beliefs, the number of persons prosecuted for this type of crime also increased: in 1966 there were 41 of them, and in 1967 - 114 people ...

An integral part of the work of the military counterintelligence agencies of the KGB to ensure the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces was measures to prevent actions of ideological sabotage in units and subunits of the army and navy, to timely suppress the channels of penetration of bourgeois ideology. In 1967, 456 attempts were prevented to distribute manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications of anti-Soviet and politically harmful content among military personnel, as well as 80 attempts to create various hostile groups in the troops ...

Great importance was attached to preventive measures aimed at preventing state crimes. In 1967, 12,115 people were prevented by the KGB, most of whom allowed, without hostile intent, manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful nature.

In April 1968 Yu.V. Andropov sends to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU a draft decision of the Collegium of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the tasks of the state security agencies in combating the ideological sabotage of the enemy."

AT cover letter to this project, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR emphasized: “Given the importance of this decision, which is actually the defining document of the Committee for the organization of the fight against ideological sabotage, we ask you to comment on this decision, after which it will be finalized and sent to the places for guidance and implementation.

We ask for permission to acquaint the First Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees and regional party committees with the decision of the Collegium through the relevant heads of state security agencies.

As noted in Andropov’s note, “unlike the units previously available in the state security agencies (secret political department, 4th Directorate, etc.), which dealt with issues of combating hostile elements in the ideological field, mainly within the country, the newly created fifth units are called upon to conduct the fight against ideological sabotage inspired by our opponents from abroad.

In the decision of the Collegium, the main attention is paid to the timely exposure and disruption of the hostile intrigues of the imperialist states, their intelligence services, anti-Soviet centers abroad in the field of ideological struggle against the Soviet state, as well as to the study of unhealthy phenomena among individual sections of the population of our country, which can be used by the enemy in subversive purposes.

A due place in the Board's decision is given to preventive work with persons who commit politically harmful acts, with the help of forms and methods that meet the Party's demands for strict observance of socialist legality. The board proceeded from the fact that the result preventive work there must be the prevention of crimes, the re-education of a person, the elimination of the causes that give rise to politically harmful manifestations. The tasks of fighting against the ideological sabotage of the enemy will be solved in close contact with party organs in the center and in the localities, under their direct leadership and control.

It should be emphasized that in fact the field of activity of the 5th department, in addition to solving the above tasks, it also included the fight against crimes against the state, and above all with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda (Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR), organizational anti-Soviet activities (Article 72), terrorism (Articles 66 and 67 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR "Terrorist act" and "Terrorist act against a representative of a foreign state"), prevention of mass riots.

So who are these "dissidents" and what was and is the attitude of our fellow citizens towards them?

Let me first make some personal remarks.

Of course, in a very "narrow circle" these people, at the time of its maximum heyday 1976-1978 numbering no more than 300-500 participants in all the union republics of the USSR, included completely different people. Different, both in their social status, and in moral and ethical attitudes and principles, political views.

There were stubborn fanatics; "convinced" adepts who uncritically cherished acquired "views" that they were not even able to articulately repeat; there were people prone to critical analysis, capable of both discussion and reassessment of their own judgments.

And with all of them, the chairman of the KGB Yu.V. Andropov suggested that the Chekists "work actively", preventing them from slipping into illegal, criminally punishable activities.

As you know, Yu.V. Andropov suggested (for which he continues to be accused of "liberalism") party bodies to enter into a direct dialogue with A.D. Sakharov, and some other "dissidents", moreover, defended R.A. Medvedev from arrest, which was achieved precisely by the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

But the party organs were arrogantly not ready to "descend" to a direct dialogue with their critics, in whom they saw only "enemies of the Soviet power."

My personal attitude towards the "dissidents" is most accurately conveyed by the following words: "my long... official activity, with a mass of human meetings and proposals, has led me to the conviction that all political struggle has some kind of sad but heavy misunderstanding, unnoticed by the warring parties. People partly cannot, and partly do not want to understand each other and because of this they beat each other without mercy.

Meanwhile, on both sides, in the majority, there are excellent personalities.

Yes, of course, among the "dissidents" there were people worthy of respect. But I am equally categorically against the "heroization" of all of them indiscriminately. In the same way, many wonderful, selfless people worked in the KGB. Although, as they say, "the family has its black sheep."

