There are sometimes more legends around the legendary planes than real facts.
Sergey Ivanov
Henschel 129 performed the same functions over the battlefield as the IL-2 - but much less efficiently
In the second half of the war, the Germans tried to convert the Ju-87 dive bomber into an ersatz attack aircraft.
The illustrations were provided by 1C and Maddox Games, manufacturers of the best flight simulator in the world, IL-2. Stormtrooper»
Read the following paragraph carefully: “The IL-2 is the famous “flying tank”, which terrified the Nazis, the world’s first armored attack aircraft. An aircraft equal in combat qualities to the Ilyushin machine could not be created by any other designer during the entire Second World War. For the first time, Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin came up with the idea to lighten the aircraft not to hang armor on the attack aircraft, but to make the armor protection of the aircraft a load-bearing structural element, which allowed the Ilov pilots to ignore the fire from the ground. Bombs, cannons and rockets from "flying tanks" crushed the armor of ground tanks.
Unfortunately, the original plan of Ilyushin, who designed a two-seat attack aircraft, was grossly violated by the military leadership. Considering that in a future war the Stalinist falcons would have an overwhelming advantage, the designer was forced to abandon the air gunner and put into production a single-seat version of the aircraft. Ilyushin's protests came to nothing. As a result, the Luftwaffe fighters, who were in charge of the air, shot down heavy, clumsy Ils with impunity ... When the pre-war mistake was eliminated and the shooter appeared on the plane again, the defensive capabilities of the Il-2 increased significantly. The Il-2 attack aircraft, the most massive aircraft of the Great Patriotic War, along with the T-34 tank, became a symbol of the triumph of our weapons.”
If you, dear readers, have not learned anything new from the previous paragraph, do not rush to put the magazine aside. We just put together textbook information about the IL-2. So is it worth writing again about the combat vehicle, about which everything is known? Costs. If only because in the above paragraph only two sentences are indisputable - the first and the last. Everything else needs clarification...
Armor - is it possible?
The problem of protecting aircraft and their crews from fire from the ground arose simultaneously with the advent of combat aviation. At first, aviators had to engage in amateur performances: they put pieces of armor, metal, or even just cast-iron pans, under the seat that were suitable in size. Toward the end of the First World War, designers in Britain, Germany and Russia tried to create armored aircraft. But at that time there were no powerful engines for the implementation of this idea.
Between the two world wars, military doctrines giving priority to strategic aviation became widespread. However, the most far-sighted military (including those in the USSR) understood that it was impossible to do without aircraft attacking (storming) the enemy directly on the battlefield or in the front line. That is, where everything that can shoot from the ground will shoot at it - from anti-aircraft guns to pistols. In the early 1930s, we built experienced heavy attack aircraft TSh-1 and TSh-2, as well as SHON (special purpose attack aircraft), armored biplanes. A significant step forward was the TSh-3 designer Kocherigin. It was a two-seat monoplane, the armored box of which was part of the aircraft's supporting structure (thus, the priority here does not belong to Ilyushin). Armament consisted of ten machine guns and bombs. True, the plane flew rather poorly - its angular body made of welded armor plates was not an aerodynamic masterpiece. Therefore, the TSh-3, which was tested in 1934, was not mass-produced.
For some time it was generally unclear whether it was possible in principle to build an armored attack aircraft with good flight data. In the UK and the US, this idea was abandoned, believing that a dive bomber could perform similar tasks. They thought the same in Germany, especially since there was an excellent Ju-87 dive bomber.
Nevertheless, in the spring of 1937, several German firms were tasked with developing an attack aircraft armed with cannons to combat armored vehicles and enemy fortifications.
IL-2 appeared not on orders from above, but thanks to the initiative of Sergei Ilyushin. This well-known designer, who created the DB-3 long-range bomber, worked in 1938 as the head of the Aviation Industry Directorate. The administrative position not only distracted from the creation of new aircraft, but also provided some advantages. It was clear to any aircraft designer of that time that an aircraft with an angular fuselage made of armor would fly badly, but only a brilliant head, free from stereotypes of thinking, could come up with the idea to make the armored hull streamlined, and only the head of the entire aviation industry could give metallurgists a task in a short time to develop technology for the manufacture of double curvature armor! And for the aircraft, which has not yet appeared in any plans.
Ilyushin had the courage to turn to the leadership with a letter in which he outlined his idea for an armored attack aircraft and criticized the aircraft of competitors. The letter had an effect: the designer was instructed to submit his attack aircraft for testing as soon as possible. By this time, the project of the machine, which was being developed clandestinely, was ready. It also turned out the fundamental possibility of manufacturing a streamlined armored hull. An agreement was reached with the designer Mikulin, who promised a powerful engine.
Unfortunately, it was a water-cooled engine, while air-cooled was preferable for an attack aircraft. After all, it is enough to get one bullet into the cooling system, and water will gradually flow out of it. The motor will overheat and fail, the attack aircraft will be disabled. You can, of course, book the radiator from all sides, but then it simply will not be cooled!
The unresolved problem of engine cooling was one of the reasons for the failure of the TSh-3. There, the radiator stuck out under the fuselage, and in the event that it came under fire, the pilot pulled it into the fuselage completely. It turned out that at the most crucial moment of combat work, the engine began to warm up, although some airflow was provided for the retracted radiator. Ilyushin creatively rethought the experience of his predecessors and placed an air tunnel inside the armored hull, across which there was a radiator. The oncoming air flow was drawn in through the upper air intake, cooled the radiator and exited under the bottom of the aircraft. Thus, the vulnerable radiator was inside, under the reliable protection of the armor.
This is just one extraordinary decision, and Ilyushin had to make dozens of similar design mini-revolutions. The main technological novelty was, of course, the manufacture of a streamlined armored box from sheets of variable thickness and double curvature. But... Having overcome an incredible amount of difficulties, Ilyushin built a plane that did not want to fly well. Tests showed insufficient speed and flight range, as well as longitudinal instability of the machine.
It is curious that around the same time, German pilots were testing the Henschel 129, which was made even earlier than Ilyushin's aircraft (thus, it is Henschel that can be considered the world's first armored attack aircraft). In some respects, this single-seat, twin-engine aircraft, armed with three guns, was more progressive than the Ilyushin one. But Luftwaffe experts recognized it as unsuccessful, after which they did not remember about it until 1942. A similar fate could await our "flying tank": at the first stage, it had no less flaws than the German counterpart. But Ilyushin nevertheless achieved the launch of his car in a series - albeit not in a completely honest way.
And now - "humpbacked!"
Sergei Vladimirovich had an exemplary Soviet biography. Origin - from horseless poor peasants, pre-revolutionary professions - a laborer, a carter of milk, an oiler on the railway ... Ilyushin had no need for worldly ingenuity. He was not only a brilliant designer, but also a man who clearly saw his goal and achieved it in every possible way. And as the head of the Glavk of the aviation industry, Ilyushin perfectly learned to understand the work of the Soviet bureaucratic mechanism.
Did the military send the plane for revision? Excellent. The range can be increased with the help of hanging tanks, but then the speed will decrease. Put in a more powerful motor? It exists, but it hasn't been completed yet. Wait for the engine? Even a successfully tested aircraft could not reach the conveyor. There was also competition between Soviet aircraft designers, rivals fought for aircraft factories. At that moment, there was a threat of Ilyushin's long-range bomber being taken out of production, and in this case, his design bureau was left without a production base. Ilyushin was no longer the head of Glavka - he was released from administrative work so that he could concentrate entirely on creating an attack aircraft. The designer understood: if the attack aircraft was not put into production in the near future, then the aircraft needed by the country could remain an experimental machine.
Ilyushin decided not to wait until the Mikulin AM-38 engine was brought to perfection. And he solved the problem of insufficient speed and range simply - he made the plane single-seat! An additional gas tank was put in place of the navigator's cabin, the armored hull was reduced, and the aircraft became lighter. The cockpit was raised in relation to the engine to provide a better view. And the plane, then called BSh-2 (armored attack aircraft), acquired a characteristic profile, for which at the front it was nicknamed "humpbacked". In the single-seat version, the attack aircraft delivered the promised performance.
Was Ilyushin right in refusing a navigator (and, in combination, an air gunner who could protect the aircraft from attacks from behind)? On the one hand, this was a tragic mistake, and hundreds of attack pilots paid for it in the initial period of the war with their lives. On the other hand, a single-seat attack aircraft was nevertheless put on the conveyor and, just before the war, began to enter aviation units.
In the future, Ilyushin constantly adhered to the version that he was forced to remove the navigator-shooter, and in Soviet times such an interpretation of events was known. Depending on the political situation, Ilyushin was “forced” either by Stalin personally or by some abstract military men. Alas, the documents show that the single-seat attack aircraft appeared precisely on the initiative of the Design Bureau, and the people's commissariats of the aviation industry and defense learned about the modernization at the last moment. Moreover, Ilyushin was obliged to submit a two-seat version of the attack aircraft for testing, but the designer, realizing that his flight data would be mediocre, did not do this.
The IL-2 entered the war as a single-seat attack aircraft armed with two cannons and two machine guns located in the wings. Additional weapons - rockets (RS) and 400 kg of bombs on the internal and external sling. The pilot, engine and gas tanks were protected by a 4-8 mm armored hull, and the total weight of the armor was about 700 kg. To the armored box, the main power element of the aircraft, the wings and the tail section of the fuselage were docked. The latter was originally duralumin, but in order to save scarce material, it was made from plywood.
Legends and myths
They say that first a person works for a reputation, and then the reputation works for a person. In relation to the aircraft, the rule also works! In the very first months of the use of the IL-2, a quite definite opinion was formed about him, and on both sides of the front. The myth about the clumsy, defenseless in front of fighters, but invulnerable to anti-aircraft guns "flying tank", which clicked armored vehicles like seeds, has safely survived to this day. In fact, both the combat effectiveness and the sluggishness of the Ilov were greatly exaggerated.
Felix Chuev, the author of Ilyushin's biography, quotes the words of Marshal Konev: “Do you know what the Il-2 is? Yes, if he gives an eres to the tank, the tank turns over! Alas, the marshal was mistaken ... It was extremely difficult to fight German tanks on the IL-2 at the beginning of the war. The effectiveness of the 20 mm ShVAK guns against tank armor was low. It was not possible to accurately drop bombs from the IL-2. The navigator, who provides aiming on bombers, was not here. The bomber sight of the pilot was ineffective. The IL-2 attacked from low altitudes or a very gentle dive, and the long hood of the aircraft simply blocked the target from the pilot! In the end, the sight (about which, during an emergency landing, the pilot almost always broke his head) was removed from the cockpit, and the pilots had to aim in the most primitive way, according to the marks on the hood. Finally, the miracle weapon, rockets, were not at all as good as it seemed to the Soviet military leaders. Even with a direct hit, the tank did not always fail, and it was only possible with great luck to hit a separate target with eres.
Why did we hope so much for the Ilys, while the Germans were so afraid of them? We must imagine the situation in 1941. Soviet aviation is knocked down, the air is dominated by the Luftwaffe. Aircraft that are completely unsuitable for this are used for attack. For example, biplane fighters I-15-bis and I-153, which were transferred to attack aviation only because they had no chance at all as fighters in battles with Messerschmitts. Against this background, the "flying tank", of course, was a step forward. In addition, the Ilys most often acted against the moving columns of the enemy. There was no need to aim very carefully here: fly along the road, and bombs with eres will find at least some target. And if Ily tanks were not always coped with, then vehicles, artillery or infantry were quite a suitable target for them. But the blitzkrieg, with which Germany crushed her opponents and hoped to crush the Red Army, is a war of maneuver, a constant movement of troops! A raid of at least a few Il-2s on a convoy meant at least panic, a stop and disabled equipment. It sometimes took several hours to resume movement.
True, the "invulnerable" aircraft, it turned out, was amazed even by the smallest caliber 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The armor protected only from bullets, but the rest of our aircraft did not have such protection either. And the saturation of mobile German units with anti-aircraft artillery was very high. Yes, plus German aces.
Here lies one of the most amazing secrets of the IL-2. Having got rid of the bombs, it was possible to fight German planes on it, like on a good fighter! An experienced pilot on the Il-2 could maneuver and go into the tail of the German Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighter that attacked him! At the front, they knew many tricks with which the Il-2 could stand up for itself: for example, the pilots were recommended to sharply slow down so that a fast fighter would slip past, and then turn on it and shoot it with cannons. In a frontal attack, an armored attack aircraft also had more chances than Messer.
Alas, the skill of the bulk of the pilots of our attack aircraft at that moment was not high. Having learned only to take off, shoot at ground targets and land, yesterday's boys got to the front. They were not taught complex aerobatics during a brief training in reserve regiments. That is why the Il-2 was considered a clumsy aircraft - it simply flew too few experienced pilots who knew how to maneuver. As a result, there were serious losses from both enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. In the first months of the war, the life of the IL-2 at the front was, on average, estimated at only a dozen sorties. Of course, the pilot did not always die when the aircraft was lost; he could jump out with a parachute or survive during an emergency landing. Nevertheless, Il-2 pilots died more often than fighters or bombers. For 30 successful sorties, the attack pilot was presented to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
folk hero
In 1942, the Germans realized it and launched the Henschel 129 into mass production, fighting with the shortcomings of the machine (however, mass production was not possible to establish). By this time, the IL-2 was produced at several large aircraft factories and was constantly modernized. Aircraft designer Sukhoi, meanwhile, created his own Su-6 attack aircraft, which surpassed the Ilyushin one in all respects. But in order to maintain the pace of production, they decided to keep the proven car in production. The second half of the war, the IL-2 passed in the splendor of its glory, enjoying the well-deserved love of our infantry, which he helped a lot and effectively. The aircraft received a boosted engine, more powerful weapons - 23 mm, and then even 37 mm guns. And the Il-2 armored vehicles became a real thunderstorm when small-caliber anti-tank cumulative bombs appeared. Pouring 192 such bombs from their bomb bays, the attack aircraft was guaranteed to hit tanks in an area of 15x75 meters.