And, probably, it is on these foundations, adding to them without fail the principles of objectivity, legality and justice, that our society has yet to evaluate its recent past.

... in May 1969, the newly formed Initiative Group for the Protection of Human Rights in the USSR (IG) sent a letter to the UN complaining about "continuous violations of the law" and asked "to protect human rights trampled in the Soviet Union", including "to have independent opinions and disseminate them by all legal means.”

From this it follows, the former well-known "dissident" O.A. Popov that "human rights activists" did not consider the Soviet people as the social base of their movement. Moreover, “the appeal of human rights activists to the West for help led to their alienation and virtual isolation from the people and even from a significant part of the intelligentsia who sympathize with human rights activists. The human rights activists themselves began to turn from an informal association of Soviet citizens concerned about the violation of the rule of law in their country, into a detachment of some kind of "global human rights movement", into a small group that received moral, informational, and since the mid-70s - material and political support from the West … closed on itself divorced from people and absolutely alien to his daily interests and needs, these groups did not have any weight and influence in Soviet society, except for the halo of the “people's defender”, which began to take shape in the 70s around the name of A.D. Sakharov.

In our opinion, it is worth thinking about the following, both forced and tortured confession of a former dissident:

“I, the author of these lines, have been collecting and processing materials for human rights uncensored publications for several years…. And although I am responsible for the truthfulness and reliability of the facts given in the documents, this circumstance does not relieve me of political responsibility for actual participation on the side of the United States in the ideological and propaganda war with the USSR.

... Of course, human rights activists and dissidents, including the author of these lines, were aware that they were undermining the image of the USSR and that was precisely what they were striving for.

That they, whether they want it or not, are taking part in the information and ideological war that the United States and NATO countries have been waging against the USSR since the early 1950s.

In the mid-70s of the last century, the main emphasis in the activities of the US administration in relation to the socialist community was placed on the humanitarian problems contained in the third section (“third basket”) of the Final Act of the European Conference on Peace and Security in Europe, signed in Helsinki on August 1 1975

“The actions of the Moscow “Helsinki Group” formed shortly after its signing, as well as “the actions of members of the rest of the Soviet Helsinki groups,” emphasizes O.A. Popov, - were of an anti-state character.

“The author of these lines,” he further admits, “it took several years of his life in the United States to understand that the true purpose of the ideological war there was not an improvement in the state of affairs with human rights in the Soviet Union, and not even the establishment of a democratic and legal state in the USSR, but the destruction or at least weakening of the geopolitical rival of the United States, whatever it was called - the USSR or Russia.

The administration of J. Carter, who declared the "protection of human rights" a central element of his foreign policy, included a clause on "support for the struggle for human rights in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe" in the strategy of "fighting communism."

In 1977, after education"Helsinki Groups in the USSR" (as well as the GDR and Czechoslovakia), a Committee was established in New York to monitor the implementation of Soviet Union Helsinki Watch Committe. Its task was to "collect information about human rights violations in the USSR, bring it to the attention of the American government, the American public and international organizations and institutions, primarily the UN, demand that the American government and Congress take "appropriate measures against the USSR."

Doesn't this remind you of the implementation of the previously cited project to create the "World Federation of Freedom"?

In our opinion, the most adequate idea of ​​both the tasks and appointment of the new KGB department, and Andropov's own vision of this problem is given by a number of speeches by the KGB chairman to the KGB teams.

So, October 23, 1968 at a meeting of the Komsomol members of the central apparatus of the KGB, Andropov emphasized: “In his desire to weaken the socialist countries, the alliance between the socialist states, he (the enemy - O.Kh.) goes to direct and indirect support of counter-revolutionary elements, to ideological sabotage, to create all kinds of anti-socialist, anti-Soviet and other hostile organizations, to incite nationalism…. In ideological sabotage, the imperialists rely on the ideological decay of the youth, the use of insufficient life experience, weak ideological hardening of individual young people. They seek ... to oppose it to the older generation, to bring bourgeois mores and morals into the Soviet environment.

In Appendix 4, readers can get acquainted with one of the analytical documents of the KGB on this issue.