They also tried to solve the problem of protecting the rear hemisphere - an air gunner was again included in the crew. True, his machine gun was not a very effective weapon against German fighters, but still it was better than nothing. The second crew member flew in Spartan conditions, there was not even an elementary seat! He sat on a canvas strap, which often broke off during the turns of the aircraft. And most importantly, the arrow was protected by a single armor plate at the back! From the sides and below, he was defenseless. Therefore, the place of the shooter in the IL-2 was often intended for the penalty box. The famous pilot, a participant in the Chkalovsky flight, Georgy Baidukov, commanded a division of attack aircraft during the war and rated the two-seater Il-2 even lower than a single-seat one: in it, the pilot had to think about how to maneuver over the target with the least risk for the shooter.
Of course, the creator of the aircraft could increase the size of the armored hull so that it would also protect the shooter. But then it would be necessary to readjust production, suspending the production of aircraft needed by the front. Ilyushin was a son of his time and was not used to calculating the cost of victories. IL-2 was also the son of its time. A front-line aircraft, he went through the war until the last day. And, like most front-line soldiers, immediately after the victory it became unnecessary. He was dismissed, replaced by a more advanced Il-10.
This aircraft is known to the Germans as the "infamous Il-2M3 attack aircraft" - the famous anti-tank aircraft. Many attack aircraft pilots were women and they fought very successfully. The main difference between the Il-2M3 and the Il-2 is the absence of the last second crew member - the gunner and, in general, any active tail protection. Il-2M3 began to arrive at the front at the end of 1942.
The Il-2 attack aircraft was probably the most massive aircraft in the history of world aviation. According to the most conservative estimates, 36,163 pieces were made. IL-2 was very hard to shoot because of its excellent armor. This gave the pilots the freedom to select and destroy targets. Also, his amazing vitality surpassed the enemy in air-to-air fights. The aircraft sometimes received horrendous damage and nevertheless continued to fly, which saved the lives of pilots more than once. Pilots called it in different ways, but more often "Flying Tank". The combination of all the qualities of an attack aircraft naturally made him a universal favorite.
On the Il-2M3 modification, the gunner covering the tail of the attack aircraft was not as well protected as the pilot. It was believed that the period of combat life of the shooter is seven times less than that of the pilot or the planes.
It was said that the plane was so heavy on takeoff that some of the female pilots were helped by their gunners to pull the control stick towards themselves. The shooter, of course, had to contrive to reach the lever from his position.
Despite the strong fire resistance, the IL-2 showed high combat effectiveness. The need for aircraft of this type was enormous. The telegram of I.V. Stalin to the directors of aircraft factories, which, in particular, said: "The Il-2 aircraft are needed by our Red Army ... like air, like bread."
Il-2M-3 (2-seater late, wing with "arrow") from the 108th Guards. hat, summer-autumn 1944
The combat use of the Il-2 also revealed its major drawback, which led to large losses - vulnerability to fire from enemy fighters attacking the attack aircraft from the rear unprotected hemisphere. The need for a second crew member to protect the attack aircraft from behind became apparent. In KB S.V. Ilyushin carried out a modification of the aircraft, and in the fall of 1942, the Il-2 appeared at the front for the first time in a two-seat version. By the end of 1942, engine builders created the forced AM-38f engine, which developed a takeoff power of 1720 hp. From January 1943, these engines began to be installed on serial two-seater IL-2. The increased power of the new AM-38f made it possible to restore the normal bomb load of a two-seat attack aircraft to 400 kg, as well as bring its flight data closer to the level of a single-seat aircraft. To improve the stability characteristics, the attack aircraft wing was given a slight sweep (the so-called "arrow" wing). By the end of 1941, due to a lack of aluminum, part of the structure (rear fuselage and wing panels) was replaced with wooden ones, which made the structures heavier and reduced the flight performance and survivability of the aircraft in combat. The situation changed only in 1944.
During serial production, various improvements were made to the design of the IL-2. For example: additional 4 - 6 mm armor plates were installed on top of the rear gas tank, above the engine and the pilot's head. The struts of the main landing gear are reinforced. The tail wooden part of the aircraft was also additionally reinforced. The volume of the rear gas tank has been increased. A dust filter was installed on the engine air intake. New equipment was also installed on the aircraft: an additional electric bomb releaser, a system for filling gas tanks with inert gas, a more convenient VV-1 sighting sight, and an RPK-10 radio semi-compass (not on all aircraft). Since May 1943, fiber-protected gas tanks were installed on the aircraft. They better ensured tightness when they were shot through with bullets, and besides, they were 55 kg lighter. Unfortunately, the gunner's cockpit was installed outside the armored hull, the armored hull, which completely protected the gunner and the "repair kit" for retrofitting the attack aircraft in the field, was released only in the spring of 1944, and the aircraft was put into production only in the spring of 1945. Thus, in 1944, only attack aircraft "modified" in the field with improved armor appeared on the fronts.
Insufficient flight data of the aircraft and armor were overcome only with the installation of a more powerful 2000 horsepower AM-42 engine, with its installation a new Il-10 attack aircraft appeared, but unfortunately it appeared too late - only in 1944.
Armament. A diverse composition of weapons (two machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, two cannons of 20 or 23 mm caliber, eight rockets of 82 or 132 mm caliber and 400-600 kg of bombs) ensured the destruction of a wide variety of targets: infantry, columns of troops, armored vehicles, tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft batteries, means of communication and communications, warehouses, trains, etc.
Initially, it was planned to install four ShKAS machine guns in the wing for firing forward with 500 rounds of ammunition for each barrel, one ShKAS machine gun on the turret for firing backwards with 500 rounds of ammunition.
Options for installing guns ShVAK and MP-6 were tested. By order of Shakhurin No. 462 dated May 21, 1941. The MP-6 cannon was discontinued and from November 41st, IL-2s were produced only with VYa-23 cannons with 150 rounds per gun.
All serial IL-2s retained two ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber with a total supply of 1,500 rounds.
The constant increase in the combat capability of the IL-2 was largely due to the continuous improvement of its weapons. In 1943, two NS-37 37 mm cannons were installed under the wing of the Il-2, used against enemy armored vehicles, although the widely publicized destruction of tanks from artillery fire from aviation was unlikely to be such. The defeat of heavy tanks from aircraft cannons could only occur with a direct vertical hit on the tank cover, and in fact the losses of tanks from artillery fire from aircraft during the war amounted to 4-5%, although in individual operations losses reached 10-15%. The point is also that 37-mm guns have a large return. Installed on the wing, at a considerable distance from the longitudinal axis of the aircraft, they begin to turn the aircraft when fired. As a result, the 37-mm cannon projectiles are strongly dispersed during firing, and aimed fire at such small objects as tanks is very difficult. So, for example, during tests of the Il-2 with NS-37 cannons, carried out at the Air Force Research Institute in 1943, it turned out that it was possible in principle to defeat an enemy medium tank with a 37-mm cannon projectile - armor up to 110 mm was penetrated by a sub-caliber projectile, but out of the total ammunition load of 120 shells (60 for each gun), only 3% or 4 shells reached the target.
The use of cumulative bombs significantly increased the effectiveness of the Il-2 in the fight against tanks and other armored vehicles. When such bombs were dropped by one attack aircraft from a height of 75-100 m, almost everything in the 15x75 m band was destroyed. into service in 1942.
Due to the exceptionally large role that the IL-2 played in the fight against the Wehrmacht troops, it became one of the most famous aircraft of the Second World War. "Airplane-soldier" - that's what the front-line soldiers called it.
| Characteristics of attack aircraft | Su-2 | IL-2 | IL-2 | IL-10 | |
| Year of issue | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | |
| Crew, people | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| Dimensions | |||||
| Wingspan, m | 14.3 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 13.4 | |
| Aircraft length, m | 10.25 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 11.12 | |
| Wing area, m2 | 20.0 | 38.5 | 38.5 | 30.0 | |
| Motor | |||||
| Type of | M-88 | AM-38 | AM-38F | AM-42 | |
| Power, hp | 1100 | 1600 | 1720 | 2000 | |
| Masses and loads, kg | |||||
| Normal takeoff | 4345 | 5670 | 6180 | 6300 | |
| Maximum takeoff | 4555 | 5870 | 6380 | 6500 | |
| flight data | |||||
| Maximum ground speed, km/h | 375 | 391 | 403 | 507 | |
| Max Speed | km/h | 467 | 416 | 414 | 551 |
| at height, m | 6600 | 2350 | 1000 | 2800 | |
| Flight range with normal bomb load, km | 1190 | 740 | 685 | 800 | |
| Armament | normal | 400 | 400 | 400 | 400 |
| maximum | 600 | 600 | 600 | 600 | |
| Armament, number | machine guns | 5-6 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| guns | - | 2 | 2 | 2 | |
| rocket projectiles | 8-10 | 8 | 4 | 4 | |
| Aviation grenades | - | - | - | 10 | |
+ Click on the picture to enlarge!
Sources:
"The history of aircraft designs in the USSR, 1938-1950" / V.B. Shavrov/
"Planes of Stalin's falcons" /K.Yu. Kosminkov, D.V. Grinyuk/
"Aircraft of the Ilyushin Design Bureau" / Edited by G.V. Novozhilova/
"Soviet aircraft" / A.S. Yakovlev/
"Stormtroopers of the Red Army" / V.I. Perov, O.V. Rastrenin/
Il-2 aircraft
The TsKB-55 aircraft (BSh-2 second armored attack aircraft) was developed in the design bureau of S.V. Ilyushin. The first tests of this aircraft began on October 2, 1939. The aircraft was a two-seat cantilever monoplane with a semi-retractable landing gear and an AM-35 liquid-cooled engine with an HP 1350 power. all vital aircraft units (motor, cooling system, tanks), as well as the crew, were in a streamlined armored hull. On October 12, 1940, V.K. Kokkinaki began flight tests of the second version of such an aircraft - TsKB-57. This aircraft was equipped with a less high-altitude, but more powerful AM-38 engine, created in the design bureau of A.A. Mikulin specifically for this aircraft. The layout of the cooling systems of the machine and cab has changed. The crew now consisted only of a pilot (a fuel tank was placed in place of the gunner). Reinforced armor and weapons. The aircraft successfully passed all factory tests, but the serial production of this aircraft was in no hurry. The first mass-produced armored attack aircraft, which received the Il-2 brand, began to appear in 1941, and the first combat units armed with this aircraft were formed just before the war. The appearance of IL-2 on the fronts was a complete surprise for the enemy. They acted with great success against the armored and mechanized units of the enemy. A diverse composition of weapons (two 7.62 mm machine guns, two 20 or 23 mm cannons, eight 82 or 132 mm caliber rockets and 400-600 kg of bombs) ensured the defeat of a wide variety of targets: infantry, troop columns, armored vehicles, tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft batteries, means of communication and communications, warehouses, trains, etc. The combat use of the Il-2 revealed its major drawback, which led to large losses - vulnerability to fire from enemy fighters attacking the attack aircraft from the rear unprotected hemisphere. The need for a second crew member to protect the attack aircraft from behind became apparent. In the design bureau of S.V. Ilyushin, the aircraft was modified, and in the fall of 1942, the Il-2 appeared at the front in a two-seater version for the first time. Since 1943, the IL-2 has been produced with a more powerful AM-38F engine. To improve the stability characteristics, the attack aircraft wing was given a slight sweep. The constant increase in the combat capability of the IL-2 was largely due to the continuous improvement of its weapons. In 1943, two 37 mm caliber cannons were installed under the wing of the Il-2, the shells of which, with a successful hit, could even hit heavy tanks. The use of cumulative bombs significantly increased the effectiveness of the Il-2 in the fight against tanks and other armored vehicles. When such bombs were dropped by one attack aircraft from a height of 75-100 m, almost all tanks in the 15 by 75 m band were destroyed. The new M-8 and M-13 air-to-ground rockets ", adopted in 1942. During the Great Patriotic War the Il-2 armored attack aircraft was a unique combat vehicle that had no analogues in any of the warring countries. In total, a record high number of these aircraft was built - 36163 copies.
Flight performance characteristics of IL-2M:
Type of: double attack aircraft.
Power point: one Mikulin AM-38F piston engine with a power of 1282 kW (1720 hp).
Flight data: maximum speed at 1500 m (4920 ft) 410 km/h (255 mph); service ceiling 4525 m (14845 ft); range 765 km (475 miles).
Weights: curb - 4525 kg (9976 pounds); maximum takeoff 6,360 kg (14,021 lb).
Dimensions: wingspan 14.6 m (47 ft 10.75 in); length 11.65 m (38 ft 2.5 in); height 4.17 m (13 ft 8 in); wing area 38.5 sq. m (414.42 sq. ft.).
Armament: two 23 mm VYa cannons and two 7.62 mm (0.3 in) ShKAS machine guns (all mounted on the wing), as well as one 12.7 mm (0.5 in) UBT machine gun in the rear cockpit; 100 kg (220 ft) bombs (four inside and two under the fuselage) or two 250 kg (551 lb) bombs under the fuselage; eight RS-82 missiles or four RS-132 missiles on underwing suspensions.
IL-2 NS-37
Developer: OKB Ilyushin
Country: USSR
The first flight: 1943
Type of: Heavy anti-tank attack aircraft
By the spring of 1943, the only armored targets of the Wehrmacht, with which the "Ils" could still successfully fight using cannon weapons, were only lightly armored armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers, as well as self-propelled guns (such as "Wespe", etc.) and anti-tank control systems (such as " Marder-M" and "Marder-III"), created on the basis of light tanks. Actually, light tanks in the Panzerwaffe on the Eastern Front by this time were almost gone. They were replaced by more powerful medium and heavy tanks.
In this regard, in order to improve the anti-tank properties of the attack aviation of the Red Army, GKO Decree No. 3144 dated April 8, 1943, Plant No. 30 undertook to produce two-seat Il-2 AM-38f attack aircraft with two guns of 37 mm caliber 11P-37 OKB-16 with ammunition according to 50 rounds per gun, without rockets, with a bomb load of 100 kg in the normal version and 200 kg in the reload version. The ammunition of ShKAS and UBT machine guns remained the same. In May, the plant was supposed to produce 50 new attack aircraft, in June - 125, in July - 175, and from August to switch to the production of all aircraft with large-caliber air guns.
Ammunition for the NS-37 gun consisted of cartridges with armor-piercing incendiary tracer (BZT-37) and fragmentation incendiary tracer (OZT-37) shells.
Armor-piercing shells were intended to destroy armored ground targets, and fragmentation shells were intended to destroy air targets. In addition, a sub-caliber projectile was developed for the new gun, which provides penetration of armor up to 110 mm thick.