Along with the identification and investigation of illegal, criminal activity, in order to initiate a criminal case either on the detection of signs of a crime, or in relation to specific suspects, the sanction of the prosecutor's office was required, considerable attention in the activities of the fifth divisions of the KGB of the USSR was also paid to prevention, that is, preventing the continuation of activities, assessed as an offense or illegal actions.

According to the archives of the KGB of the USSR, for the period 1967-1971. 3,096 “groups of a politically harmful orientation” were identified, of which 13,602 people were prevented. (In 1967, 502 such groups were identified with 2,196 of their participants, in subsequent years, respectively, in 1968 - 625 and 2,870, in 1969 - 733 and 3,130, in 1970 - 709 and 3102 , in 1971 527 and 2304. That is, the number of participants in the named "groups of politically harmful orientation", practically, did not exceed 4-5 people.

As Doctor of Historical Sciences V.N. Khaustov noted, with the beginning of the process of “detente of international tension”, which dates back to the summer of 1972, “many intelligence services of foreign states and foreign anti-Soviet organizations and centers have significantly intensified their subversive activities, hoping to extract the maximum benefit from the changed international situation and international relations. In particular, they stepped up sending their representatives to the USSR - "emissaries", in the terminology of the KGB of those years - under the guise of tourists, businessmen, participants in various types of scientific, student, cultural and sports exchanges. In 1972 alone, about 200 such emissaries were identified.”

In some years, the number of emissaries of anti-Soviet organizations and centers revealed only on the territory of the USSR exceeded 900 people.

The flow of emissaries began to grow especially after 1975 - after the signing on September 1 in Helsinki of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Its sections dealt with the recognition of post-war borders - geopolitical reality - in the world, economic cooperation between the socialist community and Western states, and the third section ("third basket") - questions of a "humanitarian nature", which began to be interpreted by Western countries and their special services as a basis for intervention in the internal affairs of states they do not like and to put pressure on them up to the imposition of economic and other sanctions.

Known not only in the United States, but also in our country, who specialized in discrediting the KGB and the policies of the Soviet government, the former editor of Reader's Digest, John Barron, in the book KGB Today, translated into Russian in 1992, noted that the "active part" of dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s it numbered about 35-50 people, some of whom were later either convicted or left the USSR for the West.

Since 1975, the activities of this, in the language of sociology, "informal" group, have been strenuously activated by Western intelligence services and centers of ideological sabotage, in accordance with the foreign policy strategy of J. Carter to "protect human rights." Her real “father” was Zbigniew Brzezinski, already known to us, presidential assistant for national security.

The “flourishing” of the dissident party, thanks to the activities of the “Helsinki groups”, reached by 1977, and then its decline began, connected with the arrest on charges of having links with the CIA of one of the members of the Moscow Helsinki Group (MHG) A. Sharansky, bringing him to the investigation of some other active participants in the "human rights" movement for committing unlawful acts.

“By 1982, wrote MHG chairman L.M. Alekseev, - this circle ceased to exist as a whole, only fragments of it remained ... the human rights movement ceased to exist in the form it was in 1976-1979.

Note, however, another important circumstance.

In the process of solving the tasks assigned to it, the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR and its divisions obtained important intelligence and counterintelligence information from abroad (for example, the report of the American National Medical Academy on the isolation of the AIDS virus), identified spies (A.B. Sharansky , A.M. Suslov), fought against terrorism, separatism, the spread of drugs, prevented the emergence of mass riots, prevented the emergence of hotbeds of social tension and negative processes ... ..

Nevertheless, we are forced to agree with the already expressed opinion that “already from the mid-70s, in the 5th Directorate, frank symptoms of ignoring people's worries and experiences were noted”, that some organs of the CPSU not only withdrew themselves from a specific organizational and social work, but also from propaganda opposition to the "social propaganda" of foreign ideological centers, that the CPSU "was asleep, lulled by its infallibility."

Yu.V. Andropov, but these steps clearly did not find understanding and support among the Kremlin's Areopagus.

And the party leaders believed that it was the KGB bodies that should solve the problems, contradictions and conflicts that arise in society for them.

But this has not always been possible.

From the book "Death to Spies!" [Military counterintelligence SMERSH during the Great Patriotic War] author Sever Alexander

Chapter 1 Directorate of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than those on the front lines of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army. In fact, ordinary employees (security officers serving military units) acted autonomously.