In April, the 30th aircraft factory manufactured 5 Il-2s with NS-37 of the head series, one of which (serial number 302349) entered the state tests at the Air Force Research Institute of the KA on May 27. The latter, after performing 26 flights with a flight time of 11 hours. 35 min. successfully completed by June 22, 1943 (lead test pilot A.I. Kabanov, chief engineer V.S. Kholopov, flight pilots Major A.K. Dolgov and major engineer A.V. Sinelnikov).
The attack aircraft presented for state tests differed from the serial IL-2 only by the installation of two NS-37 guns with an ammunition load of 60 rounds per barrel and the absence of a PC. Normal bomb load - 200 kg.
The belt feed of the NS-37 guns allowed the specialists of the S.V. Ilyushin Design Bureau to place them directly at the lower surface of the wing using a structurally very simple and quick-release mount. The guns were closed with relatively small fairings, each of which consisted of two easy-to-open flaps. Ammunition for each gun fit directly into the wing compartments. The weight of one NS-37 gun with ammunition was 256 kg.
With a flight weight of 6277 kg, the maximum speed of the attack aircraft at an altitude of 1320 m was 387 km / h, near the ground - 375 km / h. The practical ceiling of the new aircraft did not exceed 5200 m, while the climb time to a height of 1000 m was 3 minutes. The maximum range of the attack aircraft did not exceed 685 km.
Compared to serial "Ilams" armed with ShVAK or VYa cannons, the Il-2 with NS-37 and with a bomb load of 200 kg became more inert, difficult to bend and turn.
The deterioration in the flight characteristics of the new attack aircraft, as well as the Il-2 with ShFK-37 guns, was associated with a large spread of masses along the wing span and the presence of gun fairings, which worsened the overall aerodynamics of the aircraft. In the entire range of alignments, the IL-2 with the NS-37 did not have longitudinal stability, which significantly reduced the aiming of firing in the air. The latter was exacerbated by the strong recoil of the cannons when fired from them. According to the NII AV VVS KA (letter from the head of the NII AV, Major General M.V. Gurevich dated 11/19/1943 addressed to S.V. Ilyushin), the maximum recoil force, acting for about 0.03 sec, on a ground machine ( the equipment existing at that time did not allow measuring the "actual recoil force" on aircraft, and even more so when firing in the air) was a very significant value - about 5500 kg, and the average value of the recoil force was approximately equal to 2500 kg. All this led to a large dispersion of shells when firing in the air.
Field tests conducted at the Scientific Research Institute of Aviation of the Air Force of the KA showed that firing from an Il-2 aircraft from NS-37 cannons must be carried out only in short bursts no more than 2-3 shots long, since when firing simultaneously from two cannons due to their non-synchronization During operation, the aircraft experienced significant jolts, pecks and strayed from the aiming line. Correction in aiming in this case, in principle, was possible.
When firing from one gun, hitting the target was possible only with the first shot, since the attack aircraft turned in the direction of the firing gun and the correction in aiming became almost impossible. The defeat of point targets - tanks, armored vehicles, cars, etc. during normal operation of the guns was possible.
At the same time, hits on tanks were received only in 43% of sorties, and the number of hits to the spent ammunition was 2.98%.
An analysis of the results of field tests shows that the defeat of light German tanks, armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers of all types, as well as self-propelled guns of the "Wespe" type and anti-tank self-propelled guns of the "Marder-II" type "and" Marder-III "provided from a distance of up to 500 m from any direction. Medium German tanks of the StuG 40 type (assault gun), Pz. III Ausf L/M and Pz. IV Ausf G / H, as well as the StuG IV that appeared later and the tank destroyer Jgd Pz IV / 70 with armor thickness on the sides up to 30 mm, could be hit by the BZT-37 from a distance of up to 500 m from planning at angles of 5-10 ° from a height of 100 m In this case, the attack had to be carried out from the side or from behind, firing at the side or at the rear of the hull and turret of the tanks.
The hit of the shells of this gun in the rollers and other parts of the undercarriage of tanks of all types produced significant destruction, incapacitating the latter.
In the conclusions of the report on State tests, special attention was paid to the fact that flight personnel flying Il-2 aircraft armed with NS-37 guns must undergo special training in aimed fire in short bursts at small targets (individual tanks, vehicles, etc.). .d.). The 30th NKAP aircraft plant and OKB-16 NKV were recommended to urgently install a muzzle brake on the gun.
In addition, it was indicated that the IL-2 with NS-37 had to be tested with ammunition for guns of 50 shells and a normal bomb load of 100 kg, as was recorded in the GKO Resolution.
In the future, all serial Il-2s with NS-37s were produced in this version of weapons. The flight performance of the aircraft has improved somewhat. With a flight weight of 6160 kg, the maximum speed at an altitude of 1320 m was 405 km / h, near the ground - 391 km / h. Ascent time to a height of 1000 m - 2.2 min.
As you can see, when installing the NS-37 cannons on the two-seat Il-2, the designers faced the same problems as when installing the ShFK-37 cannons on the single-seat Il.
The main means of combating German tanks during this period of the war was an anti-tank cumulative aerial bomb weighing 1.5 kg in the dimensions of the 2.5 kg aerial bomb in service with the Air Force KA - PTAB-2.5-1.5. The new aerial bomb was developed at TsKB-22 under the leadership of I.A. Larionov.
The effect of the new bomb was as follows. When hitting the tank's armor, a fuse was triggered, which, through a tetryl detonator checker, caused the detonation of the charge explosive. During the detonation of the charge, due to the presence of a cumulative funnel and a metal cone in it, a cumulative jet was created, which, as field tests showed, pierced armor up to 60 mm thick at an encounter angle of 30 °, followed by a destructive effect behind the armor: defeating the tank crew, initiating detonation of ammunition , as well as ignition of fuel or its vapors.
The minimum height to ensure the leveling of the bomb before meeting the surface of the tank's armor and the reliability of its action was 70 m.
The bomb load of the Il-2 aircraft included up to 192 PTAB-2.5-1.5 bombs in 4 clusters of small bombs (48 pieces each) or up to 220 pieces with their rational placement in bulk in 4 bomb bays.
When dropping a PTAB from a height of 200 m from a horizontal flight at a flight speed of 340-360 km / h, one bomb hit an area equal to an average of 15 m ) m2, which ensured an almost guaranteed defeat of any Wehrmacht tank located in this strip. The fact is that the area occupied by one tank was about 20-22 m2, and the hit of at least one bomb in the tank was quite sufficient to disable it, in most cases irrevocably.
Thus, the PTAB was a rather formidable weapon for that time. By the way, the Chief Designer of TsKB-22 I.A. Larionov was awarded the Order of Lenin in January 1944 for the creation of the PTAB-2.5-1.5 and the AD-A fuse for it, and in 1946 he was awarded the title laureate of the State Prize of the USSR.
Flight performance
|
Modification |
IL-2 (NS-37) |
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Wingspan, m |
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Height, m |
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Wing area, m2 |
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Weight, kg |
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empty plane |
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normal takeoff |
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engine's type |
1 PD Mikulin AM-38F |
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Power, hp |
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nominal |
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takeoff |
|
|
Maximum speed, km/h |
|
|
on high |
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Practical range, km |
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Rate of climb, m/min |
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Practical ceiling, m |
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Armament |
two 37 mm NS-37 cannons (50 rounds per barrel), two 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns (750 rounds per machine gun) 100 kg of bombs (overload 200 kg) - up to 220 PTAB-2.5-1.5 |
The planes of Sergei Ilyushin accounted for more than 30% of all combat vehicles of the Great Patriotic War and made an invaluable contribution to the common cause of the Great Victory. IL-2 became the most massive combat aircraft not only in World War II, but in the entire history of aviation. A total of 36,163 attack aircraft were produced from 1939 to 1945.
In January 1938, Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin turned to the government with a proposal to create a two-seat (pilot and defensive machine gunner) designed by him armored attack aircraft - a “flying tank”, which, in terms of its combat effectiveness, was superior to light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft created at that time under the program “ Ivanov.
“I did not immediately start designing an attack aircraft, I was preparing for about three years. I analyzed the already created machines to the details. I came to the conclusion: the main thing is to combine weight, armor, weapons and speed in the best possible way, ”Ilyushin later recalled in his memoirs.
The problem of protecting an aircraft from fire from the ground arose along with the beginning of the use of aviation for military purposes. At first, the pilots themselves had to take the initiative - to put pieces of metal or just a cast-iron pan under the seat.
Aircraft designers from Great Britain, Germany and Russia have repeatedly tried to solve the problem of aircraft protection.
The Junkers and Sopwith firms even built planes armored with flat sheets. But as soon as the armor was hung up, the plane turned into a heavy, poorly and slowly flying machine. For a long time, no one managed to combine the requirements of supporting ground troops and combat survivability in one vehicle. For some time, aviation designers even assumed that it was impossible to design an armored attack aircraft.
“The task of creating an armored attack aircraft is difficult and involves great technical risk, but I undertake this business with enthusiasm and complete confidence in success,” Ilyushin wrote in his letter to Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov.
Such confidence of Ilyushin was based on the implementation of his outstanding design idea. He made the armor not only protect, but also work instead of the usual airframe frame, which made it possible to significantly reduce the weight of the aircraft.
The contours of the armored hull, which formed the contours of the forward fuselage, were inscribed with a power plant, engine cooling radiators, a cockpit and gas tanks.
From October 1937, Ilyushin combined two responsible positions: the chief designer of the Design Bureau of Plant No. 39 and the head of the Main Directorate of Experimental Aircraft Construction in the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense Industry. Wanting to concentrate on design activities, he asks the government to release him from a high state post, promising to create a new type of attack aircraft - a "flying tank" as soon as possible. Such permission was obtained, "Ilyushin flew out of Glavka on IL-2," they joked later.
Based on an analysis of the combat use of reconnaissance attack aircraft and fighters in Spain and China for direct support of ground forces, Sergey Vladimirovich, on his own initiative, what was characteristic feature his design work, spent design studies parameters and layout of an armored attack aircraft.
The creation of the Il-2 became possible thanks to the new armor steel AB-1, developed at VIAM under the leadership of Sergei Kishkin and Nikolai Sklyarov. The armor had good toughness and, most importantly, made it possible to manufacture armor parts by hot stamping. Armored parts were stamped in air, after which they were cooled in oil, and from the hardening bath they were fed back into the die for final sizing.
As Sergei Ilyushin said, at the training ground there was an endless crack of machine guns firing at the armored hull.
This was how the optimal thickness of the armor for various sections of the cabin was determined, which ranged from 4 to 12 mm. For the first time in the USSR, transparent armor of the K-4 type was used. The windshields of the cockpit lantern were made from it.
Not everyone understood what Ilyushin proposed. “The military, when they found out the thickness of the armor, convinced that it would be easily pierced. But they were wrong, because it's one thing when a bullet pierces the armor at an angle of 90 degrees, and another when the plane flies at high speed, besides, the cockpit has a streamlined shape. In this case, try to hit with a bullet perpendicular to the surface of the armor, ”Sergey Vladimirovich argued.
An experimental aircraft TsKB-55 with an AM-35 engine by Alexander Mikulin made its first flight on October 2, 1939 under the control of Vladimir Kokkinaki. Due to the underestimation by some experts of the flight and combat characteristics of the aircraft, its launch into mass production was delayed. After a large amount of fine-tuning work related to the use of a more powerful low-altitude AM-38 engine, the transition to a single-seat version at the request of the military, the installation of more powerful offensive weapons in 1940, the aircraft under the designation Il-2 was finally put into mass production at the Voronezh aviation factory. The plant workers worked around the clock together with a group of designers, which was personally headed by Ilyushin and representatives of the Mikulin Engine Design Bureau.
On March 1, 1941, the first serial Il-2 entered the factory flight test station. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, 249 Il-2 attack aircraft were built. On June 27, 1941, the Il-2 aircraft received a baptism of fire.
On the evening of that day, five aircraft of the 4th Assault Aviation Regiment attacked a column of German tanks and motorized infantry in the Bobruisk area at the turn of the Berezina River.
Simple piloting technique, powerful armament, invulnerability to fire from ground-based small arms, and partially from fire from small-caliber anti-aircraft guns, made the IL-2 a formidable means of fighting enemy ground forces, especially its tanks and motorized infantry.
In the autumn of 1941, due to the evacuation of mass-produced factories to the east, the production of Il-2 was sharply reduced. In the most difficult conditions, aircraft builders set up the production of attack aircraft in new places, people worked in unheated rooms, sometimes under open sky. But there was a battle for Moscow, and the front, more than ever before, needed Il-2 aircraft.
Stalin sends the famous telegram to Kuibyshev to factory directors Matvey Shenkman and Anatoly Tretyakov.
Telegram from I. V. Stalin addressed to the directors of plant No. 18 Matvey Shenkman and plant No. 1 Anatoly Tretyakov, December 23, 1941. Il-2 aircraft began to arrive in front-line units in an ever-increasing number. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, more than 1000 Il-2 aircraft were delivered to the front every month.
Combat experience also revealed a significant drawback of the single-seat IL-2 - its vulnerability to attacks by enemy fighters from behind. This shortcoming was eliminated by installing a rear gunner's cockpit with Mikhail Berezin's heavy machine gun. Work at the request of Stalin was carried out by Ilyushin, designers and serial plants without stopping the conveyor.
In February 1942, Stalin summoned Ilyushin to him: “But you were right. You made a two-seat attack aircraft Il-2, and we, without understanding it properly, at the insistence of some advisers, forced us to convert it into a single-seat one. Single-seat attack aircraft require cover and suffer heavy losses from fighter attacks from the tail. We need to get back to the two-seater immediately! Do what you want, but so that the conveyor does not stop!”
In 1944, the Pravda newspaper wrote about this aircraft: “The Ilyushin-2 aircraft are not only an achievement in aviation science, they are a remarkable tactical discovery.”
Ilyushin himself called the aircraft he developed a "flying tank". In the Red Army, the IL-2 received the nickname "humped". Probably not so much because of the profile, but because, as a hard worker, he got the result with his hump. “Humpbacked - because he carried the war on his shoulders,” said the pilots.
German pilots nicknamed him "concrete plane" for his survivability. The ground forces of the Wehrmacht, for the effectiveness of strikes, called the Il-2 nothing more than a "butcher", "meat grinder", "iron Gustav". There is also a mention that in some German parts the plane was called the "black death".
For the creation of the Il-2 in March 1941, Ilyushin received the Stalin Prize II degree. And five months later, in August, for the excellent combat qualities of the aircraft, one more - already I degree. This is probably almost the only case when the author was awarded two Stalin Prizes in a row for the same work.
Of all the variety of tasks that the Il-2 aircraft solved during the Great Patriotic War, their use as fighters was especially unusual. Of course, the Il-2s could not compete on equal terms with the faster and more maneuverable front-line fighters of the enemy, but when they met with some of the bombers and German transport aircraft Il-2, which were widely used in combat operations, as a rule, they were shot down.
Based on the combat experience of using the Il-2, the State Defense Committee on May 17, 1943 decided to create a single-seat armored fighter Il-1.
Sergei Vladimirovich did not share the concept of an armored fighter, and the design of the IL-1 was carried out from the standpoint of the possibility of further use of the aircraft as a high-speed and maneuverable two-seat armored attack aircraft. The new aircraft received the designation Il-10.
April 18, 1944 Vladimir Kokkinaki performed the first flight on the Il-10 attack aircraft from the Central Airfield. M. V. Frunze on the Khodynka field in Moscow. The aircraft was built at Aviation Plant No. 18 in Kuibyshev, and its final assembly was carried out at Plant No. 240 in Moscow. The attack aircraft was equipped with an AM-42 engine, had powerful artillery weapons - four NS-23 wing guns with a total ammunition capacity of 600 rounds and a UB-20 turret gun. The maximum speed of the IL-10 was equal to 551 km / h - almost 150 km / h more than the maximum speed of the IL-2.
Military pilots highly appreciated the IL-10 as simple in terms of piloting technique and not requiring special retraining from the IL-2. According to military testers, "the Il-10 aircraft is a classic example of an attack aircraft."
Review of the squadron "Chapaevtsy". Squadron Il-2M "Chapaevtsy" was built at the expense of the workers of the city of Chapaevsk and transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front.
September 12, 1944.
After testing, the Il-10 attack aircraft was put into production and from April 15, 1945 began to take part in hostilities.
Shortly before that, on March 28, 1945, as part of testing an aircraft over the Sprottau airfield in Selesia, a demonstrative air battle was organized between the Il-10 attack aircraft, piloted by Captain Alexander Sirotkin from the 108th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment, with the La-5FN fighter piloted by the Hero of the Soviet Union captain Vitaly Popkov from the 5th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment.
By that time, Popkov was considered an ace, who had about 100 battles and 39 downed enemy aircraft.
The battle ended in a draw, but the film of the photo-machine gun impartially showed that both the pilot and the Il-10 air gunner caught the fighter in the crosshairs more than once.
This made it possible to draw the main conclusion that if an experienced, enterprising pilot and a well-aimed air gunner are in the cockpit of an attack aircraft, they have a good chance of winning a duel with a fighter. In addition, at altitudes up to 2,000 meters, the Il-10 was not inferior in speed to the German Me-109G2 and FW-109A-4 fighters.
By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the high combat qualities of the Il-10 aircraft had already been successfully used by several attack aviation regiments. In large quantities, Il-10 attack aircraft were used in the war with Japan.
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the IL-10 was re-equipped with all the assault units of the Red Army Air Force that remained after the disbandment. In addition to the USSR Air Force, they were in service with the assault air regiments of the Air Forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, China, and North Korea.
Veteran pilots about the IL-2 aircraft
Council of Veterans of the 6th Guards, Moscow, Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner and Suvorov 2nd Class Assault Aviation Regiment.
Dear Sergey Vladimirovich!
... During the Great Patriotic War, the pilots of our regiment were one of the first to master a new for that time machine designed by you - the Il-2 attack aircraft. This wonderful, magnificent technique withstood "excellently" all the severe tests over the battlefield.
How many times he rescued us in difficult moments! How many times did we and our colleagues manage to save their lives thanks to the high, amazing survivability of the aircraft itself! Our attack aircraft was an indispensable reliable assistant to the ground forces. No wonder they called it at that time a "winged tank", and attack aircraft - "air infantry". This formidable machine was most feared by the Nazis, and the appearance of attack aircraft over enemy targets inevitably sowed panic and confusion in the enemy camp.
That is why the Nazis dubbed it the "Black Death".
The aircraft's high flight and tactical qualities and its enormous combat capabilities allowed us to exemplarily perform complex combat missions and deliver effective strikes against enemy positions. And our regiment - the first among the assault aviation units - already in December 1941 was awarded the title of Guards. We, the pilots who flew into battle on the machines designed by you, will always be grateful to you for your inspirational and creative work, which you have contributed and continue to contribute to the development of aviation technology. We consider you an outstanding aircraft designer of our era...
Chairman of the Council of Veterans, former regiment commander, retired Major General of Aviation L. Reino
Member of the Council of Veterans of the regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, reserve major D. Tarasov
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the Regiment, Reserve Major I. Korchagin
Responsible Secretary of the Council of Veterans of the regiment, reserve lieutenant colonel B. Shchukanov.
Dear Sergey Vladimirovich!
During the Patriotic War, or rather in 1942, I happened to land on an Il-2 aircraft on a large spruce forest, because the aircraft was hit by the enemy over the target.
I will not describe how I made the landing. But at the height of half the trees, the fuselage fell off along the rear armor plate, the trees cut off the wings, after which the plane hit the ground with its nose. Armor, just like in battle, saved my life.
I am infinitely grateful to you for your IL-2, thanks to which I owe you my life. Had it happened on another plane, I certainly wouldn't have had to write these lines.
With respect to you, former pilot Borisov Fedor Alekseevich
Angarsk-24, Engels-3, apt. four.
Dear Sergey Vladimirovich! Hello!
Sorry that you are worried about a person whom you, of course, don’t remember ... Remembering you since 1940, and especially since August 1941, when you personally escorted us on the Il-2 to the city of Leningrad from the Voronezh plant 18 for training flight personnel 13 GShAP KBF (13th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - ed.) SA Air Force. I was then an engineer at the plant's LIS - Maksimov Evgeny Ilyich - a military engineer of the 3rd category. You then told us: “Comrades, beat the Nazis in such a way that the appearance of Il-2 aircraft causes fear and horror among the Nazis, and death with fire. Happy flight!" Regiment 13 GShAP survived until Victory Day, and the memory of you will remain for centuries, and with me until my deathbed. I passed with Ilam after Leningrad, Stalingrad - 6 ShAD (6th assault aviation division - ed.), the Arctic - 17 GShAP (17th Guards assault aviation regiment - ed.), Moscow defense - 6 GShAP (6- th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment - ed.), 1st Air Army - East Prussia - Berlin. He ended the Great Patriotic War with the Ilam, having received five wounds and two contusions ...
Maksimov Evgeny Ilyich
Kyiv, st. Heroes of Sevastopol, house 17a, apt. 29.
Guard armament mechanic Sergeant of the 15th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment Konstantin Ugodin preparing a bomb load for the Il-2. Leningrad Front, September 1942.
In the Museum of the Aviation Complex. S. V. Ilyushin keeps unique documents, for example, a poem written in the Baltic States in 1945.
"Ilyushin-2" over Courland
Our strength beats the fascist -
Kaput will come to them soon:
Over the Baltic "Ily"
They are in battle formation.
Shaking the earth with a roar,
Where the fascist sits like a mole
Commit "Ily" again
Deadly twist.
Carcasses of stupid tanks
They ripple with disguise,
But - already above them "Ily":
And storm and bomb!
Tanks crawl like toads
“Everything was wrong” - this note by A.I. Pokryshkina on the margins of the official publication "Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War" became a verdict on communist propaganda, which for almost half a century kept talking about the "superiority" of the red-star aviation, which "threw the Nazi vultures from the sky" and won complete air supremacy.
This sensational book, based not on agitation, but on reliable sources - combat documentation, authentic materials for recording losses, uncensored memoirs of front-line soldiers - leaves no stone unturned from Stalinist myths. After analyzing the combat work of Soviet and German aviation (fighters, dive-bombers, attack aircraft, bombers), comparing operational art and tactics, the level of qualification of command and personnel, as well as the performance characteristics of combat aircraft of the USSR and the Third Reich, the author comes to disappointing, shocking conclusions and answers the the most acute and bitter questions: why did our aviation operate much less efficiently than the German one? Whose fault is it that "Stalin's falcons" often looked almost like "whipping boys"? Why, having an overwhelming numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe, did the Soviet Air Force achieve much less success and suffer incomparably greater losses?
6. WHY THE "FLYING TANKS" IL-2 SUFFERED HUGE LOSSES?
As we already noted in the first part, the degree of effectiveness of the actions of troops, among other things, is also determined by the level of losses they have suffered. For this reason alone, it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that not a single type of aviation in the Soviet Air Force suffered such huge (in relative terms) losses as ground attack aircraft. So, in the period from June 22, 1941 to July 1, 1942, one fighter aircraft was irretrievably lost for combat reasons after an average of 28 sorties, a bomber - after 14, and an attack aircraft - after 13. In August 1942 - May In 1943, one irretrievable combat loss accounted for 69, 48 and 26 sorties, respectively, on November 1, 1944 - 127, 125 and 85, and in January - August 1945 - 194, 133 and 90 182.
If we ignore the average figures and look at the irretrievable combat losses of specific units and formations of attack aviation in specific operations, then the picture will often turn out to be much worse! So, in July - September 1941, one Il-2 was lost on average not in 13, but in 8-9 sorties, there were regiments where the "humpbacked" managed to fly to combat missions only 3-4 times ... In the 874th assault aviation regiment of the 267th assault aviation division of the 2nd air army of the Voronezh Front, in the period from July 27 to September 18, 1942, not 26, but only 9 sorties accounted for one combat loss of the Il-2; in the 945th regiment of the 206th division of the 8th air army of the Stalingrad Front from October 13 to December 22, 1942 - not 26, but 11; in the 198th regiment of the 233rd division of the 1st air army of the Western Front at the end of 1942, the pilot died on average after 8 sorties ... In the first six days of the Battle of Kursk (July 5-10, 1943) in 2 th Air Army of the Voronezh Front, assault air units lost one aircraft on average, again, not in 26 (and even more so not in 85), but in 16-17 sorties, in the 16th Air Army of the Central Front - in 13, 306- I am an assault air division of the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front (July 5-7) - only 2.8, and the 305th - 2.2! In the 3rd Air Army of the 1st Baltic Front in the summer of 1944, in the Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk, Rezhitsko-Dvinsk and Siauliai operations, one irretrievable combat loss of the Il-2 also accounted for not 85 (or so), but only 36 sorties 183 .
You can understand how high the level of combat losses of the Il-2 was by comparing it with the level of combat losses of the main German "battlefield aircraft" - Ju87 dive bombers. Back in the middle of 1943, this last one was several times, sometimes an order of magnitude smaller than that of the IL-2! If in the assault air units of the 2nd Air Army in the first week of the Battle of Kursk one aircraft was lost, as we have seen, in 16-17 sorties, then in the 2nd and 77th Luftwaffe dive squadrons fighting on the same sector of the front - only in 153! 184 The gap persisted several times here in the middle of 1944: if in the assault air units of the 3rd Air Army during the Belarusian strategic operation there were 36 sorties for one aircraft irretrievably lost for combat reasons, then in the 2nd assault squadron of the Luftwaffe during of the German-Romanian offensive near Iasi on May 30 - June 8, 1944 - at least (sic!) 160 ... IL-2!
Such a level of combat losses not only strengthens our opinion about the insufficiently high effectiveness of the actions of Soviet attack aircraft, but also forces us (following the German experts) to single out as another factor that reduced this effectiveness, the effective opposition of German anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft.
Note that this opposition not only took many IL-2s out of the game even before they hit the target. Under the fire of German anti-aircraft guns, the actions of the surviving attack aircraft also became less effective. According to German front-line experts, in 1942-1945. (especially from the end of 1943) the fire of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery "quite often" forced the "silts" to attack from higher than usual heights - and this reduced the accuracy of shooting and bombing 186 . Sometimes - despite the fact that "German field commanders characterize the personnel of the Soviet attack aviation as aggressive, courageous and stubborn" 187 - Wehrmacht air defense generally disrupted the performance of combat missions by the "humpbacked" ones. So, in 1941, having stumbled upon dense anti-aircraft fire, Il-2 "often just dropped bombs and went back" 188 . V. Schwabedissen also mentions the order of the commander of the 16th Air Army, captured in 1942 or 1943, which ordered escort fighters “in case the attack aircraft fail to fulfill their combat mission, open fire on them and force them to repeat attacks on ground targets” 189 . Without a doubt, this desire of the Il-2 pilots to leave the battlefield as soon as possible was caused by deadly anti-aircraft fire ... However, to disrupt the fulfillment of a combat mission (although, according to the assessment of the one who fought at the end of 1942-1945 on the Eastern Front in the 52nd and 53rd th fighter squadrons of V. Lipfert, "not very often" 190) could also be German fighters. One such case is also reported by a Soviet source - a report from the leader of the "Yak" group of the 900th Fighter Aviation Regiment; according to him, on September 1, 1944, in the Shakiai region (Lithuania), five attack aircraft of the 1st Air Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, seeing that escort fighters were attacked by a large group of FW190s, refused to attack the target and went to their territory ... 191 Due to the activity of German fighters in the first days of the Battle of Kursk, July 5-10, 1943, the Soviet command itself had to use the Il-2 "with a little tension." (And anyway, by July 11, the 2nd Air Army of the Voronezh Front had lost - mainly from fighter attacks - 39% of its attack aircraft (107 out of 276 vehicles), and the 16th Air Army of the Central Front had already lost 50% of its Il by July 10 -2 - 148 out of 295 192 .)
Finally, huge losses preserved the low experience of the flight personnel of the Soviet attack aviation, as described above, in comparison with the German one.
Turning to the analysis of the reasons for the exorbitant losses of the Il-2, let us first of all ask ourselves the question: how did it happen that such a low combat survivability was demonstrated by an aircraft whose main advantage was and is considered to be “reliable armor”? Recall that S.V. Ilyushin saw the very meaning of the creation of the Il-2 in the need to reserve "all vital parts" of an attack aircraft 193 . The entire forward and middle part of the fuselage of the “silt” was a single armored hull, inside which were located the engine, radiators, gas and oil tanks, and the pilot ...