From the book Pistols, revolvers author Shokarev Yury Vladimirovich

Chapter 2 The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the NKO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the people's commissariats of defense and the navy, under which the departments of counterintelligence "Smersh" were established

From the book In the networks of espionage by Hartman Sverre

Chapter 2 The most reliable weapon "Vials" and "hairpins" Speaking in 1799 at a meeting of the Royal Society of London, the English chemist Edward Howard reported something new about the beneficial use of mercury fulminate. Because it can explode on detonation, Howard

From the book Great Patriotic War Soviet people (in the context of World War II) author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

The most important thing is the secret. General Geisler, together with the headquarters of the 10th Air Corps, was located in the upper floors of the Esplanade Hotel, one of the most fashionable in Hamburg. In the lower floors, hotel life flowed as usual; people there were relaxing and having fun. But the entrance to

From the book Forgotten War Heroes author Smyslov Oleg Sergeevich

The most important thing is the ice Establishing contact between groups in southern Norway and in the region of Trondelag was a prerequisite for the start of Hitler's campaign against Belgium, Holland and France. It was originally supposed to start a campaign in the West 4-5 days after the attack on Denmark

From the book The Andropov Phenomenon: 30 Years in the Life of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

5. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLIKOV, TO THE NPO USSR, SNK USSR AND THE CC AUCP(B) “SPEAKS, [ORG MEASURES] AND OPTIONS OF THE GERMAN ARMY’S COMBAT ACTIONS AGAINST THE USSR” March 20, 1941

From the book SMERSH [Battles classified as secret] author Sever Alexander

"MOST REAL MADNESS" Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in his memoirs "Lost Victories", in fact, does not hide his surprise at the "methods" of Russian warfare. This is how Hitler's commander calls the resistance that his troops offered on their own.

From the book Stop blowing! Frivolous memories author Efremov Pavel Borisovich

The same, the Fifth Directorate of the KGB of the USSR In criticizing the activities of Andropov as chairman of the KGB of the USSR, special attention is paid to the activities of the 5th Directorate of this department, which was allegedly engaged in the “fight against dissent” and “persecution of dissidents.” One of the homegrown

From the book Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence. Volume 3 author Primakov Evgeny Maksimovich

Chapter 1 Directorate of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR Military counterintelligence officers risked their lives no less than those on the front lines of the fighters and commanders of the Red Army. In fact, ordinary employees (security officers serving military units) acted

From the book In the name of victory author Ustinov Dmitry Fedorovich

Chapter 2 The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the NPO of the USSR and the NKVMF of the USSR Military counterintelligence, by a secret decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, was transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, under which counterintelligence departments were established

From the book of Peter Ivashutin. Life given to exploration author Khlobustov Oleg Maksimovich

The simplest KShU on the PU GEM merrily winked red warning lights. From the ship's wall newspaper. BC-5 As always, the war crept up unnoticed. By March 27, a good third of my crew had been sitting out their pants for a month, being seconded to the crew

From the book Listening. Forerunners of Snowden author Syrkov Boris Yurievich

No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE USSR NKGB To the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the NKO of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941 Message from Berlin According to information received from an official of the Committee on the Four-Year Plan, several members of the committee received an urgent task to make calculations of raw material reserves and

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The most precious year of 1939 was also significant for me in that I was elected a delegate to the 18th Party Congress and participated in its work. The congresses of our Party have a milestone in the life of every communist, every worker, in the life of the entire Soviet country. And it is no coincidence that in our

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Part V Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR

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How the World's Biggest Ear went Deaf In the late 1990s, the NSA was a powerful, top-secret organization that was eavesdropping and eavesdropping around the world. At her disposal were constellations of expensive satellites and hundreds of satellite dishes.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Fifth Directorate of the KGB of the USSR - structural subdivision KGB of the USSR, responsible for counterintelligence work to combat enemy ideological sabotage.

Story

On July 3, 1967, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Yu. V. Andropov, sent a note to the Central Committee of the CPSU on the advisability of creating an independent department within the KGB, which would be responsible for combating ideological sabotage.

On July 17, 1967, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered the note by Yu. V. Andropov and adopted resolution No. P 47/97 on the formation of the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR.