There is no paradox here, however. Let's start with the fact that for 1941-1945. the vaunted booking of the Il-2 - conceived after all in 1938 - was already insufficient, for it reliably protected only from rifle-caliber bullets. Meanwhile, on all German fighters used on the Soviet-German front, there were aircraft guns: on the Messerschmitt Bf109E - two 20-mm MGFF, on the Bf109F - one 15-mm MG151 / 15 or 20-mm MG151 / 20, on the Bf109G - either one MG151 / 20, or three of these guns, or one 30-mm MK108, on Bf109K - one MG151 / 20 or MK108, on the Focke-Wulf FW190A - either two MG151 / 20 and two MGFF, or four MG151 / twenty. The 12-mm transverse plate that closed the armored hull of the Il-2 at the rear (immediately behind which the gas tank and the pilot were located) even made its way with 15-mm armor-piercing shells already from 400 m - if they hit it at an angle of at least 50 °. From 100 m - if the angle of contact with the armor was at least 60 ° - 15-mm high-explosive shells also broke through this armor plate. And the Messerschmitts, attacking the Il-2, approached them both at 50 and 40 meters ... On the side, the pilot, tanks and radiators were covered with only 6 mm armor, from below - 4 mm; the motor was protected only by a 4 mm armored hood (the top sheet of which became 5 mm from the spring of 1942). Already from 400 m, 15-mm armor-piercing shells penetrated 6-mm sheets, even if they hit them at an angle of only 20 °! 15-mm high-explosive at a distance of 100 m pierced the side armor of the Il-2 even at an angle of 30 degrees 194 .
But on the vast majority of "Messers" - starting with the Bf109F-4, which appeared on the Soviet-German front already in August 41 - and on all the "Fokkers" were not MG151 / 15, but much more powerful MG151 / 20! The 4-mm armored hood of the "silt" was already deployed from 600 m, hitting the engine, even their high-explosive shells - so much so that the diameter of the holes reached 160 mm ... In the 6-mm upper armor of the pilot's cabin, high-explosive 20-mm shells made holes with a diameter 80-170 mm. And the 4-mm cockpit floor, according to the testimony of the German ace E. Hartmann, MG151 / 20 cannon shells penetrated when firing point-blank, even hitting it at an angle of only 10 degrees 195 .
All these circumstances (with the exception of the last one) were revealed during field tests, as well as as a result of a survey by Soviet specialists of Il-2 armored hulls damaged in battle. The front-line soldiers testify to the same; Thus, the fact of splitting the 12-mm rear armor plate “silt” by an armor-piercing projectile “Messer” was recorded in the diary entry of an air gunner of the 198th assault aviation regiment of the 233rd assault aviation division of the 1st air army of the Western Front by G. Dobrov for July 13, 1943. 196 . Former pilot of the same unit, A.N. Efimov, describes a number of episodes when Messerschmitt and Focke-Wulf shells penetrated the armored hood of an attack aircraft and disabled the 197 engine. Therefore, the high ratings of the Il-2 armor - even those given by the German participants in the war 198 - must be recognized as at least exaggerated.
But why were such ratings given anyway? And what about the indication of R. Toliver and T.J. Constable that German pilots repeatedly observed how their shells bounce off the Il-2 armored hull? 199 The latter is quite understandable: apparently, we are talking about cases where the angle of impact with the armor turned out to be too small and the shells ricocheted. And there must have been many such cases. After all, back in 1942 - the first half of 1943. (namely, the evidence cited by Toliver and Constable refers to this period) the Messerschmitts, as a rule, attacked the Il-2 from behind and a little from the side - while trying to hit the engine and the pilot. As a result - judging by the holes in the armored hulls of the Il-2, decommissioned in the winter of the 42nd - in the spring of the 43rd - the angle between the flight directions of the "silt" and "Messer" almost always did not exceed 20 degrees 200 - so from the longitudinal armor of the Il-2 the shells really often had to bounce. Especially from the armored hood with its double curvature plates; Apparently, the veteran of the 210th assault aviation regiment G.F. Sivkov recalls precisely such cases: “At first, when meeting with“ silts ”, the Germans hit right on the forward part of the fuselage. Some spent all the ammunition, and the attack aircraft continued to fly "201 (acquiring, we add, from the enemy a reputation as a "concrete bomber" (Zementbomber) 202 and the most "hard-to-kill" of Soviet aircraft). Most likely, it was after such cases in the 54th fighter squadron of the Luftwaffe in 1941 that the opinion was formed that the IL-2 "is very difficult to shoot down when attacked from behind due to excellent armor", and in the 51st (in November 1941) - that the 15 mm MG151 / 15 gun is ineffective against the IL-2 203.
But it was only necessary for the German fighter to attack the attack aircraft at a greater angle to the direction of its flight, i.e. go in more abruptly from the side - and the armor of the "cement bomber" ceased to seem invulnerable ... This, in particular, was clearly seen on November 8, 1941 by Chief Sergeant Major G. Kaiser from the III group of the 77th fighter squadron, then operating in the Crimea. After he failed to shoot down the Il-2 on the 7th, Colonel V. Mölders, Inspector General of the Luftwaffe Fighter Aviation, undertook to demonstrate to him effective methods of destroying attack aircraft. “A quick turn,” recalls Kaiser, “and at an angle of 30 degrees [not 20 degrees or less! - A.S.] his turn digs into the Russian attack aircraft in the cockpit area. The enemy plane immediately flared up and crashed. The next moment his voice was heard: “Did you see how I did it? Attack the next one!"
I performed his technique, and the IL-2 crashed into the ground. "Repeat!" Almost like in a training battle: the same approach to the target, a short burst, and the third attack aircraft falls on fire.
The fact that the best results in attacks on the IL-2 gives a side approach with firing on the sides of the cockpit was eventually found out by the pilots of the 54th Fighter Squadron 205. However, the initial disappointment experienced by the German pilots when firing at the Il-2 was, apparently, too strong. Only this can explain the fact that exaggerated ideas about the invulnerability of the "concrete bomber" turned out to be very tenacious and firmly entrenched in post-war foreign literature.
As for the German anti-aircraft gunners, they also hit the IL-2 not from machine guns, but from 20- and 37-mm automatic guns, and, in addition, their shells hit the attack aircraft, as a rule, almost strictly from the side. As shown by the examination by Soviet specialists of armored hulls damaged by German anti-aircraft guns, the angle of contact between an anti-aircraft projectile and the "silt" armor in most cases was at least 65-70 ° in the horizontal plane and at least 75-80 ° in the vertical 206 . Undoubtedly, this is precisely why the anti-aircraft gun shells pierced the armor of the "humped" almost twice as often as the shells of the German 207 fighters - attacking mainly from behind. (Of course, the fact that German anti-aircraft gunners used, along with 20-mm, and 37-mm caliber, also had an effect.) True, I.I. -2 could only be armor-piercing, but by no means fragmentation shells of 20-mm anti-aircraft guns 208. However, V.I. Perov and O.V. Rastrenin, referring to the results of a survey of armored hulls "silt" damaged in battle, as well as the results of field tests, indicate that, in terms of their damaging effect, shells of 20-mm anti-aircraft guns practically did not differ from shells of 20-mm air cannons 209 - and in the latter, as we saw, high-explosive fragmentation ammunition also broke through the armor of an attack aircraft. The same authors also provide a photograph of the holes made in the side armor of the Il-2 by a high-explosive fragmentation projectile of a 20-mm anti-aircraft gun. So the statement of I.I. Pstygo (as well as the statement of V. Shvabedissen that the armor of the Il-2 "withstood the hit of small-caliber anti-aircraft shells" 210) can be considered true only for those cases when the angle of contact between the anti-aircraft shell and the armor turned out to be too small . True, such cases were by no means isolated. They were observed, for example, by V.A. Tikhomirov, pilot of the 12th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Navy Air Force, who covered the Il-2 over Danzig in the spring of 1945; Apparently, just such a case was observed in October 1941, during an Il-2 strike on the Molvotitsy airfield south of Demyansk, and the German military doctor H. Killian: fly off to the side. This is clearly visible."
In general, the armor of the IL-2 could help him out only when a projectile hit the armor plate at a very small angle. True, the armored hull - which did not collapse during a forced landing "on its belly" - saved the lives of many pilots of downed attack aircraft, but this is another question - about the losses of pilots. A.N. Efimov also notes the “calming” psychological effect of booking on the pilot: “[...] You feel fenced off from all dangers. The impression of the reliability of the cockpit and the aircraft did not leave even in flight. The whole face of the machine caused a combat enthusiasm, helped to suppress the feeling of danger under enemy fire. The latter, of course, was to increase the effectiveness of the pilot's actions when attacking the target. However, this cannot obscure the fact that the IL-2 armor was not reliable protection against the fire of German fighters and anti-aircraft guns.
However, even if this armor was impenetrable, it would still be devalued by the fact that the “flying tank” was almost half wooden. Due to the lack of aluminum, the entire tail section of the Il-2 fuselage with a keel, and for machines manufactured in 1942 - early 1944, the skin (and sometimes the power set, with the exception of the spars) of the 213 wing consoles were made of wood - and therefore differed low resistance to projectile hits. “If an Oerlikon projectile hit an Il-2 with a metal wing,” testifies G.F. Sivkov, “it made a hole with a diameter of up to 200 mm with torn edges. The aircraft continued to fly quietly. If such a projectile hit a wooden wing, up to 30% of the skin was destroyed and a strong list immediately arose. It was difficult to keep the car in level flight. And the wooden rear fuselage of the "silt" 20-mm anti-aircraft shells often "literally sawed" in half 215 . It was on the wooden parts of the attack aircraft - trying to "beat off the tail and planes" - that many German fighter pilots also fired from cannons. So, in the 54th fighter squadron of the Luftwaffe, they came to the conclusion that the best results in the fight against the IL-2 (along with firing at the sides of the cockpit) are fired from above on the wings. And in 1944, they tried to hit her FW190 on the wooden fuselage of the "silt" 216.
In this regard, we should dwell on the meaning of this - perhaps most often glorified in domestic literature- the qualities of the IL-2, as a high survivability of the structure. Indeed, the Ilyushin attack aircraft could, apparently, withstand more hits from bullets and shells than another aircraft of the same size and with the same semi-wooden structure. It is precisely this general survivability of the structure, which is good for a semi-wooden aircraft (and not the mythical “strong armor”), which, in particular, must be explained by the statement of the former commander of the 9th anti-aircraft artillery division of the Wehrmacht, V. Pickert, about the insensitivity of the Il-2 to hits of armor-piercing shells 20– and 37 mm anti-aircraft guns 217. But in comparison with all-metal machines, the survivability of the "humpback" should still be recognized as insufficient.
The huge losses of the Il-2 themselves (the survivability of the design of which, we emphasize once again, are greatly exaggerated in the literature) should be explained primarily by the specifics of the combat use of these attack aircraft. Unlike bombers and fighters, they worked exclusively from low altitudes - which means that more often and longer than other aircraft, they were in the field of actual fire from German small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery - this very effective and numerous means of destruction. It was anti-aircraft fire that destroyed most of the IL-2s lost for combat reasons. If we take into account only those “silts” that are known for sure that they were destroyed by anti-aircraft guns or fighters, then in 1941 the proportion of victims of anti-aircraft fire among them was 68.2% (101 aircraft out of 148), in 1942 - 54, 6% (203 out of 372), in 1943 - 57.4% (1468 out of 2558), in 1944 - 67.2% (1859 out of 2741), and in January - April 1945 - 74% ( 1048 of 1417) 218 . (Note that in 1943-1945 - during the period of the general retreat of the enemy - the reasons for the death of the vast majority of downed attack aircraft were already known for sure.)
The extreme danger posed to the IL-2 by German small-caliber anti-aircraft guns was due, firstly, to the perfection of the material part of this weapon. The design of anti-aircraft installations made it possible to very quickly maneuver trajectories in the vertical and horizontal planes; each gun was equipped with an anti-aircraft artillery fire control device that provided corrections for the aircraft's speed and heading; tracer shells made it easier to adjust the fire. Finally, German anti-aircraft guns had a high rate of fire; so, the 37-mm Flak36 installation fired 188 rounds per minute, and the 20-mm Flak38 - 480 219. Secondly, the saturation of these means of troops and air defense rear facilities among the Germans was very high. The number of barrels that covered the Il-2 strike targets increased continuously, and at the beginning of 1945, up to 200-250 20- and 37-mm shells (and also up to 8000-9000 13.1-mm bullets of heavy anti-aircraft machine guns) 220 . But the attack aircraft were over the battlefield for an average of 10-15-20 minutes ... Thirdly, the high shooting, artillery and tactical skills of the German anti-aircraft gunners had an effect. The small-caliber anti-aircraft battery was ready to give the first aimed shot already 20 seconds after the detection of Soviet aircraft; corrections for changes in the course of the Il-2, the angle of their dive, speed, range to the target, the Germans entered within 2-3 seconds 221 . The concentration of fire of several guns used by them on one target also increased the probability of hitting an attack aircraft - especially if the fire was concentrated at a point through which, becoming in a "circle", all the attacking "silts" successively passed ... It is not surprising that, according to the testimony of a former pilot The 140th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the 8th Guards Assault Aviation Division of N.T. Polukarov, his Il-2, on average, received at least one direct hit from a small-caliber anti-aircraft projectile in every fourth sortie. In the 3rd Air Army of the 1st Baltic Front in June-July 1944, in the Vitebsk-Orsha, Polotsk, Rezhitsko-Dvinsk and Siauliai operations, one attack aircraft damaged by anti-aircraft guns accounted for only 2-3 sorties. And during the strikes of naval Il-2s on naval bases or convoys at sea, German anti-aircraft gunners shot down about 20% of the attacking attack aircraft and inflicted damage on another 35-40 percent! 222
In the first half of the war, the tactics used by them also affected the magnitude of the losses of attack aircraft from anti-aircraft fire. So, in 1941, they demonstrated the general disregard for anti-aircraft maneuvers common to all of the then Soviet strike aviation - they did not at all try to evade routes and shell explosions. (Major General of the Luftwaffe K. Webe explained this by the poor maneuverability of the Il-2 223, but the matter was clearly different - in the poor training of Soviet pilots and (or) their lack of combat experience. After all, later even two-seater "silts" - whose maneuverability was worse than the single-seat issue of 1941 - they maneuvered very actively in such a situation.) Such behavior over the target, the Germans emphasized, "led to exceptionally large losses" 224 .
True, in 1941-1942. IL-2 often approached the target at ultra-low altitude. This was supposed to make it difficult for the German anti-aircraft gunners both to detect the "humpbacked" ones - until the last moment not visible behind the wall of the forest or terrain folds - and to defeat them (due to too much angular movement of the target). However, it was noted in the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force A.A. Novikov dated August 22, 1942, the enemy still managed to organize “effective countermeasures from the ground to our strafing strikes. On the probable directions of flight of IL-2 aircraft, powerful curtains of anti-aircraft fire are created, for which all types of weapons are used, up to mortars, flamethrowers, land mines, tank and anti-tank guns, as a result of which our attack aircraft suffer significant losses.
Since 1942, flying at medium or low altitudes, Il-2 pilots began to use yaw along the course, sliding (i.e. lateral displacement of the aircraft) and other types of anti-aircraft maneuver - performed by the whole group and by each aircraft separately. However, in this case, either one or two flight parameters were changed (for example, only heading or heading and altitude), while for reliable evasion of projectiles it was necessary to simultaneously change three parameters - heading, altitude, and speed (changing, for example, only one course, German anti-aircraft gunners quickly took into account and corrected their routes). And this, in turn, required good training of pilots, good group flying - something that was rare in Soviet attack aviation. In addition, the Germans could fend off the anti-aircraft maneuver of the “humpbacks” by setting up barrage fire ... A more reliable way to reduce the losses of the Il-2 from anti-aircraft fire was to suppress anti-aircraft guns - before or simultaneously with the attack on the object. But this, as we saw, was neglected in the first half of 1943 - and only then did they begin to practice the constant allocation of specially trained crews for this purpose and striking anti-aircraft guns with the forces of a third, half, or even the entire group. Even if the guns could not be destroyed at the same time, their fire became less accurate, or even completely stopped. “When an attack aircraft dived into an anti-aircraft battery,” testifies I.I. Pstygo, “none of them could withstand nervous tension, and even before the aircraft opened fire, the entire crew ran to cover. [...] I don’t remember or heard that anti-aircraft gunners won such a duel at least once” 226 . With such tactics of attack aircraft, anti-aircraft guns opened effective fire only at the moment the “humpbacks” left the target ...
Nevertheless - as we saw above - the losses of the Il-2 from anti-aircraft fire (in absolute terms) were increasing: more and more of these aircraft were used at the front, which means that the German anti-aircraft gunners had more and more targets. Because of this, the total amount of combat losses of attack aircraft in 1943-1945. remained approximately at the same level or even increased: in 1943, for combat reasons, the Red Army Air Force lost 3515 of these machines, in 1944 - 3344 (and according to V.I. Alekseenko - 3722), in January - April 1945 - 1691 227 (i.e. for the whole year, with the same intensity of hostilities, up to 5000 Il-2 could be lost). And the above-mentioned increase in the number of sorties per one combat loss of IL-2 was achieved only due to a significant increase in the number of Soviet attack aircraft (and also, possibly, due to some increase in the intensity of its use, i.e., an increase in the number of sorties by one aircraft) 228 .
Most of the IL-2s lost during the war for combat reasons were destroyed by anti-aircraft guns, but in 1941-1942. most of the irretrievable combat losses (about 60% on average) were caused by fighters 229 . In 1943, only 42.6% of those IL-2s, about which it was known exactly who destroyed them (1090 aircraft out of 2558), became victims of fighters (1090 aircraft out of 2558), in 1944 - 32.2% (882 out of 2741), and in January - April 1945 - 26% (369 out of 1417) 230 . The decrease in losses of the Il-2 from fighters after 1942 was traditionally associated with us, first of all, with the conversion of the “humpbacked” from single to double, carried out in the fall of the 42nd. Of course, the installation of an air gunner's cockpit, which covered the aircraft from behind with the fire of a 12.7-mm UBT machine gun, increased the chances of the Il-2 in battles with Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. As shown by theoretical calculations and field tests, the probability of shooting down a single-seat IL-2 in one attack from behind by a Bf109G-2 fighter (with three firing points) was 51%, and by a "five-point" Bf109G-2 / R6 - 75%. For a two-seat attack aircraft, this probability decreased to 38% and 65%, respectively (in all cases, it was assumed that the German pilot had excellent flight and shooting training, and the attack aircraft did not perform any anti-fighter maneuver - so that in a real battle all these figures should have been several smaller) 231 . However, from the above figures it can be seen that the decrease in the proportion of fighter casualties in the irretrievable combat losses of the Il-2 continued in 1944-1945, when the defensive armament of the "humpback" was no longer strengthened (again, we emphasize that at the end of the war the circumstances of the death of already the absolute majority of the lost attack aircraft). So, it was not the appearance of an air gunner on the IL-2 (or, rather, not only that).
The latter, however, is not surprising. We must not forget that the increase in the defensive capabilities of the Il-2 was largely neutralized by the growth in the firepower of German fighters. In the same autumn of 1942, simultaneously with the two-seater "silts", the FW190 "killers" appeared on the Soviet-German front, having as many as six firing points (including four against one, rarely three on the Bf109 - guns); in 1943, about 40% of the Luftwaffe fighter groups opposed to the Soviet Air Force flew Fokkers, and in 1944 - about 25% 232 . The FW190A-4 and A-5 used in 1943 could shoot down a double Il-2 in the first attack from behind with a probability of 63%, i.e. with more than the "three-point" Bf109 that prevailed before the Germans - single! And the Bf109G-6, which in the autumn of 1943 replaced the G-2 modification machines and on which both 7.92 mm machine guns were replaced by 13.1 mm machine guns, with a probability of 54% 233 . Subsequently, the armament of German fighters increased even more: in the summer of 1944, the FW190A-8 appeared on the Eastern Front with 13.1 mm machine guns instead of 7.92 mm, and part of the Bf109G-6 and the new Bf109G-14 instead of the 20 mm gun became receive 30 mm.
In addition, the powerful defensive armament of the two-seater Il-2 often could not be used effectively.
Firstly, the design of the rear shooting point, which was hastily designed, was not very successful. The gunner's cockpit "turned out to be cramped and made it difficult to move, which had a negative effect on the effectiveness of air combat" 234 . And the UBT machine gun in a hurry could not provide sufficient angles of fire. In particular, the shooter practically could not defend the lower hemisphere - which was quickly taken into account by the German pilots, who switched to attacks on the "silts" from below. Others began to enter from the side (after all, the firing angles of the UBT in the horizontal plane were only 35 ° to the right of the axis of the aircraft and 28 ° to the left); the third - from above: the angle of elevation of the UBT on the two-seater IL-2 was also insufficient ... 235
Secondly, UBT itself often let down. According to the recollections of the former air gunner of the 43rd Guards Attack Aviation Regiment G.A. Litvin, he was jammed in almost every sortie, especially when firing in long bursts; the fact that “UBT had a lot of failures” is also confirmed by V.V. Usov, who flew as a shooter in the 109th Guards Assault, and V.M. Mester from the 92nd Guards Assault testifies that the most valuable thing for the IL-2 shooter was a sleeve extractor 236.
Finally, the training of aerial gunners was mediocre. Their training was organized belatedly - already after the start of production of two-seat attack aircraft - and in 1943 almost the first Red Army soldiers who came across were sent to the arrows of the Il-2. “At first,” recalls V.S. Frolov, a veteran of the 210th assault aviation regiment, “absolutely unprepared guys arrived in the regiments, who were put behind a machine gun and sent on a combat flight. Many of them could not withstand the sharp maneuvers of the attack aircraft during the flight [note that the resulting overloads in the cockpit of the gunner were felt more strongly than in the cockpit. - A.S.]. Some, firing at the enemy, interrupted the keel or stabilizer of their aircraft and perished along with the pilot. Schools that were supposed to train shooters actually sabotaged this training. So, in 1943, graduates of these schools did not know well both the theory of shooting and the material part of the UBT machine gun (often, we recall, which gave refusals), they not only never fired in the air, but they never were (37 “shooters”, who arrived in March 1943 from the 2nd Leningrad School of Aircraft Armament Technicians to the 17th Air Army of the Southwestern Front, “the Il-2 aircraft was seen only upon arrival at the front”, and some of those sent by the same school in June to assault air units 15 th Air Army of the Bryansk Front, did not know what acute, right and obtuse angles were and "had no idea about perpendiculars) 238 . The attitude towards the training of these attack aircraft crew members was truly wrecking even at the end of the war! Back in 1944, they were "not taught anywhere" to be cautious in the air 239 , and at the Troitsk "school" air gunners were not taught at all at the end of 1944! “At this school,” testifies V.M. Mester, released from there to the 92nd Guards Attack Aviation Regiment in December 1944, “I spent less than a month, of which ten days we were on agricultural work in Kazakhstan, and ten - we studied the picture ShKAS machine gun [we recall that the IL-2 shooter had a UBT. - A.S.]. There were no machine guns themselves, not to mention firing. After 20 days, in the rank of "private" we went to the front on our own" 240 . From the report of the deputy commander of the 7th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the Guards, Major Gudimenko dated June 27, 1945, on the combat work of the unit in the Great Patriotic War, it can be concluded that there, until the end of the war, “air armament gunners were not selected appropriately, as a result, the regiment arrived for replenishment people from penal companies, other units from where they were sent as extremely undisciplined, etc.” 241 .
And at times, two-seat "silts" were forced to fly without shooters at all: these latter were out of action more than pilots, and, for example, in the 92nd Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the 4th Guards Assault Aviation Division of the 5th Air Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front even in 1945 there were days when "there was only one shooter for the six" 242 .
As a result (as shown by "assessments based on the theory of aerial firing and field tests of the effectiveness of the German small arms and cannon armament against the Il-2 attack aircraft"), in the period from the end of 1942 to the autumn of 1943, the probability of shooting down a German fighter by an Il-2 shooter was on average less than the probability of shooting down by this fighter (Bf109G-2, Bf109G-2 / R-6 or FW190A-4) the "silt" itself in the first attack from the rear hemisphere: at a distance of 100 m - about 1.6 times, with 150 m - about 3.4 times, from 200 m - about 4.3 times, and from 250 m - about 4 times. And in the fall of 1943 (when the main Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front were the Bf109G-6 and the A-4 FW190A-5 modifications that did not differ much from the machines), this gap between the theoretical chances of the Il-2 gunner and the German fighter pilot increased on average, respectively, by about up to 3.7; 3.9; 4.5 and 4.9 times 243 . Apparently, the chances in real battles varied to about the same extent. When calculating, it was assumed that the German had excellent flying and shooting skills, and the “silt” did not perform an anti-fighter maneuver - but, on the other hand, there were many “absolutely unprepared guys” among the IL-2 shooters at the front, and their UBT often jammed ...
What, then, played a decisive role in reducing the losses of the IL-2 from fighters? V. I. Perov and O. V. Rastrenin (as well as V. Schwabedissen) indicate, in particular, the decrease in the number of German fighter aircraft on the Soviet-German front 244 . But the change in this number does not always correlate with the change specific gravity fighter casualties in combat irretrievable losses of IL-2. In 1941, the average monthly number of Luftwaffe single-engine fighter groups operating on the Soviet-German front was approximately 18; in 1942 - about 15.5; in 1943 - about 12.4; in 1944 - about 10.5 245 . At the same time, in 1944, the Germans increased the number of assault groups equipped with FW190F aircraft, which could also act as fighters. True, the search for and destruction of Soviet aircraft was not their main task, and only after bombing attacks they could attack the Il-2s they encountered. However, by June 1944, there were as many as eight 246 FW190F groups on the Soviet-German front, and, it seems, they completely replaced two or three fighters. And in January-February 1945, the number of fighter groups operating against the Soviet Air Force 247 increased. In this way, real reduction the number of Luftwaffe fighters in the East took place only in 1942-1943. However, in 1942, the proportion of fighter casualties in the irretrievable combat losses of the IL-2 did not decrease! And in 1944-1945, on the contrary, it continuously decreased!
Apparently, the level of Il-2 losses from fighters was determined primarily by two other factors (also mentioned by V.I. Perov and O.V. Rastrenin 248):
a) the degree of effectiveness of the actions of Soviet escort fighters and
b) the degree of effectiveness of the defensive tactics of attack aircraft (which, in turn, strongly depended on the level of training of pilots).
In fact, the fighter cover of the Il-2 in 1941-1942. often not provided - and if this cover was, they often abandoned their wards, getting carried away by the battle with the "Messerschmitts" or escaping from anti-aircraft guns that covered the object of the assault strike 249 . Escort fighters performed no better in the first half of 1943. Firstly, as noted in the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force dated July 7, 1943, then the interaction between them and the attack aircraft covered by them was still “insufficiently” worked out. It, the directive stated, “is often organized for only one sortie, and not for the entire period of a battle or operation, as a result of which the units interacting with each other do not always have the opportunity to carefully coordinate all the necessary issues and acquire skills in joint actions over a long period of time. This leads to fragmented aviation operations, to a narrowing of their effectiveness and unnecessary losses. Sometimes attack aircraft and escort fighters taking off from different airfields could not find each other; according to A.N. Efimov, escort fighters in 1943 often lost their wards on the route ... Secondly, Soviet escort fighters still acted tactically illiterately. “When meeting with the enemy,” the directive of July 7, 1943 stated, they “easily get involved with them [as in the text. - A.S.] into battle, breaking away from the covered groups and often losing them” 251 . Above the target, they also often abandoned their wards and went to a height (where it was safer from anti-aircraft fire) - and after all, the attack aircraft especially needed cover precisely at the moment of exit from the attack (when the next one behind him in the ranks was busy striking and the tail of the previous one could not be covered could) ... Finally, the number of "hawks" that were then allocated to escort the IL-2 was also insufficient - in any case, in order to successfully repel the attacks of experienced German pilots of the 43rd year.