On July 25, 1967, the order of the chairman of the KGB of the USSR No. 0096 was issued, according to which the staff of the 5th department was determined in 201 officials.

On August 11, 1989, a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was issued, according to which the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR was transformed into the Directorate for the Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System of the KGB of the USSR.

Structure

• 1st department (established in 1967) - work through the channels of cultural exchange, creative unions, research institutes, medical and cultural institutions, foreigners;
• 2nd department (formed in 1967) - work together with the PSU against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states, suppression of the activities of nationalist and chauvinist elements, as well as the "People's Labor Union";
• 3rd department (established in 1967) - work on the line of student exchange, students and teachers;
• 4th department (formed in 1967) - work in the line of religious organizations; curation of the church;
• 5th department (established in 1967) - searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and leaflets, checking signals about the facts of terrorism, helping local state security agencies to prevent mass anti-social manifestations;
• 6th department (established in 1967) - planning and information work, analysis of data on ideological sabotage: "generalization and analysis of data on the enemy's activities to carry out ideological sabotage. Development of measures for long-term planning and information work”;
• 7th Department (established in 1969) - "Identification and verification of persons who have intentions to use explosives and explosive devices for anti-Soviet purposes" . This department was also given the functions of searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents and checking threat signals against the country's top leaders;
• 8th department (established in 1973) - "identification and suppression of ideological sabotage actions of subversive Zionist centers";
• 9th department (established in 1974) - “conducting the most important developments on persons suspected of organized anti-Soviet activities (except for nationalists, churchmen, sectarians); detection and suppression of the hostile activities of persons producing and distributing anti-Soviet materials; carrying out intelligence and operational measures to uncover the anti-Soviet activities of foreign revisionist centers on the territory of the USSR”;
• 10th department (established in 1974) - "carrying out counterintelligence activities (together with the PGU) against the centers of ideological sabotage of the imperialist states and foreign anti-Soviet organizations (except for hostile organizations of Ukrainian and Baltic nationalists)";
• The 11th department (formed in 1977) - "implementation of operational-Chekist measures to disrupt the subversive actions of the enemy and hostile elements during the preparation and holding of the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow." After the Olympiad, the department was entrusted with the tasks of monitoring scientific, trade union, medical and sports organizations;
• 12th group (as a department) - coordination of the work of the 5th department with the state security agencies of the socialist countries;
• 13th department (established in 1982) - "identification and suppression of manifestations that tend to develop into politically harmful groupings that contribute to the enemy's ideological sabotage against the USSR";
• 14th department (established in 1982) - "work to prevent actions of ideological sabotage aimed at the sphere of the Union of Journalists of the USSR, employees of the media and socio-political organizations";
• 15th department (established in 1983) - work on the objects of the Dynamo sports society;
• Financial department;
• Personnel group;
• Mobilization work group;
• Secretariat.

Management

Chiefs

• A.F. Kadashev (August 4, 1967 - December 8, 1968)
• F. D. Bobkov (May 23, 1969 - January 18, 1983)
• I. P. Abramov (January 18, 1983 - May 1989)
• E. F. Ivanov (May - September 1989)

Deputy chiefs

• F. D. Bobkov (1967-1969)
• N. M. Golushko (1983-1984)

Heads of the 2nd department

• V. F. Lebedev (1983-1987)

Heads of the 4th department

Heads of the 8th department

Notable collaborators

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Notes

Links

• O. M. Khlobustov
• - Radio Liberty broadcast from the Time Difference cycle, July 14, 2012

An excerpt characterizing the Fifth Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

The war of 1812, in addition to its national significance dear to the Russian heart, was supposed to have another - European.
The movement of peoples from west to east was to be followed by the movement of peoples from east to west, and for this new war a new figure was needed, having other properties and views than Kutuzov, driven by other motives.
Alexander the First was as necessary for the movement of peoples from east to west and for the restoration of the borders of peoples as Kutuzov was necessary for the salvation and glory of Russia.
Kutuzov did not understand what Europe, equilibrium, Napoleon meant. He couldn't understand it. The representative of the Russian people, after the enemy was destroyed, Russia was liberated and placed on the highest level of its glory, the Russian person, as a Russian, had nothing more to do. The representative of the people's war had no choice but death. And he died.