As a result, back in the summer of 1943, it was not uncommon for German fighters to destroy entire groups of double (!) Il-2s. So, on the first day of the Battle of Kursk, July 5, 1943, the Messerschmitts managed to break off escort fighters from three sixes of the 175th assault aviation regiment of the 17th air army of the Southwestern Front - after which they shot down 8 out of 17 double "silts". Carried away by air combat, they left their wards and La-5, which accompanied two eights of the 237th assault aviation regiment of the 305th assault air division of the same army. The result was the destruction of 9 out of 16 IL-2s by Messers (including eight doubles). And in one of the air battles on July 7, due to the fact that the escort fighters "did not take appropriate measures to repel the enemy", the FW190 shot down 5 out of 7 attack aircraft of the 874th regiment of the 299th division of the 16th air army of the Central Front (including including at least three doubles)... 252
But after the Battle of Kursk, the fighter cover began to echelon its forces more often - so that while some were engaged in an active air battle with the Messers or Fokkers attacking the group, others were constantly next to the covered attack aircraft. It became much more difficult for the enemy to break through to the "humpbacked" and fire at them ... This is exactly how the "yaks" of the 900th Fighter Aviation Regiment acted, covering in the summer - autumn of 1944, during the Vitebsk-Orsha, Minsk, Vilnius, Kaunas and Goldap (Gumbinenskaya) operations, attack aircraft of the 1st Air Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The result of their tactically competent actions was the almost complete absence of losses in the Il-2s they accompanied in numerous battles with the Bf109 and FW190 253 (it should, however, be noted that most of the latter apparently belonged to assault groups, whose pilots were more difficult to lead fight against Soviet aircraft than real fighters). Sometimes - at least in the 5th and 17th air armies of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, respectively - along with the groups of "free combat" and direct cover, there was also a group sent forward to clear the airspace (similar to those that they worked so effectively for the Germans during Operation Citadel). “The interaction between fighters and attack aircraft,” admits W. Schwabedissen, “constantly grew, therefore, approximately from the end of 1944, the actions of attack aircraft became much more effective” 254 .
In turn, for the misses of the Il-2 escort fighters, even at the very end of the war, they could pay very dearly. So, as early as March 20, 1945, at the beginning of the Vienna operation, the head of communications of the 3rd Guards Fighter Air Corps F.M. th assault air corps of the 5th air army of the 2nd Ukrainian front 255. As we see, neither the UBT machine guns that covered the Il-2 from behind, nor the fact that the attacking Fokkers were not fighters, but attack aircraft, helped. "silts" of the 953rd assault air regiment of the 311th assault air division of the 2nd air army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, "often" threw attack aircraft on the way back from the target - because of which they, even switching to strafing flight, "suffered losses from fighters" of the enemy 256 . Here, however, apparently, the small supply of fuel of the Soviet "hawks" affected ...
As for the defensive tactics of the Il-2, in 1941-1942. it was distinguished by passivity, unwillingness to fight with attacking fighters, using maneuver and wing weapon fire (recall that there was no rear firing point on the "humpback" then). So, the pilots of the 77th dive squadron of the Luftwaffe G. Pabst and E. Stoll-Berberich more than once observed in the 41st how the Il-2 attacked by the Messerschmitts "stubbornly remained on the combat course, not taking any defensive maneuvers and not trying to escape , sometimes until the complete annihilation of their group" 257 . Apparently, these attack aircraft flew to the target; being (which happened more often) attacked after striking, the "humpbacks" tried to leave at increased speed. At the same time, they, as a rule, pressed against the ground itself (and in the 41st they preferred to go to the target at low level). After all, it was not easy for a fighter pilot to notice a dark green attack aircraft flying at a height of only 5-25 m and therefore merging with the background of the terrain; it was dangerous to dive on it (after approaching the distance of effective fire and shooting, there might not be enough altitude to exit the dive); couldn't go downstairs...
However, in a competition with well-trained German pilots, strafing seemed to help little. “Before our eyes,” O.D. Kazachkovsky, who then served as the head of intelligence in the 641st artillery regiment of the RGK, recalled similar cases at the beginning of the war on the Southern Front, “graceful, thin fighters [...] easily catch up and shoot down flying over us aircraft. [...] Then the same thing is repeated, and more than once. [...] These are the German Messerschmitts shooting down our IL-2 attack aircraft” 258 . According to front-line pilot A.G. Nakonechnikov, during the summer battles of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction, attack aircraft that "fled from the battlefield at low altitude" "suffered colossal losses, often losing entire groups" 259 . (True, against the background of the southern Russian steppe, aircraft flying at low level were also clearly visible, and the flat terrain made it easier for the Messers to pursue the Ils at the same ultra-low altitude. But, on the other hand, the same monotonous landscape and flat terrain made it difficult for the Germans height detection - just like when flying over the surface of the water - and, therefore, increased the risk of crashing into the ground when attacking ...)
In general, an attempt to get away from fighters often not only did not improve the position of the “humpbacks” (the speed of the Bf109 was still much higher), but also worsened it. After all, flights at maximum speed were not practiced either in flight schools or in reserve regiments - and attack aircraft, led by young pilots, inevitably lagged behind the group. And the stragglers were doomed: the enemy attacked them first of all, and other "silts" could no longer help them ...
But in order to take the fight, the pilots of single-seat attack aircraft again lacked training. Since, according to the flight data, the IL-2 was hopelessly inferior to the fighters, they could achieve any success in combat with the latter only by interacting with each other. And for this, the "humpbacked" had to fly in a more or less dense formation. Then - knowing that from other directions it was covered by neighboring aircraft - one or another pilot could turn on the Messerschmitt flying nearby and fire at it from wing cannons and machine guns (thus disrupting, perhaps, an attack on a neighbor ...). But maintaining a tight battle formation required good group flying! In 1941, there were relatively many pilots with more or less decent flying experience in the assault aviation regiments - but even then attempts to fight the "Messers" (maneuvering in the "front" formation) turned out to be unsuccessful. And in 1942, the majority of attack pilots, as we have seen, were young people who had not been taught to fly in formation either at school or in the reserve regiment. Many didn't even know how to fly individually! As a result, the battle formation (“link wedge” or “link bearing”) was stretched, and after the first approach to the target, after a 180 ° turn, it completely disappeared: “I go there, and he here, and I didn’t see him anymore "... 260 It was no longer the "bearing of links" that left the target, but an extended "chain" of separately flying aircraft - unable to maintain any fire interaction. Such separate Messerschmitt planes were easily shot down, wedged into the gaps between them. The fragmentation of the attack aircraft group also made it difficult to cover it with escort fighters (if any).
True, at the end of 1942, to carry out attacks, the “humpbacks” everywhere began to use a simpler battle formation - the “circle of aircraft”. In it, each pilot had to maintain his place only relative to the aircraft flying in front (whereas when attacking from the "bearing of links" - also relative to those flying to the right and left). Instead of a sharp 180° turn for a new approach to the target, a smooth 360° turn was now performed. Therefore, during the strike, the system became easier to maintain. However, the attack aircraft, leaving the attack, still turned out to be defenseless: flying behind at that moment began to attack the target and, accordingly, ceased to cover the tail of the car in front of it. There was also the problem of maintaining the formation when moving away from the target ...
In addition, until the end of 1942, attack pilots did not have any instructions on the tactics of combat of single-seat IL-2 with Bf109. Only in September 1942 did the command of the Red Army Air Force recommend a number of tricks here. It was proposed, for example, to build a "defensive circle", where the tail of each attack aircraft was covered by the fire of cannons and machine guns flying behind. At the same time, by turning along the course, raising or lowering the nose of the aircraft, the pilots of the "silts" could also drive away fighters approaching the "circle" with fire. When moving away from the target, it was recommended to use such an anti-fighter maneuver as a “snake”, i.e. leave along a wave-like trajectory, alternately laying either a right or a left turn. This made it difficult for the German pilots to aim: after all, both the course and the angular velocity of the target were constantly changing. In addition, leaving the “snake”, the attack aircraft pilot could better than flying in a straight line, view the rear hemisphere (the single-seat IL-2 had a very poor rear view; it was provided only by two “windows”, which, according to G.F. Sivkov , "were always smeared with something" 261). Large groups of attack aircraft could use "scissors", i.e. leave in two "snakes" spaced several tens of meters apart in height and not coinciding with each other in the phases of turns - so that the planes from different "snakes", like the ends of scissors, then approached, then diverged ... If, however, the fighter was attacked a single attack aircraft, he should have slipped out from under it - knocking down the Germans' aim - or laying a turn. In the latter case, the high-speed Bf109, which could not turn around as sharply as the low-speed Il-2, inevitably broke away from the attack aircraft and could even lose sight of it. Finally, when attacking the Messer from behind, the pilot of a single Il-2 could sharply slow down - so that the German would jump forward and come under fire from the wing cannons and machine guns of the "humpback".
It is easy to see, however, that all these techniques again required good individual piloting technique and good group flying ... The fact that “attack aircraft are not yet trained everywhere to conduct defensive air combat with the widespread use of“ circle ”,“ snake ”and“ scissors," even nine months later, in the directive of the commander of the Red Army Air Force dated July 7, 1943 262
True, in 1943, with the displacement of single-seat Il-2s by doubles, it finally became possible to use tactics in the fight against fighters that had long been successfully used by the German Ju87 - the same single-engine two-seat vehicles with a rear firing point. This tactic consisted both in maintaining a tight, compact formation by a group of attack aircraft, and in mutually covering each other with tail machine gun fire, i.e. in concentrating the fire of as many air gunners as possible on the most dangerous this moment from attacking a group of fighters. Such a concentration of fire could partly compensate for the insufficient training of each individual air gunner; while maintaining fire interaction, the limited angles of fire of the UBT machine gun, noted above, ceased to be of great importance. If the gunner of an attack aircraft attacked at a high angle from the side or from above was not able to turn his machine gun towards the attacking fighter, then the gunners of the aircraft flying in formation in front of him could easily do this. The compactness of the battle order of the group just ensured the maintenance of such fire interaction.
However, the deplorable situation with the training of attack pilots, which developed in 1941-1942, persisted, as we saw, in the first half of 1943 - and many still did not know how to fly in formation ... This circumstance was still in the spring - summer The 43rd still led to the fact that the battle formation of the "humped" - especially when moving away from the target - very often stretched 263 . And the fate of separately flying aircraft that “fell out” of the fire interaction system immediately began to be affected by the inexperience of the shooters and the design flaws of the rear firing point. It was precisely the inability to maintain a tight formation that explained the above-described cases of the defeat in the first days of the Battle of Kursk of entire groups of two-seater Il-2s that found themselves without fighter cover - as well as cases of 100% extermination of groups of attack aircraft during strikes against German airfields in the Oryol ledge and Donbass 5- May 8 and June 8-10, 1943 (for example, on May 7 and June 8, even groups consisting of 12 Il-2s each were completely shot down - the first from the 58th and 79th Guards Assault Aviation Regiments of the 2nd Guards Assault air division of the 16th Air Army of the Central Front, and the second - from the 614th Regiment of the 225th Division of the 15th Air Army of the Bryansk Front 264). Another phenomenon noted in the directive of July 7, 1943 (and also due to insufficient crew training) also had an effect - poor air monitoring. Inexperienced pilots clearly focused all their attention on driving the machine - and, of course, often did not notice the Messers or Fokkers approaching at high speed. And the shooters, as noted above, were not taught caution in the air even in the 44th ...
The rear continued to supply undertrained pilots in 1944-1945, and cases of loss of the IL-2 due to insufficient group flying occurred at the end of the war. So, in March 1945, during the East Prussian operation, the attack aircraft of the 1st Air Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front still sometimes went astray due to "stretching groups" during the battles with FW190 265. However, in the front-line units, the development of group flying in 1944-1945. began to pay much more attention than before, and the increase in the second half of 1943 in the regiments of the layer of experienced pilots greatly facilitated the achievement of good results here. And they have finally been reached! “Stormtroopers,” states W. Schwabedissen, speaking of the last period of the war, “strongly kept the formation” 266 . In addition, as already noted, in 1944-1945. IL-2s began to operate more often in large groups - 12-36 and even 54 aircraft each. It was incomparably more difficult for the Messers and Fokkers to attack such groups: the increased density of heavy machine gun fire sharply increased the likelihood of an attacker being shot down. Improved in the last period of the war and the battle formations used by the "humped" on the route to the target and back. Groups could line up, for example, with a “ladder of links”, in which each link flew below the previous one, thereby protecting it from attacks from below - which became more frequent, as we remember, after equipping the IL-2 with a tail machine gun ... When the situation changed, the groups also changed their battle formations.
As a result, the Germans admit, "the only really effective tactic for German fighters" in the fight against the Il-2 in 1944-1945. "there was only a surprise attack" ... 267
V.I. Perov and O.V. Rastrenin reasonably point to another factor that influenced the decrease in the second half of the war of Il-2 losses from fighter attacks - the deterioration, starting from 1944, of the training of German fighter pilots 268 . However, the importance of this factor should not be exaggerated. In January 1945, skillfully using surprise attacks, the Messerschmitts operating in the sky of Hungary destroyed from 14.2 to 18% of the attack aircraft that were available in the 17th Air Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on January 1 (53 out of 372 aircraft fell victim to "Messers" for sure, and 14 - the causes of death of which remained unknown - presumably) 269. “There were a lot of our fighters in the air,” recalls G.G. Cherkashin, who fought then in the 672nd assault aviation regiment of the 306th assault air division, but the Germans “caught the moment, jumped out of the clouds, cut off from the extreme groups and shot down” 270 . According to veterans, in the 154th Guards Assault Aviation Regiment of the 307th Assault Aviation Division of the 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the end of the war, there were even more losses from fighters than from anti-aircraft guns.
The Il-2 aircraft (attack aircraft) is a combat vehicle of the times of the Great Patriotic War, which is very famous for its combat exploits when destroying the enemy. The designer of this machine is Sergey Ilyushin, who has been developing this model since 1938. This aircraft model was often called a flying tank, because it had excellent armor, which was too tough for the enemy.
Description of the Il-2 aircraft (attack aircraft)
IL-2 was the most famous combat unit of the skies during the Great Patriotic War, both among ours and among the enemy troops. At that time, not a single army in the world had even a miserable semblance of such an attack aircraft. It was specialized for flying at low altitudes and at the same time had an invulnerable armored shell. Its main task was to destroy enemy manpower and tanks.
In our country, in the early 1930s, active development of an attack aircraft with an armored fuselage began. The predecessors of the Il-2 aircraft were heavy armored attack aircraft, which are known under the brand names TSh-1,2 and 3. The main task of the designers was to manufacture armor that could not violate the aerodynamic properties of the aircraft.
The first TSh models had bent pieces of armor that were not streamlined enough, and as a result, this led to a deterioration in the aircraft's flight properties, and at the same time they had a lot of weight. Also, in the first models of this attack aircraft, low-power engines were used, which led to low speed and high acceleration when lifted off the ground. The solution to this problem was the installation of more powerful engines and the use of a new type of armor, which was biconvex. These modifications made it possible at the end of the thirties to produce a real and high-quality attack aircraft under the name Il-2.