Pierre, as is most often the case, felt the brunt of the physical hardships and stresses experienced in captivity only when these stresses and hardships were over. After his release from captivity, he arrived in Orel, and on the third day of his arrival, while he was going to Kyiv, he fell ill and lay ill in Orel for three months; he became, as the doctors said, bilious fever. Despite the fact that the doctors treated him, bled him and gave him medicines to drink, he still recovered.
Everything that happened to Pierre from the time of his release to his illness left almost no impression on him. He remembered only gray, gloomy, sometimes rainy, sometimes snowy weather, inner physical anguish, pain in his legs, in his side; remembered general impression misfortune, suffering of people; he remembered the curiosity of the officers and generals who questioned him, which disturbed him, his efforts to find a carriage and horses, and, most importantly, he remembered his inability to think and feel at that time. On the day of his release, he saw the corpse of Petya Rostov. On the same day, he learned that Prince Andrei had been alive for more than a month after the Battle of Borodino and had only recently died in Yaroslavl, in the Rostovs' house. And on the same day, Denisov, who reported this news to Pierre, mentioned the death of Helen between conversations, suggesting that Pierre had known this for a long time. All this only seemed strange to Pierre at the time. He felt that he could not understand the meaning of all this news. He was then in a hurry only to leave these places where people were killing each other as soon as possible, to some quiet refuge and there to come to his senses, rest and think over all the strange and new that he had learned during this time. But as soon as he arrived in Orel, he fell ill. Waking up from his illness, Pierre saw around him his two people who had come from Moscow - Terenty and Vaska, and the elder princess, who, living in Yelets, on Pierre's estate, and learning about his release and illness, came to him to walk behind him.
During his recovery, Pierre only gradually weaned from the impressions that had become habitual to him of the last months and got used to the fact that no one would drive him anywhere tomorrow, that no one would take away his warm bed, and that he would probably have lunch, and tea, and supper. But in a dream he saw himself for a long time in the same conditions of captivity. Just as little by little, Pierre understood the news that he learned after his release from captivity: the death of Prince Andrei, the death of his wife, the destruction of the French.
A joyful feeling of freedom - that complete, inalienable freedom inherent in a person, the consciousness of which he first experienced at the first halt, when leaving Moscow, filled Pierre's soul during his recovery. He was surprised that this inner freedom, independent of external circumstances, was now, as it were, surrounded with excess, with luxury, by external freedom. He was alone in a strange city, without acquaintances. Nobody demanded anything from him; they didn't send him anywhere. Everything he wanted he had; The thought of his wife, which had always tormented him before, was no more, since she was no more.
- Oh, how good! How nice! he said to himself when a cleanly laid table with fragrant broth was moved to him, or when he lay down at night on a soft, clean bed, or when he remembered that his wife and the French were no more. - Oh, how good, how nice! - And out of old habit, he asked himself the question: well, then what? What will i do? And at once he answered himself: nothing. I will live. Ah, how nice!
The very thing that he had tormented before, what he was constantly looking for, the purpose of life, now did not exist for him. It was no coincidence that this desired goal of life now did not exist for him only at the present moment, but he felt that it did not exist and could not exist. And this lack of purpose gave him that full, joyful consciousness of freedom, which at that time constituted his happiness.
He could not have a goal, because he now had faith - not faith in any rules, or words, or thoughts, but faith in a living, always felt god. Previously, he had sought it for the purposes he had set for himself. This search for a goal was only a search for God; and suddenly, in his captivity, he recognized, not by words, not by reasoning, but by direct feeling, what his nanny had told him for a long time: that God is here, here, everywhere. In captivity, he learned that God in Karataev is greater, infinite and incomprehensible than in the Architecton of the universe recognized by the Masons. He experienced the feeling of a man who found what he was looking for under his feet, while he strained his eyes, looking far away from him. All his life he looked somewhere, over the heads of the people around him, but he had not to strain his eyes, but only look in front of him.
He was not able to see before the great, incomprehensible and infinite in anything. He only felt that it must be somewhere and looked for it. In everything close, understandable, he saw one thing limited, petty, worldly, meaningless. He armed himself with a mental telescope and looked into the distance, to where this shallow, worldly distance, hiding in the fog, seemed to him great and infinite only because it was not clearly visible. This is how he imagined European life, politics, freemasonry, philosophy, philanthropy. But even then, in those moments that he considered his weakness, his mind penetrated into this distance, and there he saw the same petty, worldly, meaningless. Now, however, he had learned to see the great, the eternal, and the infinite in everything, and therefore, naturally, in order to see it, to enjoy its contemplation, he threw down the trumpet into which he had until now looked over the heads of people, and joyfully contemplated around him the ever-changing, eternally great , incomprehensible and infinite life. And the closer he looked, the more he was calm and happy. The terrible question that previously destroyed all his mental structures was: why? no longer existed for him. Now to this question - why? a simple answer was always ready in his soul: then, that there is a god, that god, without whose will a hair will not fall from a person’s head.

The KGB of the USSR is the strongest body that controlled state security during the Cold War. The influence of this institution in the USSR was so great that almost the entire population of the state was afraid of it. Few people know that the security forces of the KGB of the USSR functioned in the security system.

History of the KGB

The state security system of the USSR was created already in the 1920s. As you know, this machine almost immediately began to work in full mode. It is enough to recall only the repressions that were carried out in the USSR in the 30s of the 20th century.

All this time, until 1954, state security agencies existed in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of course, in organizational terms, it was absolutely wrong. In 1954, two decisions were made supreme bodies authorities relating to the security system. On February 8, by decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the security agencies were removed from the subordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Already on March 13, 1954, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by its decree, created the Committee for State Security of the USSR. In this form, this body existed right up to the collapse of the USSR.

KGB leaders

Over the years, the organ was headed by Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov, Vladimir Alexandrovich Kryuchkov, Vitaly Vasilyevich Fedorchuk.

Functions of the KGB

The general essence of the activities of this body is understandable, but far from all the tasks of the security agencies that they performed in the system of the totalitarian regime for many years are known to a wide circle of the population. Therefore, we will outline the main range of functions of the KGB:

• the most important task was the organization of intelligence activities in the capitalist countries;
• the fight against spies from foreign intelligence agencies on the territory of the USSR;
• work to counter the possible leakage of data that is important for the state in all areas of activity;
• protection of state facilities, borders and major politicians;
• ensuring the smooth operation of the state apparatus.

Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

The State Security Committee had a complex structure, consisting of central offices, departments and departments. I would like to dwell on the KGB departments. So, there were 9 divisions:

1. The third directorate was responsible for military counterintelligence. In those years, the relevance of management tasks was enormous due to the active arms race between the USSR and the USA. Although the war was not officially declared, the threat of the transition of the conflict of systems from "cold" to "hot" was constant.
2. The fifth division was responsible for political and ideological issues. Ensuring ideological security and non-penetration of ideas "hostile" to communism into the masses is the main task of this structure.
3. The sixth department was responsible for maintaining state security in the economic sphere.
4. The seventh performed a specific task. When suspicions of serious misconduct fell on a certain person, they could be placed under surveillance.
5. The ninth division guarded the personal safety of members of the government, the highest party leadership.
6. Operational and technical department. During the years of the scientific and technological revolution, technology was constantly developing, so the security of the state could be reliably protected only with good technical equipment of the relevant bodies.
7. The tasks of the fifteenth department included the protection of state buildings and strategically important objects.
8. The sixteenth division was engaged in electronic intelligence. It was created already in the last period of the existence of the USSR in connection with the development of computer technology.
9. Construction department for the needs of the Ministry of Defense.

Departments of the KGB of the USSR

Departments are smaller, but no less important structures of the Committee. From the time of creation and right up to the disbandment of the KGB of the USSR, there were 5 departments. Let's talk about them in more detail.

The Investigation Department was engaged in the investigation of crimes of a criminal or economic nature aimed at violating the security of the state. In the conditions of confrontation with the capitalist world, it was important to ensure the absolute secrecy of government communications. This was done by a special unit.

The KGB was supposed to employ qualified officers who had undergone special training. This is what it was created for. graduate School KGB.

In addition, special departments were created to organize wiretapping telephone conversations, as well as indoors; to intercept and process suspicious mail. Of course, not all conversations were listened to and not all letters were read, but only when suspicions arose about a citizen or a group of people.

Separately, there were special border troops (PV KGB of the USSR), which were engaged in the protection of the state border.