The predecessor of the first IL-2 was the armored attack aircraft BSh-2, which had two seats in the cockpit for a pilot and a machine gunner. Bsh-2 was also developed by Ilyushin's design bureau in 1938, this aircraft was equipped with sheet armor. This type of armor was also used in the Il-2 aircraft. It should be noted that the first Ilov models were made with wooden hull parts, these were the fuselage wing consoles and the tail wing.
Design features of the Il-2 attack aircraft
The chassis in this attack aircraft folded back, and then retracted into the wing body, after which they were closed with fairings for better aerodynamics. As for weapons, then the designers approached quite thoughtfully. Airborne armament was installed in the inner part of the wing, and guide devices for rockets were installed under the wing of the attack aircraft. Due to the armor and the installed AM-35 engine, the IL-2 developed a low speed, only up to 400 km / h, and the landing speed was 140 km / h.
When testing the BSh-2 aircraft, the designers decided that the new attack aircraft should be produced in a single version to reduce the weight of the aircraft. After that, a single-seat attack aircraft was built, which showed excellent flight and combat characteristics. This was the very first Il-2 - an attack aircraft with an armored fuselage. In 1941, this aircraft model was put into serial production at many factories.
The Il-2 showed its quality and reliability in the first years of the war, but there were also shortcomings. The biggest flaw was the lack of a machine gunner who could repel attacks from enemy aircraft from the tail. This shortcoming led to heavy losses. An interesting fact is that the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to pilots after ten successful sorties, and not after 100, as usual.
Innovations in the design of the IL-2 (attack aircraft)
In the first months of 1942, the Ilyushin design bureau held a conference to which testers and pilots who were directly related to the new attack aircraft were invited. This conference was convened to share experiences and also to find out how an aircraft behaves in combat. When communicating with the pilots, it became clear that the main problem and disadvantage of the aircraft is the lack of a second seat in the car for the machine gunner. Also, the attention of the designers was paid to the increase in engine power and to increase the cannon caliber.
After this conference, the designers nevertheless returned to the initial two-seat attack aircraft model. Also, the machine gunner was provided with a mobile heavy machine gun, which will help protect the aircraft from enemies from the rear and will increase the range of firepower. Since 1942, the IL-2 began to be produced with a more powerful engine of 1720 horsepower. This made it possible to increase the speed of the aircraft to 420 km / h, and also significantly reduced the length of acceleration for separation, and all this with a mass of more than 6 tons in full combat configuration.
As for the four 20-mm machine guns, their designers also replaced them with large-caliber guns. This attack aircraft was also equipped with cumulative anti-tank bombs. But with all the innovations and upgrades, the wing consoles were still made of wood, and only since 1943 their design and the material used were replaced by more efficient ones.
Due to the addition of a machine gunner's seat, the design of the entire armored hull had to be changed, and the tail fuselage of the aircraft was also changed. After all the adjustments, the mass of the armored hull of the attack aircraft reached 990 kg. All components of the armored hull were tested by shooting. IL-2 was also used in naval battles to destroy ships, and on land it easily destroyed enemy tanks and motorcades. This attack aircraft was used at the front and with the support of our troops in the near rear.
Because of the powerful armor and excellent weapons, this attack aircraft model was called a flying tank. Over the entire period of the aircraft's existence, over 36 thousand armored attack aircraft were produced by the factories of the Soviet Union. Such a huge number of combat vehicles can only compete for leadership with the legendary T-34 tank.
Combat use of the legendary attack aircraft
According to the official data of the Red Army, until 1941, 1.5 thousand aircraft were sent to the front, 1.1 thousand of which were lost Il-2, but most of the losses were not related to combat missions. Many combat units were lost due to unsuccessful maneuvers at low altitudes or due to unsatisfactory weather conditions.
During the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, our army lost more than 23 thousand attack aircraft and over 7.8 thousand pilots. It should be noted that 12 thousand aircraft were lost not in combat conditions. As for the Ils, the statistics say that every 53rd flight was the last for an attack aircraft. As for survivability, it should be noted that among all types of combat aircraft, attack aircraft died most often, despite the fact that they had excellent armor and powerful weapons.
The reason for the heavy losses of Ils was the tactics of warfare, since they flew at low altitude and attracted all the fire of enemy artillery. According to the data of the assault units, the number of non-returning ILs was 3%. But at the same time, one should also take into account the fact that after sorties, half of all returned aircraft had damage from enemy weapons. Sometimes returning attack aircraft could count several hundred holes in the fuselage and wings, but after field repairs such a machine could easily return to combat. At the end of the Great Patriotic War, the army of the Soviet Union had 3289 Il-2 aircraft in service.
Il-2 attack aircraft combat tactics
The main advantage in combat of such an attack aircraft was that it worked at altitudes up to 1 km, and it carried out the main combat activity at an altitude of 20-50 meters. Due to the low flight altitude, Ilu was not afraid of enemy artillery, and his armor easily protected the aircraft from infantry. In turn, the attack aircraft could effectively destroy enemy tanks and manpower. When working at low altitudes, a fairly high speed of the aircraft of 400 km / h was also a plus, which other attack aircraft, which could only accelerate up to three hundred kilometers per hour, could not afford.
After the destruction of ground targets, the IL-2 could easily switch to attacking enemy air targets, which, although they had great speed, did not have such armor and weapons as the Soviet attack aircraft. An interesting fact is the cunning of our pilots, who used the external similarity of Il with a German bomber. Our pilots could attach themselves to the German aircraft, which did not suspect anything, and calmly destroy them.
Il-2 design
IL-2 is a single-engine low-wing aircraft with a mixed design. Its peculiarity is that armor is included in the power circuit of the airframe. She replaced the skin of the middle and forward fuselage and frame. The load-bearing armored hull consists of homogeneous steel armor, it covered the cockpit, engine, some units and radiators (the armored hull on the prototype protected the side gunner). The thickness of the transparent armor of the cab visor is 64 mm. It is capable of withstanding a 7.62 mm armor-piercing bullet from zero range.
There is an erroneous opinion that the Il-2 was originally a two-seater, but on the orders of the military leadership, Ilyushin had to convert the attack aircraft into a single one. Due to the lack of defensive armament of the aircraft, there were heavy losses at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
In fact, the aircraft was originally ordered as a two-seater, but on the initiative of Ilyushin it was converted into a single-seat one. The reason for this was unsatisfactory flight qualities (rate of climb, speed and range), as they did not meet the requirements presented by the Air Force. At the same time, other designers were working on the armored Il-2. In order to save his offspring in the face of fierce competition, Ilyushin developed his single version. He managed to achieve a reduction in the volume of the armored hull by removing the side gunner. In its place was an additional fuel tank, as well as a reservation for the rear centering by weight, which could not but cause criticism, since it greatly worsened the controllability of the car.
Due to the economic mass, the attack aircraft fully met the requirements for speed, and with the help of installing an additional tank, it was possible to achieve the required flight range.
Faced with serious losses of the Il-2 without defensive armament, the Air Force demanded that Ilyushin return the aircraft to a two-seat one, which, in fact, was implemented at the end of 1942. But it was no longer possible to change the armored hull, so the gunner had to be taken out of the armored hull. Its protection is a six-millimeter sheet of armor located on the side of the tail. The protection of the pilot from the rear hemisphere was provided thanks to the transverse armor of the HD, which had a thickness of 12 mm (plus 6 mm armored back).
It is worth noting that the armored hull, which protected both crew members, was received only by the latest modification of the aircraft, namely the Il-10, which began to be mass-produced in 1944.
Armament IL-2
Two guns in the wing consoles (in the main version - 23 mm VYA, initially - 20 mm ShVAK, in the anti-tank series - 37 mm), 45 mm guns were studied
· Two machine guns ShKAS placed on the wings of the aircraft
Containers PTAB, air bombs
Rockets RS-132 and RS-82
· On two-seat versions, a 12.7 mm UTB machine gun was used as a defensive armament.
IL-2 modifications
Produced in both single and double versions. Various design and technological changes were made regularly. For example, at the end of 1941, a wooden tail section with metal stringers was used. Changed weapons, armor.
· IL-2 (single-seat) is a serial modification of the attack aircraft, which does not have a cockpit for the rear gunner. In some parts, due to large combat losses, attempts were made to convert a single-seat aircraft into a two-seat one. In many cases, imitations of the rear gun were created - a dummy installed in the slot in the cockpit.
· IL-2 (double) was a serial modification, which was equipped with UBT and ShKAS machine guns, as well as a gunner's cabin with a lantern. Massively exploited in the later periods of the war.
· IL-2 AM-38F - a serial attack aircraft with a boosted engine, characterized by high takeoff power.
· IL-2 KSS - a serial modification of the IL-2 AM-38F aircraft with exactly the same engine, but boosted, with some design and aerodynamic improvements. Instead of a metal tank, protected fiber gas tanks were used, where after a while most of the small holes were covered with a projector compound that could thicken in the open air. To improve control and stability, a counterbalancer and damping springs were installed in the aircraft.
Il-4 (Il-2 M-82) - an experimental version of the attack aircraft, which had an M-82 engine with good takeoff power, namely 1675 hp.
· IL-2 ShFK-37 - a single-seat version of the attack aircraft, armed with two 37 mm aircraft guns, designed by OKB-15, with an AM-38 engine.
· IL-2 NS-37 was a modification of IL-2 AM-38F. The aircraft was equipped with 37 mm cannons, without rockets, to increase anti-tank properties.
· Il-2 NS-45 - a modification of the Il-2 AM-38f aircraft, which has two NS-45 guns.
· IL-2T - according to unofficial data, the modification was capable of carrying a torpedo, as a result of which the guns had to be sacrificed. Three machine guns remained among the small arms: at the rear gunner and two wing guns. But documents that would confirm the existence of this modification have not been found to this day, although there are numerous aircraft models (in addition, this modification is often used in video games).
The Il-2 aircraft, along with the T-34 tank and Katyusha, became one of the symbols of the Great Patriotic War and victory in it. And for what reason did this happen? Why IL-2? Let's try to figure it out. First of all, the IL-2 turned out to be an extremely effective combat unit, namely, an attack aircraft. The attack aircraft also has another name - a direct support aircraft, which explains its combat mission.
That is, if tactical bombers (for example, Pe-2) aim at objects of different significance and distance from the front, strategic aviation(for example, Pe-8) - an attack on the country's strategic facilities in the depths of its territory, then the IL-2 must participate in the attacks of ground troops, support them, literally “iron” the enemy’s battle formations during the battle, before the battle and after it. In fact, this is flying artillery. The requirements for aircraft of this class are quite peculiar. The main ones are: high firepower, the possibility of pinpoint destruction of ground targets and increased survivability of the aircraft. The IL-2 possessed all these qualities, which is why it became a legend, which, when it appeared over the battlefield, caused a sharp rise in the morale of the Red Army and panic among the German soldiers.
IL-2. A photo.
Now in order. It should be noted that the IL-2 was actually the first aircraft that was designed specifically as an attack aircraft, before that, in all countries of the world, fighters performed this role, on which tons of weapons and armor plates were hung. At the time of the start of work on the Il-2, the Red Army had a military doctrine similar to the German one - to quickly attack, destroy and capture. For such a doctrine, Il-2 class aircraft, along with fighters, were most in demand. Therefore, they took the development of the new aircraft more than seriously and even developed a new aircraft gun specifically for the Il-2 - VYa-23.
It was she who, being installed in the amount of two units, to a greater extent determined the combat effectiveness of Ila, since she was an accurate and powerful weapon suitable for destroying everything up to medium tanks and boats. In addition, there were a pair of ShKAS machine guns in service, with a phenomenal rate of fire of 1800 rounds / minute for that time, which simply mowed down the personnel of enemy units. In addition, Il was armed with another relatively “fresh” invention - missiles, in quantities from 4 to 16 pieces, which were called RS-82 or RS-132 (a rocket with a caliber in millimeters). This weapon was less accurate than cannons, but more accurate than bombs, so it took an intermediate place between them.
Well, there was also the possibility of hanging bombs with a caliber of up to 250 kg, which further increased the combat effectiveness of this aircraft. Accordingly, the IL-2 had a very impressive and diverse, and therefore a very effective arsenal, which fully ensured the pinpoint defeat of individual targets.
Now about survivability. The survivability of the aircraft is a parameter that determines the resistance of the aircraft to hits. Simply put, the amount of enemy lead that the aircraft is able to swallow and continue flying. For an attack aircraft, this is an important parameter, because it flies low over the battlefield, at low speeds and traditionally shoots everything that can shoot at it. IL-2 is the first aircraft in the world that had a load-bearing armored hull protecting the pilot and engine; before it, armor plates were simply hung on the aircraft in some places.
IL-2. Video.
Such a design significantly gains in weight compared to simply hanging steel, which means it allows you to increase the amount of armor without compromising the aircraft's flight characteristics. IL-2 had armor that could only be hit by armor-piercing projectiles with a caliber of 20mm or more. But you should not assume that it was impossible to shoot him down with machine-gun fire, because the wings and tail of the car had no armor and were made of wood. But nevertheless, the survivability of the IL-2 was very high, and increased even more due to the high flight performance, in terms of which it was not much inferior to the German Bf-109E.
Not for nothing, after all, in the German ground units, the IL-2 received such nicknames as the "butcher" or "flying tank", these nicknames were well deserved.
IL-2 Sturmovik main characteristics:
- IL-2 modification
- Wingspan, m 14.60
- Length, m 11.60
- Height, m 4.17
- Wing area, m2 38.50
Weight, kg
- empty plane 4525
- normal takeoff 6060
Engine's type:
- 1 PD Mikulin AM-38
Power, hp
- nominal 1 x 1575
- 1 x 1665
Maximum speed, km/h
- near the ground 370
- at height 411
Practical range, km 685
- Rate of climb, m/min 417
- Practical ceiling, m 6000
- Crew, people 2
Armament IL-2 Sturmovik:
- two 20 mm ShVAK cannons (210 rounds per barrel)
- two 7.62 mm ShKAS machine guns (750 rounds per machine gun)
- one 12.7 mm collar for firing backwards (280 rounds)
- 8 RO-82 and 400 kg of bombs (overload 600 kg).